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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 This dissertation investigates the determinants of interstate political alignment, 
examining why states join others in conflictual or cooperative endeavors and which side 
they take in those situations.  The puzzle it seeks to address is why some states are much 
more likely to gain support than others, and whether the likelihood of such support varies 
on the basis of the issue under dispute and the characteristics of the state itself.  The 
dissertation emphasizes the interests of rulers, particularly in their need to obtain support 
on issues of high salience to them.  The desire for future reciprocation lies at the heart of 
these alignment decisions.  First, leaders consistently reciprocate positive and negative 
alignments, rarely changing sides in consecutive conflicts. Second, rulers avoid positively 
aligning with leaders of unstable or politically unrepresentative states, as the latter are 
less likely to be in a position to return the favor. After providing a general explanation of 
alignment, the dissertation demonstrates that not all alignments are created equal. The 
willingness of rulers to reciprocate is contingent on the cost and discernibility of past 
alignment decisions. A ruler who provided unambiguous support to another and paid a 
large price for doing so can expect future support more readily than someone who did 
not.  I test the theory in three chapters, two quantitative and one qualitative.  In the 
former, the hypotheses relating to reciprocation and regime characteristics are tested on a 
new dataset consisting of all potential interventions into existing wars, MIDs, and 
sanctions. The qualitative chapter consists of a case study of the former Soviet Union 
from 1991 to the present, and attempts to determine whether alignment decisions made 
by those states were for reasons specified in the alignment theory. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
In December 2001, British Prime Minister Tony Blair received a phone call from 
US President George W. Bush.  The phone call was not unexpected: the two leaders had 
been working closely together in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, 
coordinating their assault against Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan.  By December of 
2001, the Taliban was all but routed.  The topic of the conversation, however, was not 
Afghanistan, but rather Iraq.  President Bush wanted to know Britain’s position on a 
possible attempt to topple Saddam Hussein, the long-time ruler of Iraq.  Prime Minister 
Blair replied that “if [regime change] became the only way of dealing with this issue, we 
2 
 
[are] going to be up for that.”1  This scene would replay itself in Canberra, Rome, Tbilisi, 
Bangkok, and several dozen other world capitals.  Scarcely a decade later, the phones 
rang once again in many of the same capitals.  The US was still asking friendly states to 
pursue hostile action against another country.  The topic, however, had changed.  The 
target was no longer Iraq, but Iran.  The preferred form of alignment was not war, but 
sanctions.  Figures 1-1 and 1-2 illustrate the extent of support for the US-led efforts. 
Figure 1.1.  2003 Coalition Against Iraq         Figure 1.2.  US-led Coalition Against Iran 
*red = part of US-led coalition; blue = in open opposition to US-led coalition 
There are two unmistakable patterns in the maps, both of which relate to the 
questions this dissertation seeks to address.  The first is the sheer similarity of the US 
alignment partners.  The three states that sent combat troops to Iraq – the United 
Kingdom, Australia, and Poland – have all levied sanctions against Iran.  The same is true 
for most states that eventually contributed troops to the Iraq war-effort.  Looking at it 
from another angle, not one country that sent troops to Iraq in 2003 has openly come out 
against the Iranian sanctions.  Hence, the first question that is dealt with by this 
dissertation is whether each form of alignment – wars, militarized disputes, sanctions, etc. 
                                                 
 
1 The quote is part of an unreleased telephone conversation between the two leaders, confirmed by Prime 
Minister Blair at a public inquiry into the events preceding the 2003 Iraq War (Norton-Taylor 2011). 
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– has its own unique causes, as implied by nearly all the quantitative literature – or 
whether there is something fundamentally similar between all multi-party alignments. 
The second pattern that can be discerned from the maps is the magnitude of 
support for the US.  Despite being considerably stronger than Iraq and Iran, the United 
States was far more likely to obtain positive than negative alignment.  Even the 
opponents of US sanctions against Iran have not gone so far as to impose retaliatory 
sanctions against the US or its supporters.  The depth of pro-American support is no less 
striking.  The support came from the Americas, Western Europe, Southeast Asia, and 
Australasia.  It came from democracies and autocracies, states rich and poor, old allies 
and countries that have only recently become a target of US attention.  Consequently, the 
second issue that is examined by this dissertation is why anyone would pay the steep 
political and economic cost of joining a conflict in which they were not an original 
participant, and why they would do so on one side and not on the other. 
These questions on the determinants of political alignment2 touch upon some of 
the most fundamental themes in the field of International Relations (IR).  The clearest 
link is to the long-standing debate over the balance of power.  Which states partake in 
balancing coalitions and why is central to that centuries-old argument.  Though not 
couched in the same language, the democratic peace thesis seeks to explain alignment 
behavior on the basis of regime type.  More broadly, theorizing in terms of alignment 
brings together numerous literatures, ranging from writings on war and military interstate 
disputes (MIDs), to voting behavior at the United Nations, to trade disputes.  
                                                 
 
2 Briefly, political alignment is the stance a state takes on a well-defined proposal that is intended to resolve 
a stake over which two or more states have conflicting positions.  The full definition can be found in 
section 1.1 of this dissertation. 
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Conceptually, this research examines the decision by rulers to take sides in concrete 
political disputes, engaging in cooperative or conflictual behavior with other members of 
the international system.  This dissertation aims to show that many manifestations of 
conflict or cooperation are similar and share the same set of causes.  Nevertheless, all 
alignments are not created equal, either in their intent or in their impact. 
Political alignment is not only of theoretical, but also of practical importance.  
Whether we want to know which states will join the United States in leveling sanctions 
against Syria, if a war between Israel and Iran would expand, or which bloc Colombia 
will support in the next round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, a theory 
of political alignment can tell us which factors most strongly affect the political 
calculations of state leaders.  The benefit of utilizing such a theory is that it grants the 
researcher the ability to put themselves in the shoes of a statesman – a point made long 
ago by Hans Morgenthau.  Instead of thinking about the wide array of factors that could 
be responsible for every foreign policy decision, we can contemplate what a ruler wants 
to achieve and how a given action helps them come closer to attaining that objective. 
The issue of alignment is hardly unique to IR.  Congressmen make deals to 
support each other’s bills, political parties enter into governing coalitions, and firms 
pursue strategic alliances with their competitors.  The common denominator in this 
research is the individual agreement on a stake, or alignment, as the unit of analysis.  It 
would be trivial to make common party membership as the starting and ending point of 
research on congressional voting.  Neither would a study about the grand coalition 
between Germany’s Social Democrats and Christian Democrats assume unconditional 
inter-party support across all pieces of legislation, nor use the distribution of power 
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between the parties to explain all votes.  Yet these premises provide the foundation of 
much of the alignment literature, flaws that this study strives to address. 
The disconnect between alignment research in IR and similar studies in other 
fields does not end with the problematic unit of analysis; it is widened by the complete 
disregard for past interactions.  States are assumed to possess certain interests and blindly 
follow them at each point in time.  Allies exist to be used and later tossed aside, while ties 
with former enemies are easily mended.  Whether another state was a reliable or a 
treacherous ally in the past is meant to have no bearing on their likelihood of being 
sought for closer cooperation.  Thus, most alignment theorists would be hard-pressed to 
explain the ambivalent American response to the recent revolt in Bahrain on the one hand 
and the harsh response to Libyan actions on the other. 
More generally, research on alignment has been hampered by two contradictory 
trends in IR.  The early focus on grand theory meant that a narrow set of factors were 
used to predict every possible form of alignment.  States aligned with one another 
because of power or threat, and they did so across all issues.  The recent trend involves a 
shift toward specialization and mid-range theory, leading to islands of marginally-related 
explanations.  Not only are the areas of conflict and cooperation studied in isolation from 
one another, but the concepts of conflict and cooperation themselves fragment into 
numerous narrowly-defined research programs.  The very idea of alignment has been 
subordinated to the investigation of the causes of war, MIDs, crises, military alliances, 
sanctions, UN General Assembly voting, bilateral trade, multilateral trade, foreign aid, 
etc. While this research enriched our understanding of individual expressions of 
alignment, it did so at the cost of generalizability and deductive rigor.  Few statesmen 
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would draw a sharp distinction between the factors influencing their ability or willingness 
to engage in each form of cooperative and conflictual behavior named above, and yet that 
is exactly how those research questions are approached.  Disconnected theories are used 
to explain every cooperative and conflictual form of alignment, and little attention is paid 
to the empirical and theoretical inconsistencies between thematically-similar studies. 
 Even when the concept of alignment is mentioned – rarely as a vital dependent or 
independent variable – it is invoked in mutually incompatible ways, befalling a fate 
similar to that of the balance of power theories that once made up the dominant alignment 
research program.3  Alignment has been used to denote, inter alia, alliance partners, a 
congruence of interests, a shared issue position, and a general foreign policy direction.  
The term itself is never explicitly defined, nor its empirical domain specified.  As a result, 
cross-study comparisons become problematic, and attempting to understand what a given 
author means by alignment becomes a laborious task.    
 These challenges to alignment theory do not lessen the importance of political 
alignment as a source of inquiry.  International politics deeply affect the lives of 
numerous individuals in the world, and alignment decisions underlie all but the simplest 
interactions in the international community.  The effects of alignment range from 
determining the outcomes of wars, to providing leverage in trade disputes, to outlining 
the shape of climate change agreements.4  Romania’s unprovoked entrance into World 
War I cost the country hundreds of thousands of lives.  The Yugoslav coup that ended 
                                                 
 
3 See Haas (1953), Zinnes (1967), and Schroeder (1989) for overviews of the many different, frequently 
contradictory, ways in which the balance of power concept is employed.  The three authors would not be 
pleased to know that many of their warnings about the term’s usage have gone unheeded.   
4 The idea of alignment figures to play a larger role both in and out of academia as the world moves further 
away from Cold War alliance systems, and with it, legalistic conceptions of cooperation (Wilkins 2012). 
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that state’s brief alignment with the Axis Powers in World War II led to a military 
confrontation and brutal occupation that killed a total of a million Yugoslav citizens.   
 Non-military alignments have also entered the annals of human history, for 
reasons good and bad.  The decision to resolve the post-World War II German issue by 
forming a European Coal and Steel Community – eventually giving rise to the European 
Union – led to economic stability and an unbroken cycle of peace.  The use of reparations 
to punish Germany in the wake of the First World War contributed to German economic 
stagnation and the rise of nationalist parties, the German Nazi Party among them. 
 Humanity is affected not just by alignments that were made, but also ones that 
were not.  The reluctance of Austria-Hungary to get involved in the Franco-Prussian War 
resulted in the creation of a unified German kingdom, subordinating the Dual-Monarchy 
to the new German economic and military behemoth.  The decision by the Soviet Union 
to abstain from participating in the United Nations Security Council during the discussion 
of the Korean crisis led to an expansion of the Korean War.   
A theory of alignment has the prospect of not only explaining political decisions, 
but to also add to the cumulation of knowledge in IR by bridging several literatures that 
at their core deal with alignment decisions.  There is an abundance of research on the 
determinants of war, MIDs, sanctions, foreign aid, and UN voting.  Many of these works 
make strong theoretical and empirical contributions, but, in treating their own subject 
matter as self-contained, do not adequately engage with related research.  A theory of 
alignment would provide a framework for showing how these studies are linked, allowing 
for greater synthesis between these thematically-related areas of research.   
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1.1 Definitions 
A theory of alignment first requires a definition of alignment and the specification 
of its theoretical domain.  Given the lack of consensus in the field as to how the term is 
defined, I start with the dictionary definition.  According to Merriam-Webster, to align is 
“to array on the side of or against a party or cause” (“Align”).  One implication of this 
definition is that to align with one side also means aligning against another.  There could 
be two or more sides, and they do not have to be equally balanced, but there needs to be 
at least one actor on each side. 
For practical purposes, the domain of the theory is restricted to stakes on which 
there is some disagreement between two or more other states, or what might be termed 
third-party alignment.  One can conceivably operationalize any agreement between two 
or more states as an instance of positive alignment and any disagreement as negative 
alignment.  This would, unfortunately, broaden the concept to unwieldy proportions, 
making virtually any inter-state activity fall within the domain of the term.  One could 
also allow for alignment between state and non-state actors or between multiple non-state 
actors.  This would first require a pre-theory as to which non-state actors are important, 
what their preferences are, and how they interact with each other and with states.  Such a 
pre-theory would be a significant contribution to the field of IR, but is outside the 
purview of the present study.  Therefore, I require at least one state on opposite sides of 
an issue position before an alignment can be made.  If a state does not take an explicit 
position, then it is considered non-aligned. 
The next step is to adapt the term to IR through the prism of the issue paradigm 
on which the alignment theory is based.  Though they do not explicitly define it, 
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Mansbach and Vasquez (1981, 236) refer to an agreement/disagreement aspect of conflict 
and cooperation, which provides the theoretical basis for the alignment concept used 
here.  Those who agree to a concrete resolution of a stake are said to have a shared issue 
position.5  An issue position is a position an actor takes toward a specific attempt to 
resolve a stake (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981, 188).  Issue positions are distinct from 
stakes, which are objects of value that actors attempt to obtain (Mansbach and Vasquez 
1981, 74), and issues, which are a number of interrelated stakes.   
The proposal to settle a stake does not have to be limited to a written declaration, 
as the term might suggest.  The proposals can include a declaration of war, an imposition 
of sanctions, or a promise to support certain clauses in a multilateral treaty.  The common 
element is the presence of a clear action or a promise of a future action that is intended to 
aid or hinder another state or group of states.  This definition rules out vague 
announcements of support or opposition, and declarations on topics that have no obvious 
solutions, like ambiguous peace processes or opposition to a rising state’s power.  
There are large extant literatures on specific forms of alignments, other than those 
already mentioned.  The closest connection between the concept of alignment and its 
manifestations is one relating to formal alliances, which is covered more thoroughly in 
the theory chapter.  As the alliance literature makes clear, there is a substantial number of 
                                                 
 
5 This definition is also consistent with Sullivan’s (1972, 115) view of informal alignment, which he 
defines as the tendency for two nations to share a common conflict object.  The theory of alignment 
proposed here does not explicitly differentiate between formal and informal alignments as long as the 
alignment is entered into publicly.  The latter component would rule secret agreements as a source of 
alignment, as the causal mechanism of the theory requires domestic and international actors to be aware of 
an alignment’s existence.  To the extent that the alignment theory differentiates between formal and 
informal alignments, it is that the formal ones tend to be costlier to ratify and to implement, which makes 
them more valued than alignments in the lower cost categories.  See section 1.4 for more detail. 
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reasons for entering into alliances, and those alliances serve a multitude of different 
purposes.  A country might ally with someone in order to improve its military capacity, to 
deter an attack, or to gain influence over the new ally’s foreign policy decision-making 
process.  They might also form alliances whose requirements rest anywhere on a 
spectrum that includes consultation to jointly planning an attack on a third state. What 
makes any of these alliances a form of alignment is that there is a specific promise to act 
in an agreed-upon manner once certain conditions are in place, and it is explicitly or 
implicitly directed against a specific threat.  In cases where there is no clear target, it 
would be reasonable to still consider the act a type of alignment.  Nevertheless, one of the 
purposes of the scientific enterprise is to group phenomena that are similar.  An 
agreement on a stake that has no party on the other side would operate based on a 
different logic to the alignments discussed throughout this dissertation and will therefore 
not be considered an instance of alignment for the purpose of theory or empirical testing. 
Membership in international institutions creates the same quandary. Joining some 
institutions is a sign of supporting some states and opposing others.  This is clearest in the 
case of institutionalized multilateral alliances, like NATO and the Warsaw Pact.  One can 
also view membership in certain economic institutions as a method for minimizing 
another country’s influence over one’s economy, with membership in the WTO being a 
primary example.  More recently, we have witnessed Ukraine lose a piece of its territory 
and face the prospect of an all-out invasion over its decision to sign an association 
agreement with one economic bloc over another.  On the other hand, membership in 
many institutions, especially economic ones, is not remotely controversial from an 
international perspective, and would not be considered a form of alignment here.   
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Although alignment decisions are generally viewed as being purposive, the 
definition of alignment used here does not make this a requirement.  Leaders of one state 
might have the same issue position as those of another because they want something from 
the latter or because both happen to desire the same resolution to a stake.  In practice, 
determining whether a specific alignment is purposive or incidental is a futile exercise.  
Attempting to directly ascertain the motives for these decisions is counter-productive and 
requires making the kind of judgments that political scientists are ill-equipped to make.   
 Given the above considerations, I define political alignment as a shared issue 
position, composed of three interrelated components.  To be positively aligned, two or 
more states must be in agreement on a concrete proposal or action that is intended to 
resolve a specific stake or dispute.  Conversely, states can be negatively aligned if they 
find themselves on different sides of a stake, or they can be nonaligned if they are not a 
party to that stake’s resolution.  Due to theoretical and practical concerns, the domain of 
this dissertation is limited to multi-party alignments, involving at least three states.   
1.2 Contributions 
 The main contribution of this dissertation is the creation of a falsifiable, issue-
based theory of interstate political alignment.  The importance of falsifiability is self-
evident: hypotheses that cannot be disproven provide little value to the scientific 
enterprise (Popper 1963).  Contrary to Popper’s notion of science, the theory here is 
probabilistic.  Factors hypothesized to affect alignment decisions set constraints on state 
rulers.  Regardless of the degree of those constraints, the rulers are free to ignore them, 
albeit at a high price.  Some leaders are very risk-acceptant.  Some might be concerned 
about their legacy.  Others might have preferences that are wildly at odds with the needs 
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of their country.  In yet other states, multiple actors have claim to their state’s foreign 
policy, complicating efforts at a coherent foreign policy.  Even with these disclaimers, the 
proposed theory can be considered falsified if its key hypotheses fail standard tests of 
statistical significance or do not have a substantive effect on alignment decisions. 
 Part of what makes the proposed theory falsifiable is the use of concrete 
alignment decisions as the unit of analysis.  Many previous studies of alignment have 
been plagued by the ambiguity of what was being investigated.  The most problematic of 
those studies equated alignment with a general foreign policy direction of a country.  The 
flaw with that line of inquiry is that the key determination – namely the direction of a 
country’s foreign policy – is incredibly subjective.  One can point to different alignment 
decisions to argue that country X was either pro-country Y or anti-country Y.  Using 
specific alignment decisions minimizes the role of subjectivity.   
 The second major contribution of this dissertation is the amalgamation of multiple 
IR literatures, including those on war onset and war joining, militarized interstate dispute 
(MID) onset and joining, sanction onset, reciprocation, and the democratic peace.  Each 
of the literatures views its particular type of alignment as the dependent variable, 
overlooking not only foreign policy substitutability, but also the similar impact of these 
alignments on future foreign policy decisions.  A theory of MID onset might control for 
past MIDs – which make future MIDs more likely – but not past sanctions or alliances.  
The resulting omitted variable bias leads to incorrect estimates of regression perimeters. 
 If the goal of IR research is the cumulation of knowledge, then the field will 
advance by breaking down artificial boundaries between the study of various forms of 
cooperation and conflict.  Treating each form of alignment as a separate field for 
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investigation would makes sense only if the underlying data-generating process – 
statesmen making foreign policy decisions – operated under the same logic.  That is 
clearly not the case.  Rulers do not view each act of cooperation or conflict in isolation 
from other such acts just because the latter are of a different form.  The sanction regime 
imposed by the United Nations on Iraq in the 1990s was not put into place because of 
Iraq’s past sanctions-related behavior, but rather because of actions that would currently 
be covered by separate IR literatures: interstate wars, civil wars, and human rights abuses. 
 One way that this dissertation integrates some of the IR literatures is by creating a 
measure of alignment.  Unlike earlier attempts at issue typologies, this measure is not 
based on the theoretically indefensible distinction between economic and military issues.  
Instead, it places all alignment forms into a two-dimensional plane.  Each type of 
alignment is classified on the basis of its cost and discernibility – the ease of determining 
whether an alignment was directed for or against a specific state.  Being an early joiner to 
a multi-party war would be a costly and discernible alignment.  With a few exceptions, a 
UN General Assembly vote would be neither costly nor discernible.   
 The third contribution of this dissertation is the introduction of a new alignment 
dataset.  Previous studies that explicitly used alignment as the outcome to be explained 
relied on a qualitative research design.  Quantitative studies of the subject limit 
themselves to explaining one form of alignment, which precludes a direct comparison of 
their results.  The dataset used here combines four forms of alignment for which data is 
widely available.  The closest design to this dataset is utilized by the war 
joining/expansion literature.  This group of datasets is coded in a manner to allow states 
to join the original disputants.  What the datasets do not do is allow states to join disputes 
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on the side of states that were not initial parties to the dispute.  The former design would 
attempt to explain Brazil’s joining of World War II with reference to the country’s 
relationship with Germany and Poland, the first two states involved in that conflict.   
The dataset used in this dissertation instead allows states to join any dyadic 
conflict, including ones composed of joiners.  Thus, Brazil is coded as not only able to 
join the Germany-Poland dispute, but also the Germany-US one, among others.6  This 
provides for a more realistic picture of the decisions leaders face: they know that taking 
an issue position affects their relationship with every other state that takes a stance on the 
same issue.  In the First Gulf War, Israel was convinced by the US not to join the conflict 
precisely because it would dissuade Arab states, including those that strongly disliked the 
Iraq leadership, from entering the war on the Israeli-American side.    
1.3 Theoretical Overview 
At the heart of the political process is the desire of state leaders to maximize value 
from the resolution of issues that are most salient to them.  In order to succeed at this 
objective, rulers have to leverage their control of a limited set of resources for the 
purpose of resolving issues that those resources are ill-equipped to settle.  A leader of a 
militarily weak but prosperous state might need military assistance against an aggressive 
neighbor.  A ruler of a militaristic state might need aid in keeping afloat their country’s 
economy.  The key to maximizing value is interstate political alignment; by aligning with 
                                                 
 
6 While determining which state someone wanted to align with would require comprehensive historical 
knowledge, even ignoring cases where a historical consensus does not exist, the effect of an alignment is 
not entirely based on this intention.  That is, joining a dispute in order to aid country X nevertheless 
generates hostility with country Y, the recipient of the negative version of alignment.  By not allowing 
states to align with anyone but the original participants, one assumes up front what one intends to prove.   
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states that are likely to be in a position to help them in the future, leaders are able to use 
their strengths to overcome their weaknesses. 
Alignment, at least of the costly variety, is not for everyone.  Leaders need to 
have sufficient resources to help another state resolve their dispute, and they must gain 
domestic support – whether from elites or the public – for their involvement.  The former 
provides a possible explanation for the end of the Cold War: the collapse of the Soviet 
and the succeeding Russian economies reduced the amount of resources available to 
Soviet and Russian leaders, preventing them from pursuing any alignments, whether 
against the US or any other state.  An implication is that once the Russian economy 
recovered, as it did in the 2000s, relations between Russia and the US would degenerate.   
The domestic support requirement entails a connection to the disputants, whether 
good or bad.  Rulers need to justify their expenditures on international causes, which is 
where a historical link plays a role.  Victims of another state’s hostility or benefactors of 
their largesse find it in their interest persuade the public of the necessity of intervention.  
By highlighting events the public is aware of, these groups can help a leader justify a 
potentially expensive involvement in the other country’s disputes.  Thus, European states 
with weak ties to India and Pakistan steer clear of conflicts between the two rivals.   
When leaders do have the domestic and external capacity to get involved in the 
resolution of someone else’s issue, they do so either as a form of repayment for past 
services or as a down payment toward a future alignment.  Repaying and courting 
reciprocation are thus a crucial motivation for many alignment decisions.  A related 
factor is the bilateral history of conflict and cooperation between the states.  A failure to 
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support a friend or to oppose an enemy carries with it enormous domestic costs; both risk 
incensing domestic constituencies that favor the maintenance of the status quo. 
If gaining future support is the sina qua non for present alignment decisions, then 
the perception that future aid will not be forthcoming would be extremely detrimental to a 
state seeking to procure alignment.  It follows that markers of unreliability, whether 
institutional or behavioral, would prevent rulers from being able to obtain alignment.  
Autocracies are especially vulnerable to being designated as unreliable due to the real 
risk of the regime being replaced with one that is chosen by a completely different 
selectorate or being forced to incorporate factions in the government that are hostile to 
the previous foreign policy direction.  This logic is arguably the main reason that Iraq and 
Iran – both unrepresentative autocracies – have had such poor luck in obtaining support. 
The domestic and international contexts of rulers contemplating alignment also 
play a role in alignment decisions.  Leaders that are desperate for international support – 
whether the salient issue they want to resolve has a domestic or international origin – 
gravitate toward states that are best positioned to help them.  They also avoid 
antagonizing states that have an asymmetrical advantage against them.  The former helps 
explain Uzbekistan’s turn toward Russia in the wake of the Andijan massacre.  The latter 
does the same for Kazakhstan’s pro-Russian line. 
The reciprocal alignment theory presented here generally predicts lengthy cycles 
of cooperation or similar cycles of conflict.  Empirically, that type of behavior is 
frequent, but not constant.  To explain change, the theory looks to the generation of new 
salient issues and domestic changes.  As old issues are resolved or are otherwise removed 
from the agenda, the rationale for a continuation of past foreign policy behavior weakens.  
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New issues can provide the impetus for a radical rethinking of foreign policy.  
Domestically, as the selectorate of a country undergoes transformation or instability 
changes the relative importance of various issues, the maintenance of old foreign ties 
becomes less of a priority. Finally, alignments are not equally effective in guaranteeing 
future support; alignment decisions are affected by the cost and discernibility of previous 
alignments, factors that provide a basis for the newly-created measure of alignment. 
1.4 Alignment Measure 
 One of the contributions of this study is the creation of an alignment measure, 
which places each form of alignment on two dimensions: cost and discernibility.  The 
advantage of using a formal measure instead of using imprecise, unranked categories, like 
“military”, “economic”, and “political” is that it avoids having to classify complex issues 
into neat boxes.  Instead of making an arbitrary decision as to whether sanctions against 
Iran are economic or political, or whether a vote in the UN GA can be deemed military if 
it calls for military action, a measure provides an a priori rationale for placing each 
alignment in a specific part of the measure relative to other forms of alignment.  
 The cost part of alignment deals with the price a leader must pay in order to 
pursue alignment on a particular policy.  That cost could be domestic, such as when a 
ruler needs to persuade a key constituency to adopt their preferred position.  It could be 
entirely external, when their state becomes a target for international retaliation.  Or the 
cost could come from both elements.  The cost a leader is prepared to pay to align is 
proportional to the benefit they expect to receive or have already received.  For example, 
Australia has partaken in many US wars because of a perceived need for American 
military assistance in the future.  On the other hand, a lower cost alignment can arise 
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from many sources, making it difficult to predict.  Those reasons can range from a desire 
to voice one’s normative views to not being able to afford a costlier form of alignment. 
 Another way to conceive of the cost dimension is to consider the depth and 
duration of an alignment decision.  The more expansive the cooperation or the conflict 
arising from the alignment, the greater the sacrifices that must be made by the pertinent 
ruler.  Gaining domestic support for a one-off weapons shipment to a country requires 
substantially less effort than arranging wide-ranging military cooperation.  Similarly, an 
alignment over an issue that appears and disappears within weeks is qualitatively 
different than one entailing long-term involvement.  This would be the difference 
between a ruler condemning Syria’s use of chemical weapons and a ruler actively 
involved in getting Syria to destroy those type of weapons. 
Discernibility refers to the ease with which other states can know whether a third 
state expressly aligned with or against them.  If Canada is one of over a dozen states to 
send troops against Iraq in 1991, Saddam Hussein could not be certain whether the 
Canadian intervention was a part of Canadian hostility toward his state or whether 
Canada was merely supporting the United States.  When two states find themselves on 
the same side of a vote on a UN resolution, they cannot know whether this alignment was 
a purposive attempt to take the same side or whether it only reflects common interests, a 
problem that pertains to Congressional voting.  This lack of clarity makes indiscernible 
alignments less valuable to the original disputant, but can also serve as a hedge against ill 
will and retaliation.  When a leader sees some value in a relationship with a state they feel 
pressured to intervene against, they nevertheless have an incentive to make the 
intervention as indiscernible as possible, making it easier to mend relations in the future. 
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1.5 Dissertation Plan 
 The current chapter of the dissertation provided an overview of political 
alignment – including its precise definition – demonstrated the importance of the topic, 
and offered a concise account of an issue-based theory of alignment.  Each of the 
succeeding chapters in this dissertation builds upon the concepts presented thus far, and 
tests the new explanation of alignment and its theoretical implications in both a 
quantitative and qualitative manner. 
 Chapter 2 reviews the dominant theories of alignment, showing how the 
conception of alignment has changed over time, with each change giving rise to a richer 
understanding of alignment but also spawning new shortcomings.  Chapter 2 will begin 
by tracing the evolution of alignment theories from the 1600s to the modern period.  
After deriving some lessons from this classical canon, the chapter analyzes the capability 
research program, with its derivative balancing and bandwagoning schools of thought.  
The next section of Chapter 2 deals with the homophily research program, incorporating 
social field theory and theories of the democratic peace.  The last set of theories 
examined is concerned with the regime security basis of alignment.  The chapter does not 
end with a review of the aforementioned theories; instead, it seeks to utilize the 
contributions and shortfalls of the existing frameworks to create a list of necessary 
components for a sounder theory of political alignment. 
 Chapter 3 starts with the basic question, “what is a social scientific theory”?  
After tentatively answering that question and indicating what a theory of the social sphere 
can hope to explain, Chapter 3 derives basic tenets of alignment from the broader issue 
paradigm.  This is followed by a list of assumptions that are necessary for the ensuing 
20 
 
theory to work, along with justifications for those assumptions.  Chapter 3 then lays out 
the theory of reciprocal alignment, focusing on the factors that affect the propensity of 
statesmen to get involved in other states’ disputes, and the impulses underlying their 
decision to pick a particular side.  The chapter also shows how an alignment measure can 
be derived from the issue paradigm, and illustrates the relevance of this measure to the 
issue-based theory of alignment.  The last portion of the chapter goes through testable 
implications of the theory.  It provides a list of hypotheses on the basis of the reciprocal 
alignment and competing theories, which are all tested in future chapters. 
 The ensuing four chapters seek to empirically test the proposed theory.  Chapter 4 
comprises the research design.  In this chapter, a strategy is put forth to turn theoretical 
expectations into falsifiable hypotheses.  This entails a discussion of the alignment 
dataset, methods that are appropriate in light of the theory and dataset, and a justification 
for the operationalization of the dependent and independent variables.  Chapter 5 tests the 
main propositions from the alignment theory.  Using war joining as the main outcome 
variable, I test hypotheses relating to dyadic history, reciprocation, and the reliability of 
alignment partners.  This is buttressed by the examination of context-specific 
determinants of alignment, and possible causes of breaks in alignment patterns.  Chapter 
6 continues with the quantitative testing of the theory by adding variation in the cost and 
discernibility of the alignment options.  The chapter aims to demonstrate the importance 
of not treating all forms of alignment uniformly.  The dependent variables in this chapter 
include the order of joining a war, the order of joining a militarized dispute, and the 
number of supporters of a sanction regime.  
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 Chapter 7 continues the testing of the alignment theory by providing a qualitative 
test.  The drawback of quantitative tests is that they are not able to fully integrate the 
complex set of relationships states enjoy with one another, and can only deal with 
widely-recorded forms of alignments, such as conflicts and formal alliances.  Chapter 7 
aims to address these concerns with the aid of an extensive case-study, using the method 
of congruence coupled with limited process-tracing, covering several non-European 
Union members of the former Soviet Union (FSU) from their independence in 1991 to 
the present.  This chapter examines not only whether dyadic history factors are positively 
associated with positive alignment, but also whether those exact factors were responsible 
for driving the alignment decisions. 
 Chapter 8 serves as the conclusion.  The chapter begins by tying the proposed 
theory to the Iraq and Iran examples mentioned earlier in this chapter.  It then 
summarizes the main findings, before deriving several policy implications from the 
theory.  Lastly, I talk about possible extensions of the reciprocal alignment theory and 
steps that could be taken to further test the existing hypotheses.   
 This dissertation has many objectives, but its primary one is to change the focus 
of alignment theories from one emphasizing general, untestable patterns to one more 
interested in uncovering the determinants of visible, quantifiable decisions.  Through the 
use of analysis, theory, and data, I hope to change the way this topic is thought and 
written about.  I provide a theory of political alignment, and not the theory of the same 
name, leaving room for the examination of other aspects of this important concept, 
including, but not limited to, an explanation of alignment’s effects.   
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
The extant literature on alignment is as varied as it is wide-ranging.  The 
questions “who aligns,” “on what issues,” and “why” rarely receive the same responses 
across different studies.  Nevertheless, there are sufficient similarities between those 
studies to divide them into three research programs, each basing its explanation of 
alignment around one central concept: capabilities, homophily, and regime security.7  For 
reasons that will become apparent, the three programs are generally tested in distinctive 
temporal or spatial domains: capabilities in Western Europe, homophily in the post-
World War I and/or post-World War II era, and regime security in the third world.  Given 
the heavy emphasis on qualitative work in all but the homophily research program, these 
differences in empirical domains likely play a fundamental role in selecting the factors 
each program underlines as being the dominant causes of political alignment. 
2.1 Capabilities Research Program 
The first, and by far the largest, group of alignment theories is centered on the 
role of material capabilities – or power, as they are usually called – whether actual or 
perceived.  These theories, commonly operating from a realist framework, assume that 
states exist in a condition of anarchy and are concerned with matters of security and 
power (Morgenthau 1978).  States are then expected to make their alignment choices with 
the object of accumulating capabilities or thwarting someone else, usually a potential 
hegemon, from doing the same.  Other factors are ignored or downplayed, except when 
                                                 
 
7 Theories of reciprocation, developed predominantly by neoliberal institutionalists, will also be examined.   
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they are used to explain away anomalies.  In these cases, either insidious interest groups 
(Mearsheimer and Walt 2007) or irrational leaders (Waltz 1988) are blamed for ignoring 
the “national interest” and furthering goals other than “national security”.   
The capability research program can be split into bandwagoning and balancing 
explanations, with the latter further sub-divided into a plethora of objects that states 
might balance against.  The balancing school, whose main claim is that states align 
against anyone seeking hegemony, is the more popular of the two and has a stronger 
pedigree.  It traces its intellectual roots to late 16th-early 17th century Europe, when the 
concept was given shape by Francis Bacon of England (Little 1989, 89), Hugo Grotius of 
the Dutch Republic (Hoard 1925, 262), and Alberico Gentili of what is now Italy (Vagts 
and Vagts 1979, 559).8  Balancing became an explicit objective of European great powers 
with the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 (Bull 1977, 35), and was likely a 
reaction to Spanish and French attempts to create a universal monarchy over the previous 
century (Boucoyannis 2007, 713).   
Then, as now, the balance of power concept was the victim of the twin problems 
of lack of precision and political misuse.  While some did conceive of the term as 
entailing opposition to the mighty, the balance of power was also used to denote a just 
equilibrium, which was based not on opposition to a potential hegemon, but rather on 
great powers respecting each other’s boundaries and working together to prevent 
unnecessary conflict (Little 1989, 92; Schroeder 1989, 144).  In terms of using force for 
                                                 
 
8 Though a rough idea of balancing was mentioned by Chanakya over two millennia ago, and was talked 
about in Italian courts in the 15th century (Maurseth 1964, 120), it did not have a clear meaning or 
justification at the time.  For instance, Machiavelli, who was writing at the turn of the 16th century, was 
concerned with Italian unification, not balancing against hegemonic pretenders (Boucoyannis 2007, 712). 
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the purpose of preventing hegemony, balancing was generally associated with the foreign 
policy of a single state – England.  Fearing that a continental hegemon would create a 
powerful armada and subjugate the British Isles, England consistently strove to weaken 
the strongest power in continental Europe (Vattel qtd. in Gellman 1989, 159); England, 
and later Britain, was thus the “holder of the balance” (Bacon qtd. in Maurseth 1964, 123; 
Morgenthau 1978, 352).  To speak of balancing as a law of politics would be to equate 
the English foreign policy with the foreign policy of the world.  Moreover, English 
balancing was limited to Europe (Sheehan 1989, 128) – likely because that was the only 
continent where it did not enjoy supremacy (Pollard 1923, 61) – and Britain hedged its 
bets when dealing with powerful continental foes, such as Napoleon (Rosecrance and Lo 
1996) and Hitler (Trachtenberg 2003, 189), attacking only when all other options failed.9 
The clarity of the balancing concept is further muddled by the ways in which it 
was deliberately misemployed, frequently by English statesmen and jurists – a point 
made repeatedly by Carr (1939).  In essence, a balance was any distribution of 
capabilities that favored the country that claimed a balance was in place.  Hence, Britain 
in the 1880s spoke of an equilibrium in the Mediterranean that really signified British 
dominance (Schroeder 1989, 140).  A few decades earlier, German and Italian 
nationalists claimed that destroying lesser German and Italian states for the purpose of 
unification would promote the European balance (Schroeder 1989, 139).  According to 
the latter interpretation, a balance undermined the very object it was meant to protect. 
                                                 
 
9 This is not to say that Britain did not prepare for war with those states, including by engaging in costly 
arms races, but it did not strike the targets preemptively.   
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Modern IR scholars have attempted to increase the precision of balance of power 
theory, not always successfully.  Balancing theorists claim that alignment is guided by 
the desire to align against the strongest or most threatening state, and assume that such 
balancing is always in a state’s interest.  In a system characterized by anarchy – defined 
as a lack of a world government – each state must ensure its own security (Mearsheimer 
1990).  This leads rational states to care exclusively about their relative power.  States 
cannot afford to subordinate their interests to the interests of sub-national groups; nor is 
there room for friction between domestic groups that might have a different interpretation 
of the national interest (Grieco 1997).  When the use of force is always an option and 
there is no actor to punish aggression, the only way states can survive is to prevent the 
rise of a hegemon.  The existence of even a benevolent hegemon cannot be tolerated, 
because it is impossible to know whether the hegemon will remain benevolent (Walt 
1985, 5).  It follows that any state wishing to preserve its security must align against any 
state in a position to seek hegemony.  Not only does joining the weaker side prevent a 
state from being dominated in the future, it gives that weaker state more influence over its 
allies – resulting from its meaningful contribution to the coalition (Walt 1985, 6).   
 The balancing framework does allow for exceptions.   Scholars within this school 
assert that the polarity of the international system affects the efficiency of the balancing 
process (Christensen and Snyder 1990, 140).  A multipolar system, denoting the 
existence of more than two great powers, is said to be more inefficient due to a higher 
potential for miscalculations of relative power and opponent’s resolve (Mearsheimer 
1990, 14).  States that are weak (Walt 1985, 17) or in a geographically disadvantageous 
position (Mearsheimer 1990, 15) might find it difficult to balance.  Unit-level variables 
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are added into the equation.  States possessing nuclear weapons find it unnecessary to 
balance owing to their security being ensured (Waltz 1993, 53).  Misperception of the 
relative strength of offensive and defensive military technology creates obstacles for 
potential balancing (Christensen 1997).  The balancing policy can also fail due to 
successful strategies pursued by the potential hegemon, such as splitting a potential 
blocking coalition (Crawford 2011) or masking their expansionist intentions 
(Fiammenghi 2011).  Lastly, states can refuse to balance because their rulers are simply 
irrational, meaning that balancing can fail even if all the conditions for it are present 
(Waltz 1997; Mearsheimer 2001, 12).10  This paints a confusing and, to a large degree, 
arbitrary picture of the mechanisms by which balancing is supposed to work.  This 
problem is exacerbated by the existence of two major competing balancing theories. 
 One of the theories, created by Waltz (1979), deals solely with the capabilities of 
potential opponents.  States will generally align against the most powerful state in terms 
of material power; some might not, but for that, they will pay a price.11  The potential 
hegemon need not be hostile or provocative.  The very possibility of aggression when 
combined with the high probability of the potential hegemon’s victory forces every 
rational ruler to balance as a way to ensure their state’s survival.   
Walt (1985) offered an alternative theory, hypothesizing that states align against 
those that threaten them most, with aggregate material power being only one aspect of a 
potential threat.12  Thus, a powerful state can avert balancing coalitions against itself by 
                                                 
 
10 Interestingly, many of these scholars have argued for decades that the United States did not follow the 
dictums of balance of power theory (Payne 2007), a rather large anomaly for a theory concerned 
predominantly with the behavior of a handful of the most powerful countries in the world.      
11 For that reason, Waltz (1997, 915) argues his theory cannot be falsified by a lack of balancing behavior. 
12 The other elements of threat are proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intentions (Walt 1985, 9). 
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behaving non-threateningly on the international stage.  Neither Walt’s balance of threat 
theory nor Waltz’ neorealism are applied consistently, however.  A major proponent of 
Waltz’ theory, Layne (1993, 45) argues that other states will balance against the US if it 
behaves aggressively, implying that intentions matter.  Walt (1985, 15) contradicts his 
own contention that intentions matter by saying “intentions can change and perceptions 
are unreliable, it is safer to balance against potential threats than to hope that strong states 
will remain benevolent”.  The clear implication is that states should not wait to be 
threatened before they balance against the powerful.  Essentially, there is a great deal of 
confusion amongst balance of power theorists about how much of a “law” balancing is 
and just what states balance against.  What all these theorists do have in common is the 
belief that states act as unitary actors and try to maximize their own security, which 
cannot be done as long as potential or actual hegemons exist.  The causes of this behavior 
are anarchy and the distribution of capabilities; other factors, including the characteristics 
of the states involved and the history of their interactions, are of secondary importance.  
Behaviors that might breed hostility over time are left unexplored (Coplin et al. 1973). 
The balancing explanation provides a rationale for states always aligning against 
the strongest state or perhaps the several strongest states in the system, but tells us little 
about alignments in which these states are not involved.  It ignores the immediate 
interests of states or their leaders, who are unlikely to have the long shadow of the future 
that the theory implies.  Nor does it differentiate between different types of alignments or 
justify its assumption that all issue types are treated through a security prism and 
addressed in a manner consistent with that schema.  Instead, proponents of the 
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explanation would currently expect balancing behavior against the United States by all 
states on all issues, a prediction that has been indisputably disproven. 
The literature on bandwagoning is narrower than the one on balancing.  Few 
claim that bandwagoning is a law of politics or that there is a natural tendency towards it.  
Walt (1988, 282) defines it as involving “unequal exchange; the vulnerable state makes 
asymmetric concessions to the dominant power and accepts a subordinate role”.  But 
bandwagoning theorists protest that this definition makes bandwagoning merely a form 
of capitulation (Sweeney, 2004, 430), and instead define the term as joining the stronger 
side, not the bigger threat (Schweller 1994, 81).  The purpose of balancing is said to be an 
attempt to minimize losses, while the goal of bandwagoning is the maximization of gains 
(Schweller 1994, 74).  States do not pursue security all or even most of the time, and are 
instead motivated by profit or reward (Schroeder 1994, 120; Schweller 1994, 79).  In 
“jackal bandwagoning”, weaker states side with an aggressive rising power in order to 
achieve an unearned share of the spoils (Schweller 1994, 93-5).  Historical examples 
include Mussolini’s Italy allying with Hitler’s Germany and Japan siding with the Triple 
Entente.  The immediate compensation and low cost arising from bandwagoning also 
makes it the preferred policy of states lacking elite consensus (Schweller 2004, 171). 
 Bandwagoning theorists do not argue that states always bandwagon; rather, they 
claim that bandwagoning takes place when security is not at a premium (Sweeney 2004, 
444).  They do not, however, provide criteria for determining when that is the case.  
Unlike supporters of balancing, who tend to highlight a handful of balancing wars against 
aggressive major powers, bandwagoning scholars make use of a greater variety of 
historical evidence to buttress their position.  Schroeder (1994, 117) examines several 
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time periods between the 17th and 20th centuries and discovers that bandwagoning was 
used far more frequently than balancing.  In fact, he finds that balancing has been rare 
and only used when all other strategies failed.  This is unsurprising given the costs states 
face when balancing, along with problems of coordination.13  If states pursue only their 
immediate interests, then buck-passing, free riding, and attempts to obtain favors from 
stronger states should be the norm (Wohlforth 1999, 29; Elman 2004, 563).   
 Bandwagoning theorists also point out that even states looking to maximize 
security have reason to bandwagon with the dominant power of the day.  Siding with a 
status-quo power, even if it happens to be the strongest state, is entirely rational, as the 
main sources of danger to status-quo states, weak or strong, are revisionist states 
(Sweeney 2004, 434).  By contrast, balance of power theory largely rules out the 
possibility of states being revisionist, as that would be contrary to their assumption that 
states seek to maximize security and not power.  Some balance of power theorists try to 
deal with this dilemma by adding an ad hoc assumption.  They claim that, despite all 
leaders knowing that acts of revisionism have always led to the formation of a balancing 
coalition, some will still choose to go through with those policies because they have 
“been able to persuade themselves that skillful diplomacy and clever strategy would 
enable them to transcend the normal processes of balance-of-power politics” (Waltz 
1988, 625).  However, this bases the efficiency of the balancing process on the rationality 
of leaders, suggesting that only irrational rulers would violate the theory’s prescriptions, 
making the theory ultimately unfalsifiable.  Proponents of bandwagoning avoid that 
                                                 
 
13 Hui (2004, 192) cites Han Fei, a philosopher during the Chinese Warring State period, making the point 
that states rescuing their weaker neighbors sap their own strength, eventually leading to their own defeat. 
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pitfall, though they do not provide a priori measures for determining when security is at a 
premium, a necessary condition for bandwagoning behavior. 
The main flaw with the balancing explanation is that it assumes a single-
mindedness from a state’s leaders that is unlikely to be found in the empirical world and 
examines the decision to align in a complete void.  Leaders, whose own interests are left 
unexamined, are meant to ignore every objective other than the prevention of hegemony.  
Attempts by great powers to radically increase their capabilities through the use of force 
are incredibly rare (Wolfers 1952, 137), with the two most recent examples being Nazi 
Germany and Napoleonic France.14   
According to both the balancing and bandwagoning explanations, rulers are meant 
to ignore the quality of their relationships and the prospect of future cooperation when 
making the decision to align.  They are supposed to align with states with which they 
have a recent history of intense hostility, and do so against their existing allies.  No 
attention is paid to the complications a leader would face with attempting to convince 
their constituents, whether in a democracy or autocracy, with the Orwellian rhetoric that 
the enemy of yesteryear is the friend of today.  In fact, there are no instances of a major 
power fighting a war on the side of a country just to join a war against that country in a 
20-year period power since the Napoleonic Wars.15  The likelihood of reciprocation is 
also disregarded.  While the weaker state in a dispute might appreciate support more than 
                                                 
 
14 Even if we look at the 18th century, during which the balance of power idea became popularized, 
balancing stopped being a useful policy by the latter half of the century, as the threat of domination by 
Hapsburg Spain and Bourbon France receded (Black 1983).   
15 See Appendix 1 for a list of major powers that had the opportunity to meet these criteria, but did not.  
Moreover, there are no post-German unification examples of two major powers fighting a multilateral war 
on the same side and then fighting a multi-lateral war on the opposite side.  China’s actions in the Korean 
War come closest, but China was not designated a major power by the Correlates of War prior to 1950. 
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the stronger one, this does not mean it will have the ability or willingness to compensate 
the intervener for their effort.  If the intervener and the weaker state also specialize in a 
similar type of resources, broadly defined, or compete with each other over salient stakes, 
then the intervention makes even less sense.   
2.2 Homophily Research Program 
The next two research programs that are examined each deal with one of the 
above two criticisms: the homophily/similarity explanations take history, though not the 
shadow of the future, into account, and the regime security theories take a leader’s 
interests seriously.  Nonetheless, neither addresses the flaw tackled by the other, and both 
have their own shortfalls.  The homophily program rejects or minimizes the role of power 
in alignment decisions, choosing to privilege the influence of similarity, particularly as it 
relates to regime type.  While this school of thought is far more diverse than the 
capability one, making use of different assumptions and providing diverse causal 
mechanisms for state similarity’s impact, there is agreement that states choose to align 
with those that are most like them, whether because it implies homogeneous interests, an 
affinity toward similar actors, or higher trust in the likelihood of reciprocation. 
 The homophily explanations attribute the effect of similar institutions on 
alignment behavior to psychological and/or interest-based causes.  For the former, they 
argue that leaders view states that are similar to their own as being part of an ingroup, and 
states that are different as part of an outgroup (Hermann and Kegley 1995; Corbetta 
2010).  A ruler’s perception of states is then colored by the degree of similarity between 
that state and his own (Werner and Lemke 1997; Maoz 2010).  A democratic ruler will 
reach different conclusions about the same action carried out by an autocrat and a 
32 
 
democrat, which will affect the direction of their state’s foreign policy (Melin and Koch 
2010).  This line of reasoning was first popularized with Rummel’s adaptation of social 
field theory to international relations.  Rummel (1977) argued that the distance between 
two actors on key attributes determine their cooperative and conflictual behavior toward 
one another.  This would later act as a starting point for democratic peace theorists.   
On the interest side, homophily scholars contend that leaders of states with the 
same institutions tend to have matching interests, while leaders of states with different 
institutions having reason to suspect that each is trying to undermine the other.  Lai and 
Reiter (2000) argue that democracies find it easier to credibly commit, making them more 
reliable alliance partners.  Therefore, jointly democratic allies do not have to fear being 
taken advantage of.  Werner and Lemke (1997) make the point that the ability of rulers to 
stay in power is undercut by a dissimilar state weakening the legitimacy of their political 
system; history provides many examples of democracies overtly and covertly attempting 
to weaken the domestic support of autocratic regimes.  As a result, similar regimes have a 
greater incentive to help each other, which explains the disproportionately high number 
of alliances between democracies (Siverson and Emmons 1991).  Gartzke and Gleditsch 
(2004, 779) do find that democracies are less likely to honor alliances than autocracies, 
which is seemingly an anomaly for this research program. However, the authors point out 
that alliances are entered into when the prospect of reciprocation is in doubt, suggesting 
that democracies generally support each other without the need for a formal agreement. 
If we conceive of alignment more broadly, then the democratic peace literature 
also has something relevant to say about the alignment patterns of states with similar 
regime types.  After all, if democracies very rarely have militarized conflicts with one 
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another, that should also mean that democracies will not align against other democracies, 
at least in the type of disputes that have a high likelihood of getting militarized.   
Democratic peace theorists provide two sets of explanations for this expectation.  
The first is a normative one, and asserts states externalize their domestic norms of 
behavior into the international realm (Maoz and Russett 1993).  According to this logic, 
rulers expect the leaders of other states to treat them as they would their domestic 
opponents.  If the latter are dealt with exclusively with violence and coercion, the odds of 
the two working together will be significantly smaller.  The proponents of the 
institutional explanation claim that leaders of states with larger winning coalitions have to 
rely more on good public policy than on paying off supporters, meaning that democracies 
do not get involved in wars they cannot win (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999).  Knowing 
that democratic leaders try harder, other democrats avoid targeting their states.  In terms 
of alignment, a democratic ruler will think twice about aligning against another 
democracy as they will not want to end up on the losing side of the dispute. 
Unlike authors in the capability research program, similarity theorists provide a 
concrete set of interests, at both the leader and state level, which should motivate rulers to 
align with a particular type of states.  They provide a less thorough case as to why the 
effect of certain institutions should be dyadic and not monadic.  For instance, unless we 
assume that autocrats are entirely indifferent about winning conflicts they engage in, they 
should be less likely to target democracies than they are to target autocracies.  
Consequently, all states should be more likely to align with a democrat than an autocrat.   
The more fundamental problem with this literature is the ambiguity of the very 
concept of similarity.  By focusing on vague or contested concepts like democracy, 
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homophily theorists are unable to provide a precise causal link between the similarity and 
alignment behavior.  Depending on the definition one uses, democracy can entail 
everything from simply having competitive elections (Alvarez et al. 1996) to allowing 
freedom of expression and association (Dahl 1971) to the competitiveness of executive 
recruitment (Marshall et al. 2011).  The commonly used measure of democracy has six 
components: regulation of executive recruitment and political participation, 
competitiveness of said recruitment and participation, the openness of executive 
recruitment, and the degree of executive constraints (Marshall et al. 2011).  None refer to 
the lack of violence against domestic opponents, and a state can be deemed a democracy 
despite having a narrow winning coalition.  The lack of differentiation between states that 
are labeled democracies is less a problem than throwing all non-democracies into the 
same regime type category.  There is arguably less in common between a monarchy and a 
military dictatorship than between a state that is barely over the threshold of democracy 
and one that is slightly under.  Some of the biggest challenges to the legitimacy of 
autocratic rulers have come from other types of autocratic rulers.  Illiberal nationalists in 
Europe delegitimized multiethnic empires, and Arab nationalists overthrew several 
traditional monarchs.  The Saudi royal family is less concerned with US democratization 
efforts in the Middle East than it is with infiltration by the Iranian theocracy.   
2.3 Regime Security Research Program 
The regime security literature is more explicit in dealing with the interests of 
rulers.  It starts with the empirical observation that the domestic structure of third world 
states is frequently closer to anarchy than it is to hierarchy (David 1991, 242).  The rulers 
of those states tend to lack domestic legitimacy and control over their territory – a 
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consequence of the arbitrariness of most third world borders – which precludes them 
from commanding the loyalty of their people (Ayoob 1984, 45; David 1991, 239).  A 
related challenge is extracting resources from a people with no national consciousness 
and a country with little infrastructure.  This has a devastating effect on those leaders’ 
ability to ensure their states’ external security (Barnett 1994, 370).  Of greater interest to 
these rulers, the internal and external sovereignty of their state is likelier to be threatened 
by internal opponents than external ones (Cooper 2004, 327).16  Coups claim the careers 
and lives of far more third world leaders than do external invasions (David 1991, 238; 
Barnett 1994, 373).  If these rulers want to stay in power, they need to employ interstate 
alignment as a bargaining chip, using it to obtain assistance against domestic opponents 
(David 1991, 235-236). Whether that requires aligning with a potential hegemon in 
exchange for equipment or outright intervention, or aligning with a democracy that has 
the capacity to provide more foreign aid, it is a small price to pay for one’s life. 
The key assumption of the regime security literature is that the main objective of 
any third world leader is political survival (David 1991, 236; Miller and Toristyn 2005, 
332).  Putnam (1988, 434) suggests that this might be true for all states, as leaders craft 
their international policy in a manner that will satisfy domestic interests that will keep 
them in power.  Unlike many assumptions in IR, this assumption is easily testable.  If 
regime survival was the main goal of leaders everywhere or even just in the third world, 
we should see a vast majority of leaders clinging to power through any means necessary.  
And yet, numerous leaders, in the third world and elsewhere, have been ousted without 
                                                 
 
16 Cooper (2004, 335) notes the example of Kuwait, which resisted intelligence cooperation with other 
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council due to its rivalry with Saudi Arabia, but reversed course in the 
wake of an attempted assassination of the Kuwait emir.   
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using all means at their disposal to stay in power.  The ones that are unwilling to let go 
tend to fear for their life or wealth if they were to step down, a situation that is not very 
common.  Instead, it is not inconceivable that leaders have other policy preferences that 
they rank higher than their personal ability to convert those preferences into policy.  The 
expectation that these preferences are more likely to be attained if the leader relinquishes 
power is probably behind numerous instances of monarchs and military juntas stepping 
aside to let others take their place.  Moreover, even if some types of rulers were 
predominantly concerned with survival, the regime security school does not tell us 
anything about alignments between states that do not have weak, illegitimate leaders, or 
even weak leaders that are presently not facing a domestic threat.  In such instances, 
regime security proponents tend to defer to balancing theorists. 
2.4 Flaws in the Literature 
Although each of the three research programs reviewed thus far contributed 
valuable insights into who states might want to align with, none approaches alignment in 
a holistic manner.  First, not one of the explanations deals with the two-stage nature of 
alignment.17  Before leaders can decide to choose a particular side in a dispute, they must 
make the decision to get involved in the first place.  The type of states that has the 
capacity to get involved or might benefit from the involvement is not representative of all 
states.  If only some states or states in specific situations will enter into an existing 
conflict, then it is a non-random subset of the state population that gets to decide whom 
                                                 
 
17 There have been a few exceptions, including Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979), Gartzke and 
Gleditsch (2004), Corbetta (2010), Melin and Koch (2010), but their research strategy has generally been 
overlooked by other scholars of alignment. 
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to align with.  Second, none of the research programs adequately account for different 
types of alignment.  Capability theorists make an arbitrary distinction between security 
and non-security issues, as if the former are always salient and the latter never are.  The 
others do not even make that point, assuming that whichever type of alignment they 
examine is representative of all alignments.  On the one extreme are capability 
researchers, who believe that a theory of alignment can be obtained entirely in the context 
of war (Walt 1985; Christensen and Snyder 1990; Schweller 1994).  On the other are 
some homophily theorists, who believe the same about voting in the General Assembly 
(Russett 1966; Powers 1980; Voeten 2004).   
A third problem with the theories examined is that their empirical predictions are 
not directly comparable.  Capability theorists are interested in the affairs of great powers, 
and therefore limit their focus to Western Europe.  The inexplicable lack of great power 
wars over the previous half a century also pushes them in the direction of studying pre-
World War II European alignments.  Homophily theorists go in the opposite direction, 
though for different reasons.  Until the First World War, there was not much diversity in 
terms of regime types.  With a few exceptions, states were ruled by either absolute or 
constitutional monarchs.  Basing alignment decisions on similarity would not be of much 
use during that time.  World War I gave rise to numerous democracies.  Many reverted to 
authoritarianism within a decade, however.  It was not until World War II and 
decolonization before the situation was transformed.  Even then, democracy, particularly 
of the liberal variety, stubbornly remained a predominantly Western phenomenon.  As a 
result, omitted variable bias always lurks when similarity in regime types is used to 
explain alignment decisions.  Regime security authors err in the opposite direction, 
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restricting their analysis to Africa and the Middle East, where the conditions posited by 
their theories are mostly likely to exist.  In the end, empirical support for one research 
program does not act as disconfirming evidence for the others.   
Beyond the question of empirics, the three research programs are based on shaky 
micro-foundations.  None pays enough attention to what statesmen might hope to gain 
out of alignment beyond the narrow goal of staying in power.  States might not be equally 
likely to repay benefactors for past support.  Rulers might find themselves unable to carry 
out a preferred alignment policy due to severe domestic constraints, be they a strong 
domestic opposition, a lack of resources, or more salient domestic priorities.  In order to 
address some of these shortcomings, I turn to the disparate reciprocation literature, 
dominated by neoliberal institutionalists and area studies experts. 
2.5 Reciprocation Literature 
The idea that actors help others with the expectation of receiving some form of 
assistance in return is not a novel one.  Over a century ago, Hershey (1905, 60) predicted 
that cooperation between the US and Britain in the Spanish-American war and 
cooperation between those two states and Japan in the intervening period would lead to 
acts of cooperation in the future.  A decade later, his prediction was confirmed; all three 
states fought on the same side of World War I.  Notwithstanding this general 
understanding of reciprocation, the concept was popularized in IR by Axelrod and later 
Keohane.  In his widely-read book The Evolution of Cooperation, Axelrod (1984) put 
forth specific criteria that made reciprocation an evolutionary dominant strategy in 
iterated games.  Using a round robin computer tournament as his evidence, Axelrod 
established that a TIT FOR TAT strategy is superior to all alternatives.  The strategy is 
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incredibly simple.  The player starts with a cooperative move, and then reciprocates every 
succeeding move from the other player.  If the other player cooperates in the first round, 
so does the TIT FOR TAT player in the second round.  If the other player defects in the 
second round, then the TIT FOR TAT player defects in the third round.   
According to Axelrod (1984, 46), this strategy won because of three key 
characteristics: niceness, forgiveness, and retaliation.  A TIT FOR TAT strategy is nice in 
that it starts with a cooperative move, thus avoiding defection from retaliatory strategies.  
A TIT FOR TAT strategy is forgiving in that it is willing to cooperate in response to a 
cooperative move regardless of how many times the other player defected in the past.  
The strategy is retaliatory as it defects in response to every defection by the other player.   
The implication of Axelrod’s work for international politics is that countries 
should reciprocate behavior good and bad.  Any cooperative move should be countered 
with a cooperative move, and every act of hostility should be responded to in kind.  
Keohane (1986) pointed out that a strict TIT FOR TAT strategy, or what he called 
specific reciprocity, can become extremely dangerous for interstate relations.  The reason 
is what Axelrod called “echo effects”: a rivalry that starts has no way of ending (Keohane 
1986, 10).  A lesser problem caused by specific reciprocity is that exact measurements of 
exchanged values is rarely possible in the international arena, thereby limiting the ability 
of a state to respond properly to positive acts by another country (Keohane 1986, 7). 
Keohane (1986) was more supportive of another type of reciprocity, which he 
calls diffuse reciprocity.  Under diffuse reciprocity, states reciprocate cooperative 
behaviors not because it would lead to continued cooperation, but rather to improve the 
condition of the entire system, of which they are a part (Keohane 1986, 20).  This 
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rationale for cooperation creates mutual trust (Keohane 1986, 21), resulting in a deeper 
relationship that is unlikely to ever produce a rivalry spiral. NATO and the “special 
relationship” between the US and UK can be considered examples of diffuse reciprocity.  
The flaw with this concept is that diffuse reciprocity can only occur in the context of 
strong international regime links and shared interests, which, as even Keohane (1986, 23) 
admits, is far from the norm in international affairs.  The benefit of diffuse reciprocity is 
thus unlikely to be shared by much of the world. 
The idea that international politics operates on the basis of a reciprocity logic is 
not without its critics.  The main obstacles to reciprocation, and cooperation in general, 
according to the concept’s critics are cheating and the pursuit of relative gains (Grieco 
1988).  A state would be hesitant to aid another today if the expected payoff never 
arrives; a state can, for example, offer to disarm in an act of mutual disarmament but then 
go back on its word after the other side follows through.  Cooperating with a country 
today can also make it sufficiently powerful to use those newfound capabilities to extract 
painful concessions from the first state.  Maoz (2010) also made the point that non-
democracies might exploit cooperation, and demonstrated that only democratic networks 
regularly make use of the TIT FOR TAT strategy. 
The preponderance of evidence has not justified the skepticism of reciprocity’s 
critics.  Using Rummel’s Dimensionality of Nations project, Sullivan (1972) shows that 
past levels of alignment consistently predict present alignment behavior for great powers 
and other states active in international affairs.  Drury et al. (2005, 466) similarly find that 
allies – states that cooperate militarily – receive humanitarian aid at a rate seven times as 
high as non-allies.  Numerous case studies provide evidence for a similar pattern of 
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behavior.  Despite opposition to colonialism, Pakistan supported Portugal in its conflict 
over Goa, an act clearly intended as a retaliatory measure against India (Rastogi 1961, 
167).  Sri Lanka rapidly improved its relations with the Communist bloc after US foreign 
aid dried up (Kodikara 1973, 1126).  Bilateral reciprocity, of both the cooperative and 
hostile variety, was also the norm in the behavior of Middle Eastern states from 1979 to 
1997 (Goldstein et al. 2001).  The key insight that can be gleamed from each of these 
studies is that the “national interest” can be pursued in a multitude of ways, albeit some 
constricted by domestic and international pressures.  What drives countries away from 
past alignment partners are not changes in power distribution or sudden realizations that 
the other state has a different type of regime, but rather a pattern of hostile behavior. 
 Existing theories of reciprocation are not hampered by many of the theoretical 
limitations of the capability, homophily, and regime security research programs, but still 
possess three significant weaknesses.  First, a reciprocation strategy would not be able to 
explain breaks in alignment policies.  Both virtuous and vicious cycles of interstate 
behavior are intermittently broken.  A theory of alignment based solely on a reciprocation 
logic fails to explain those structural breaks.  Second, reciprocation ignores all but the 
most recent past.  States are expected to cooperate in year t just because they did in year t 
– 1, even if the two states have a long history of conflict; the same is true in reverse.  Yet, 
politicians and the public have memories, and domestic interests coalesce around a 
specific foreign policy over a long period of time.  A sharp change in the behavior of 
another state might lead some to reexamine their views and interests, but grievances and 
gratitude do not disintegrate from one or two unexpected changes in policy.   
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Third, reciprocation models fail to account for the future; they do not say why 
countries would want continued cooperation or continued conflict.  Joint cooperation 
might be Pareto efficient within a dyad, but the value of such cooperation must also 
incorporate the opportunity cost of not pursuing cooperation with another actor.   This is 
particularly true when the cooperation creates dependency and is costly to undo.  
Correspondingly, a spiral of hostility rarely benefits the participants.  Even the possibility 
of successful general deterrence does not fully explain the need for negative 
reciprocation.  The resources used for continued conflict cannot be utilized elsewhere.  
The other side might also respond better to carrots than to sticks, despite the existence of 
moral hazard.  Another factor must be present that incentivizes statesmen to maintain a 
hostile pattern of behavior.  With these points in mind, the following chapter uses 
reciprocation as a motivator of alignment behavior, but attempts to resolve each of the 
aforementioned shortcomings of reciprocation through the use of an issue paradigm.  
Briefly, the proposed reciprocal alignment theory deals with the problem of breaks in 
alignment patterns by emphasizing the rise and resolution of issues, along with domestic 
changes.  It addresses the flaw with using history by allowing past alignment decisions to 
exert a diminishing effect over an extended period of time.  The theory provides a logic 
for continued cooperation or conflict that is based on the empowerment of domestic 
interests that push for the maintenance of status quo policies.   
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Chapter 3 – Reciprocal Alignment Theory 
As the previous chapter makes clear, the extant theories of political alignment 
suffer from a variety of flaws, chief among them being the atomistic manner in the study 
of alignment and the lack of concern for the history of interaction.  The reciprocation 
literature, which has occasionally been used to explain alignment decisions, avoids most 
of those shortcomings, but is not without weaknesses either.   For these reasons, I create a 
new theory of alignment that makes heavy use of the issue paradigm and the logic of 
reciprocation.  The new theory, which I call reciprocal alignment theory, integrates a 
range of alignment explanation into one over-arching theory of alignment.  It seeks to 
explain the rationale for alignment itself, and not just for specific forms of alignment.  It 
does not treat all forms of alignment as identical, but does point to significant similarities 
between them.  In essence, the theory suggests that past behavior structures the schema 
through which actors view current interactions and creates a set of incentives that push 
those actors toward maintaining the same type of relations that they have enjoyed in the 
past.  Only under conditions of decisive change do those schemas and incentives 
diminish, allowing policies that bring about a break from the past.  
To summarize the theory, alignment is defined as the stance a state takes on a 
well-defined proposal that is intended to resolve a stake over which two or more states 
have conflicting positions; it is a valuable tool to leaders wishing to expand their capacity 
to pursue a wide variety of interests.  Alignment is not without costs, however, and 
pursuing it is not always a viable or efficient option.  State leaders, the actors responsible 
for their country’s foreign policy, must make two decisions before their state becomes 
aligned with another.  As the first step, they must establish whether they want to take a 
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concrete position on a stake involving other states.  Rulers make this determination on the 
basis of several factors.  They want to make sure they can contribute to the resolution of 
the stake. They will also find it easier to obtain domestic support for foreign involvement 
when there is a history of cooperation or conflict with one or both disputants.  A lower 
cost of alignment can nevertheless make a great number of stakes riper for intervention.   
In the second stage of alignment, when leaders take sides in disputes, two sets of 
factors affect all alignment decision, and another two gain importance depending on a 
state’s present circumstances.  The main objective of alignment is to procure future 
positive alignment and to avoid future negative alignment; this goal is what makes 
reciprocation the key to alignment behavior.  Rulers will align with states with which 
they have a cooperative history of relations, and against those with whom they have a 
conflictual history.  The willingness to align with a state is negated when the latter is 
ruled by an unreliable regime, whether because it is unstable or unrepresentative, or 
because it had reneged on alignment commitments in the past.  The uncertainty of 
reciprocation associated with these regimes makes them ill-suited cooperation partners.   
In terms of context-specific correlates of alignment, I focus on situations where a 
state has a relationship of dependence on another.  The ruler of the former will feel strong 
pressure to align with the latter, regardless of the stake being disputed.   Consequently, 
leaders are pressured into making alignments that they might otherwise prefer to avoid.   
This is far from the only context where that influences decisions to align, but for reasons 
of brevity and availability of relevant data, it will be the only one tested here.   
The cost and discernibility of the preferred form of alignment play a large role in 
both phases of the alignment process.  Leaders dependent on a state for future assistance 
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will make their positive alignments with that state as discernible as possible.  Conversely, 
if a leader has to align against a state that can impose a high price for that act, they will 
make that alignment indiscernible.  Unfortunately for these leaders, indiscernible 
alignments are also unlikely to be reciprocated.  The cost component exerts a different 
effect, allowing states with fewer resources to take part.  Nevertheless, past alignments 
and dyadic history will continue to exert a strong influence on alignment decisions. 
3.1 Science and the Social Sphere 
The idea of generating theories with falsifiable hypotheses entered the social 
sciences through a philosophy of science concerned entirely with the natural sciences.  
This behavioralist approach was responsible for immense contributions to IR by forcing 
scholars to be clear with their concepts and to state hypotheses relating to those concepts 
in manner that allows for falsification.  Every form of research has its shortcomings, and 
behavioralism is no exception.  Some of those flaws must be accepted as the price for 
adopting natural scientific methods; others can be addressed or potentially overcome.  
The most obvious predicament resulting from the adoption of natural scientific 
methods to the social sphere is the ability of those methods to incorporate free will.  
Every factor of importance can show a particular choice to be a bad one, and yet an 
individual can insist on taking that option.  Criminals steal even when the likelihood of 
getting caught is high, drug addicts maintain their drug habits even when it might cost 
them their lives, and statesmen start wars they have no hope of winning.  The existence of 
free will has two implications for social scientific research.  The first implication is that it 
rules out the possibility of the type of theories seen in the natural sciences, which must be 
“cast-iron, generalizable, and amenable to covering law explanations” (Almond and 
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Genco 1977, 503). Unless the effect of a social variable is vacuously important, it is 
unlikely to unfailingly predict another variable.  A social scientific theory can posit a set 
of constraints, but it cannot hope to explain how every individual will respond to those 
constraints.  Assuming most people do respond to constraints, the effects of variables in 
the social sciences will be probabilistic and not deterministic.  Free will does not rule out 
the possibility of explanation in the social sciences altogether, as individuals can act 
according to certain rules even if they are not driven by nature to do so.  For example, we 
can hypothesize that someone with a 9 to 5 job will leave their house before 9 AM even 
though that person is free to stay at home (Nicholson 1996, 118).   
The second implication of free will is that actors can learn from experience.  No 
two decisions are independent, meaning that observations in cross-sectional or time series 
models are not truly comparable.  If having tanks improves the probability of victory in a 
war, then all states have an incentive to build tanks, annulling the advantage of this type 
of weaponry.  Though not entirely satisfactory, memory can be incorporated into theory, 
and statistical tools, such as ones proposed by Beck et al. (1998), can be used to account 
for some of the temporal interdependence. 
The social scientific enterprise faces two further difficulties, which it shares with 
the natural sciences.  The first relates to the production of theory, and the second to its 
accuracy.  Social scientific theories are based on assumptions that can only be challenged 
on logical and philosophical grounds (Shoemaker et al. 2004).  The higher the ratio of 
assumptions to testable hypotheses in a theory, the less powerful that theory (Shoemaker 
et al. 2004).  Even if all of a theory’s premises are logically deduced from the initial 
assumptions, we can only say that the premises preserve the truthfulness of the 
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assumptions; deduction does not produce new truths (Chalmers 1999).  Flawed 
assumptions will lead to flawed theory, and an overabundance of assumptions will lead to 
an explanation that has little relation to the empirical reality.  However, even sound 
assumptions do not tell us whether a theory is a good predictor of the empirical realm.  
Provided that assumptions cannot be tested, the utility of a theory must arise from 
another source.  That source is the explanatory power of a theory.  A good theory must be 
able to explain a larger set of phenomena than its competitors (Lakatos 1970).  The 
relationship to competing theories is important because the accuracy of any theory cannot 
be verified.  What could be determined is whether a theory is closer to the truth than its 
competitors (Popper 1963).  An added complication is the trade-off between case-specific 
precision and generalizability.  A theory with enough unique components might be able 
to perfectly explain a particular case, but would be inapplicable to all other environments 
(Bueno de Mesquita 1985).  If explanatory power is an important indicator of a good 
theory, then generalizability must take precedence over idiosyncratic description. 
This analysis suggests several implications for a theory of political alignment.  
First, the theory must be probabilistic, focusing on the internal and external constraints 
faced by leaders.  Leaders should usually, but not always, respond to those constraints.  
Second, it must account for learning.  State actions must have consequences.  Betrayal or 
a lack of reliability by a state or category of states should be reflected in future alignment 
decisions.  Third, a theory of alignment must make use of a limited number of 
assumptions while justifying the inclusion of each one.  And fourth, the strength of the 
alignment theory must be judged not only on the basis of standard statistical tests, but 
also in relation to opposing explanations. 
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3.2 Issue Research Program as the Foundation of Reciprocal Alignment Theory 
The reciprocal alignment theory presented here takes the issue paradigm as its 
starting point.  The issue paradigm in political science has its origins in the writings of 
Easton (1965), which moved analysis of politics away from discussion of power and 
toward contention over issues (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981, 30).  Rosenau later adapted 
Easton’s framework to the study of international politics, which he believed first required 
the formulation of a typology of issues (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981, 30).  The new 
paradigm abandoned the previous emphasis of IR on the struggle for power, and instead 
used issue generation, proposals for issue resolution, and the determination of issue 
positions as the bedrock of its positive heuristics.18   
Mansbach and Vasquez (1981) followed Rosenau’s pre-theory (1966) with a new 
issue-based theory of politics, covering every step of the issue cycle, from the genesis of 
an issue to its removal from the agenda.  Within this approach, an issue is a general 
subject of a dispute; it presupposes disagreement (Diehl 1992).  An issue can be 
narrowed down to specific stakes, which involve concrete attempts to allocate value, and 
can arise from either the environment or relevant actors (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981, 
74).  An actor is relevant if it has the capability to affect an outcome (Shapiro 1973, 39).  
Abortion might signify an issue over which political actors in the Unites States disagree, 
while a piece of legislation requiring parental consent for an abortion would be the stake.  
Issues that arise over time are not constant, and neither is their salience.  During the Cold 
                                                 
 
18 See Lakatos (1970) for a discussion of the role a research programs plays in establishing positive and 
negative heuristics.  In brief, positive heuristics tell scientists which questions are worth asking, and 
negative heuristics provide a list of inquiries that are considered pseudo-scientific.   
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War, political elites in some states were able to fund terrorist groups without fear of the 
issue making it on the international agenda.  Similar actions in the post-2001 world 
would lead to a harsh and immediate response.  While issues and stakes refer to topics of 
disagreement, an issue position refers to the stance an actor takes toward any proposal to 
resolve a stake (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981, 188).  An issue position is two-
dimensional: it incorporates both the stance on an issue and the certainty with which that 
stance is held (Coplin et al. 1973).  Once a stake is resolved, it is removed from the 
agenda, though it could suffer the same fate at an earlier stage if it loses its salience 
(Mansbach and Vasquez 1981, 120). 
Three key components of this theory will provide the underpinnings of the 
alignment explanation presented here.  The theoretical domain of the latter is by practical 
necessity limited to one stage of the issue cycle: the formation of an issue position, which 
eventually leads to the authoritative allocation of value. The three elements are: the use of 
a stake as the unit of analysis, the privileging of actors responsible for decision-making, 
and the tripartite basis for issue position decisions.  The first two serve as assumptions on 
which the theory is built; the third, in an amended form, will help answer the question of 
which side a statesman is pushed to take in the event of a dispute between other actors. 
I start with the assumption that states have no interests apart from those attributed 
to them by their rulers.  In a broad sense, a policy might be harmful or beneficial to the 
long-term security and/or prosperity of a state, but the state is not an entity that can create 
policy objectives or implement them.  That responsibility falls to a state’s leader, and it is 
that leader who has preferences over how stakes are resolved.  To equate the leader with 
the state would require making several untenable assumptions.  The ruler would have to 
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be entirely altruistic, placing the interest of a collectivity above their own interest or the 
interest of their family or clan.  The leader would need to determine an objective method 
for divining the interest of the state, and possess complete information about the expected 
effect a given policy would have on that abstract interest.  They would also need to have 
the unwavering support of most of society in order to implement that national interest, 
even if doing so would be disadvantageous to parts of that society.  In sum, basing a 
theory on the idea of a national interest requires assuming an all-knowing and altruistic 
leader, along with an unquestionably loyal and altruistic society.   
The emphasis on a leader’s interest entails rejecting the classical realist and 
neorealist assumptions about states aiming primarily to maximize their power or security.  
I also reject the contrary notion that the motivation for every governmental policy can be 
reduced to the desire of a leader to stay in power.  Few statesmen want power for power’s 
sake, especially when the power prevents them from achieving their other objectives.  
Democratic rulers regularly leave office instead of attempting to subvert the constitution 
to stay in power.  The same is generally true of one-party states, such as modern China 
and PRI-ruled Mexico.  The reason top officials from other autocracies tend to stay in 
power until forced from office has more to do with what might happen to them or their 
supporters once they are out of office than with wanting to maintain their position. 
Instead of the extreme altruism or power-hunger assumptions, I rely on the logic 
of bounded rationality.  In terms of rationality, leaders act according to their own 
preferences, though those preferences can take into account the interests of others 
(Kirchgässner 2004).  Those interests are exogenous to the stakes that are being resolved.  
One ruler might seek to expand the territory of their state, another might wish to spread 
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Marxism, and yet another to aggrandize himself.  Rationality only requires them to 
consistently pursue those goals, and does not refer to the ends the leaders attempt to 
achieve.19  What leaders can or cannot do is limited by constraints, whether individual, 
domestic, or systemic (Forester 1984).  The bounded aspect of rationality refers to a 
possible lack of information regarding the variety of policy choices and the net benefit of 
the available options.  Rationality might also be bounded by various psychological 
factors, group dynamics, and time constraints during crises.   
In the context of an issue paradigm, bounded rationality means a leader ranks 
stakes in the order of their importance to them and then attempts to get their way on as 
many as possible, stressing those at the top of the list.  The more salient the stake under 
dispute, the more resources a leader should be willing to allocate to ensure that the final 
distribution of value from that stake matches their issue position.   
Alignment theory is agnostic as to the issues that are salient at any given time and 
to the preferences leaders have over how those issues are resolved.  The main reason for 
this stance is the reality that issues that are salient for one leader or people are frequently 
not salient for another.20  This is precisely what Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) 
found in their cross-sectional analysis of the political positions of post-communist 
political parties.  This does not mean that issue salience is random.  In the post-
communist cases, ethnically divided societies gave a more prominent role to ethnic 
                                                 
 
19 One implication of this logic is that leaders who favor a certain policy should be willing to pay a higher 
cost to pursue it, regardless of the national security implications.  This is exactly what Croco (2011) finds: 
leaders who are responsible for starting a war are more likely to see that conflict to its end.  If the 
predominant concern was the “national interest”, all leaders would be equally likely to do this. 
20 As an example, when religion was a major source of conflict in Europe, Protestant princes whose 
domains did not border Catholic ones did not initially treat religion as a salient issue.  This changed only 
when the Holy Roman Emperor began supporting the anti-Protestant Dessau League (Owen 2005, 88). 
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issues, and democracy was a wedge issue in societies where democratic institutions were 
not consolidated (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009).  State-level variables would thus 
be necessary for explaining the foreign policy priorities of specific states. 
Regardless of the issues that are salient to a particular leader, the ability to pursue 
them all is limited by scarcity.  As much as individuals would like to obtain everything, 
they have a limited amount of resources to achieve that goal.  Instead, actors must make 
trade-offs.  Objects that are more important are obtained before other ones; the quality 
and price of an item affects one’s willingness to get it.  Rulers of states are in the same 
position, though some have access to vastly greater quantities of resources than others.21  
This has a clear implication for alignment: if a leader can obtain value with the aid of 
another state that they would otherwise be unable to obtain or be forced to pay a higher 
price to acquire, then they have a strong incentive to request assistance from others.   
The lack of an international body with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force 
means that other states cannot be made to comply with the request for aid.  Even when 
there is an agreement to align – to take the same issue position – this promise cannot 
always be enforced.  Instead, states must rely on goodwill, an ability to impose a cost for 
non-compliance, and the possibility of the situation being reversed in the future.  In a 
world defined not only by international anarchy but also scarcity, even the leaders of the 
strongest states have to prioritize the allocation of resources.  Consequently, alignment is 
both a valid and valued strategy.  The two most common methods of getting others to 
align with one’s issue position are to provide them with an immediate inducement or to 
                                                 
 
21 Gilpin (1981) makes similar assumptions in his work.  He argues that states operate on an indifference 
curve, facing a trade-off between security and welfare.  The slope of that curve varies from society to 
society, and the curve itself shifts outward for states with greater resources (Gilpin 1981, 20-23).   
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promise to reciprocate.  The former is frequently an impractical option: the price of 
gaining someone’s support could cost more than the value generated by this alignment.  
Furthermore, many state leaders cannot afford this strategy.  The United States might be 
able to provide Palau and Micronesia with enough carrots to obtain their votes on UN GA 
resolutions and China might be able to buy recognition from Vanuatu and Macedonia, but 
states likes Sweden or Kenya are rarely in the same position.  The main option at the 
latter’s disposal is the promise of reciprocation: helping a ruler of another state obtain a 
preferred outcome on one stake in exchange for doing the same on another stake.  That 
promise is based not only on the leaders’ ability to deliver on their promise, but also on 
the perception of delivering by relevant actors.  The logic of alignment will therefore 
differ depending on a leader’s ability to create that perception. 
A related issue is one of credibility.  A leader cannot credibly threaten to disavow 
future cooperation in retaliation for a negative alignment on an inconsequential UN GA 
vote.  They also cannot expect military support from all friendly states during a costly 
military conflict.  The type and amount of resources that a leader can use to gain outside 
support is therefore not constant.  This variation poses a dilemma for any theory of 
alignment: if rulers cannot use the same strategies to obtain alignment on all issues and 
have varying expectations about the kind of assistance they can obtain in different 
situations, then is it possible to have a single theory of alignment?   
The general approach in the alignment literature has been to either pretend that 
this problem does not exist or to separate important issues from non-important ones, 
usually along the military-economic divide, and to proclaim that a given theory only 
applies to the former.  While the second strategy is preferable to the first, it not only 
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provides an arbitrary distinction between issue areas, but also relies on the implicit 
assumption that non-economic issues are never salient and military issues always are.  As 
a result, variation within each issue area is ignored both theoretically and empirically.  An 
alternative approach is to create a theoretically-informed measure of alignment, which 
would allow us to explain not only decisions to align, but also what form that will take. 
Though the issue paradigm does not currently incorporate an alignment measure, 
it does provide an indirect solution toward locating dimensions on which such a measure 
can rest.  Specifically, Mansbach and Vasquez (1981, 192) offer three calculi that are 
meant to determine issue position: cost-benefit, participant interdependence, and 
participant affect.  A different calculus is said to apply to different types of stakes and 
inter-actor relationships; the cost-benefit calculus is assumed to be used for highly valued 
stakes for instance (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981, 193).  I use a somewhat different 
approach and conceive of these calculi as providing bases for comparing and contrasting 
available alignment options.  The cost dimension tells leaders how expensive a given 
policy would be, and lets them decide whether the future benefit of alignment outweighs 
its immediate cost.  The participant interdependence calculus can be thought of as 
distinguishing the discernibility of an alignment.  Some forms of alignment make it 
obvious whom a state is predominantly aiding or harming; in others, that determination is 
harder to make.  The willingness to make a more discernible alignment and the likely 
reaction to that willingness are an integral part of a leader’s decision-making process.  
The last calculus, participant affect, will be dealt with separately as a cause of alignment. 
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3.3 Alignment Measure 
Given the significant variation in the forms of alignment and the steps statesmen 
take to obtain it, we should not expect all types of alignment to be driven by the same 
factors.  The problem is figuring out a foundation for an alignment measure.  Creating a 
measure based on issue areas is not a suitable solution – there is too much variation 
within each issue area.  An alignment measure needs to be sensitive to two challenges.  It 
needs to account for the ability of a leader to observe the strength and resolve of actors 
who seek to resolve a common stake.  It also needs to provide a way for a leader to 
determine that a given actor is indeed providing assistance, instead of providing it to 
someone else or choosing the same issue position incidentally.  The former notifies a 
leader of the extent of cooperation; the latter of its purpose.  The rationale for sending 
different signals and using disparate forms of resources is unlikely to be the same. 
I place alignments on two dimensions: cost and discernibility.  The cost 
dimension refers to the price, both domestic and international, that a leader must pay to 
enter an alignment.  This cost can be based on the domestic opposition an issue position 
is likely to generate, the resources a state must allocate to the particular stake, and 
reputational costs an alignment can be expected to create.  Similarly, the deeper and 
longer the alignment, the higher the cost a leader must pay to sustain it.  Table 3.1 
provides some examples of alignments with different costs: a vote at the UN GA is 
unlikely to produce any of the three costs mentioned, while joining an ongoing war 
would impose high costs in each of the arenas.  The higher the cost someone is perceived 
to pay in order to align, the more that cooperation is valued.  The corollary is that states 
should be unwilling to offer this kind of alignment barring exceptional circumstances. 
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The discernibility dimension is more abstract, and refers to the ease with which 
another actor can determine whether the first state is specifically aligning with someone 
or making a general statement about their issue position.  Discernibility does not refer to 
the difficulty in figuring out a state’s issue position; rather, a low degree of discernibility 
makes it unclear who a state is aligning with in a multilateral dispute.  As a general rule, 
the more states involved in a stake and the later a leader takes a concrete position, the 
harder it is to establish whether one state’s issue position is meant to support or oppose 
any specific country.  That complicates any future demands for reciprocity. 
Discernibility is frequently the mechanism through which countries are allowed to 
save face in order to deescalate a dispute.  Any country taking a stance on a salient issues 
risks retaliation from countries finding themselves on the opposite side of the issue.  
Depending on the history of interaction and other factors, the ruler of the latter might find 
himself in a position where anything short of severe retaliation would lead to significant 
domestic costs.  As a result, a state that wishes to avoid putting adversary’s ruler in such 
a position would strive to act indiscernibly, allowing that ruler a way to deescalate the 
situation.  Israel frequently makes use of this strategy to bomb alleged arms convoys in 
nearby states.  By not openly admitting to these attacks, Israel provides cover for the 
rulers of the affected countries to do nothing, avoiding a potentially costly confrontation.  
Table 3.1.  Alignment Measure Based on Cost and Discernibility Dimensions 
 Discernible Semi-discernible Indiscernible 
Low cost  Treaty of friendship UN SG voting IL convention, UN GA 
voting 
Medium cost Early joiner in low-level 
MID or sanction regime 
Free trade area Multilateral alliance, 
accession to WTO 
High cost Early joiner in war  Regional customs 
union 
Joining war as part of a 
large military coalition 
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 Table 3.1 provides a non-exhaustive list of alignment policies and shows 
approximately where they fall on the cost and discernibility continuums.  The table 
illustrates several important points about the alignment measure and the concept of 
alignment in general.  First, we see that a more discernible alignment is not necessarily a 
more costly one.  It does not cost more to sign a treaty of friendship than it is to vote a 
certain way in the Security Council, but everyone will know precisely which states are 
cooperating only in the former case.22  If nine states vote “yes” in the Security Council, it 
is difficult to make the case that any state was aligning with or against any other specific 
state; it is equally hard to determine whether a ruler voted a certain way out of loyalty to 
another state, or if they was acting in their narrow self-interest. 
 Second, the alignment dimensions are not coterminous with issue areas.  Getting 
domestic approval for a preferential trade agreement can be as complicated and costly as 
getting support for a military alliance.  It was certainly a more arduous task for the US 
government to gain elite and popular support for the North American Free Trade 
Agreement than it was to gain support for drone attacks against Pakistan and Yemen. 
 Third, the table clarifies the relationship between alignments and alliances.  The 
latter are considered one possible expression of the former.  Unlike other forms of 
alignment, alliances require a present or anticipated enemy against whom the use of force 
is directed (McGowan and Rood 1975, 860).  They are a narrower category than 
alignments, which include expectations over behavior on a multitude of issues (Wilkins 
2012, 56).  Given that members of an alliance pledge to aid each other in the event of war 
                                                 
 
22 Based on the definition of alignment used here, a treaty of friendship can only be considered a form of 
alignment if another state opposes the signing of such a treaty. 
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(Holsti et al. 1973, 4; Snyder 1997, 4), we can say that alliances have a significant cost.  
However, we know that between 25 to 94 percent of states do not come to their allies’ 
defense – depending on the type of military dispute and alliance (Smith 1996; Leeds et al. 
2000; Leeds and Gigliotti-Labay 2003; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004)23 – and many 
alliances are never invoked, which makes the cost lower than of an actual military 
intervention.  Additionally, not all alliances are the same: the US alliance with South 
Korea is qualitatively different to NATO.  Both can also incorporate multiple alignment 
decisions over a long period of time, whether those are to maintain an alliance in the face 
of threats or to somehow alter it.  Thus, alliances are instances of alignment that could 
fall within different parts of the discernibility axis.   
A potential concern with the alignment measure is that it implies that states do not 
substitute in terms of different alignment forms.  For example, a state might choose not 
only whether or not to align, but also the method through which it aligns.  According to 
this logic, a state might demonstrate alignment by signing a military alliance, which 
might then make a free trade pact unnecessary.  Although there are undoubtedly instances 
where alignment substitution took place, there are generally a limited number of 
proposals that are put forth to distribute the value of a given stake.  One state might 
provide limited or extensive assistance to another state in the event of war, or perhaps 
vote to support that war at the UN GA or UN SC, but it could hardly declare that it would 
demonstrate its alignment by signing a treaty of friendship.  Nevertheless, one must be 
                                                 
 
23 Smith (1996) finds that only 25 percent of states come to their ally’s defense during a war; Leeds and 
Giglioti-Labay (2003) show that 35 percent of democracies honor their relevant alliances compared to 57 of 
autocracies; Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004) come up with 6 and 16.3 percent for the same categories, based 
on a different operationalization of alliance reliability. 
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cautious in interpreting a lack of one form of alignment in case two states cooperate on 
the same issue in another forum.  This task is outside the realm of this study, however. 
3.4 First Stage of Alignment 
The first step to appreciating why states align is to identify the interests and the 
constraints of the actors responsible for making these decisions.  When presented with an 
opportunity to align, statesmen need to make two separate, interrelated judgments.  They 
must determine whether they should take a stance on a disputed stake; at this stage, they 
choose between alignment and non-alignment.  If the leaders decide to get involved, they 
must consider whose side to take.  The first evaluation must be conducted before the 
second, though the factors influencing both stages of the alignment process overlap.24   
To grasp why leaders make sacrifices to align with other states, we must look at 
the global context in which they co-exist.  As economists frequently point out, we live in 
a world defined by scarcity.  No ruler, regardless of how powerful, is in a position to 
successfully pursue all of their goals at once.  Difficult choices need to be made.  Though 
rulers have some leeway in resource allocation, they have a strong incentive to 
concentrate on those resources that enable them to obtain optimal outcomes on issues of 
the greatest salience to them.25  These moves are not made in a vacuum.  There is a high 
                                                 
 
24 The decision to treat these two decisions as sequential is an analytical and methodological one.  The 
methodological rationale is simpler: one cannot choose which side to join in a dispute without first having 
taken a side.  There must, by necessity, be more observations in the initial stage.  Analytically and game 
theoretically, one can make an argument that states work backward: deciding whether they want to support 
a particular disputant before making the choice of joining or not joining a dispute.  Though that logic is a 
reasonable one, it presupposes the conclusion to be true, namely that past alignment matters a great deal.  In 
effect, a country like Australia is not going to join a war on the opposite side of the US, making the choice 
the get involved the primary decision.  However, the reason Australia would not consider joining the war 
against the US is precisely because of past or anticipated alignment behavior.     
25 One way to think about issue salience is to consider what portion of their time a leader spends dealing 
with the particular stake (Coplin et al. 1973, 78).   
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domestic cost for attempting to alter the status quo, whether due to bureaucratic or 
interest group resistance.  This path dependence means that once state resources are 
shifted in a certain direction, any attempt by a leader to radically change the pattern of 
allocation is going to be contentious and costly.26  For example, a ruler with several 
claims against their state’s territory knows that a strong military is necessary in case of an 
attack.  Consequently, they will dedicate a significant portion of their state’s resources 
toward the military.  Once those resources are allocated, however, it becomes difficult to 
shift the funding for another purpose, even if the territorial threats diminish. 
Alignment is a possible solution for leaders caught in the above trap.  They want 
to gain the ability to maximize the value from a particular type of stake, but have limited 
domestic means of accomplishing that objective.  Instead, diplomats make a bargain with 
a foreign counterpart: in exchange for that state providing assistance with resources in 
which it has what might be termed a comparative advantage, the first state will 
reciprocate on a stake in which it has that same influence.  An oil-rich state like Saudi 
Arabia might offer to provide economic assistance in a future stake to a state in exchange 
for military assistance against Iraq.  The United States, which has extensive military 
capabilities, can then accept that offer, knowing that it can fight a war at a relatively low 
cost, and might find ways to utilize Saudi Arabia’s non-military assistance in the future.   
One implication of this argument is that leaders will join disputes to whose 
resolution they can materially contribute.  A leader of a state with a weak military would 
face a high risk and a low reward for getting involved in someone else’s military conflict: 
                                                 
 
26 See Pierson (2000) for an overview of the role of path dependence in politics.  A key insight from 
Pierson’s work is that policies become harder to reverse the longer they are in place, meaning that 
exceptional circumstances are usually required before a state can reverse its past policies.   
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the reward would be low due to the low contribution, and the risk is high due to the real 
possibility of military defeat.  In economic matters, poor states do not have the capacity 
to provide financial assistance to others, as doing so risks worsening their own situation. 
 The above provides an international story of alignment.  Yet, leaders are no less 
constrained by domestic factors than they are by external ones.  Domestic actors have to 
be convinced that allocating resources to resolve other countries’ issues is a worthwhile 
endeavor.  These domestic actors have less information at their disposal about both the 
foreign actors and the stake over which they quarrel than their state’s leader.  They are 
also likely to be single-issue constituents, whether that issue is trade, support for or 
opposition to a specific ethnicity, or revanchism.  Accordingly, these domestic interests 
develop cognitive shortcuts and base their support or opposition foreign entanglement on 
past relations.  It is important to note that the role of history at this stage of the alignment 
process is not to decide which side to support, but rather to determine whether the 
potential intervener has a sufficient connection to the disputants to warrant action. 
The mechanism through which dyadic history exerts an effect relies on the 
relative power of domestic hardliners and accommodationists, and their ability to impose 
constraints on their country’s leadership.  A recent history of conflict between states 
empowers hardliners in both states, who are resolute in their opposition to cooperation.  
Any ruler urging compromise risks the wrath of those hardliners, which might lead to the 
leader’s removal from office.  We see this situation in Turkey today.  Reaching an 
acceptable agreement with either the Turkish Kurds or with Cyprus would be political 
suicide.  Similarly, a Pakistani leader who resolves the status of Kashmir or an Israeli 
leader who gives up eastern Jerusalem is likely to have a short tenure.  That is not to say 
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this kind of agreements will never be made.  A ruler might view the resolution of a long-
standing dispute as their top priority.  They might be willing to jeopardize their career to 
obtain this goal.  Sadat and Rabin gave up their lives to make peace with Israel and the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization, respectively.  The world has few such leaders.   
 To summarize, the choice of alignment over non-alignment is most strongly 
influenced by two factors.  First, statesmen are more likely to get involved in a dispute in 
which they can make a difference.  Otherwise, the participation might be infeasible or 
underappreciated.  Second, leaders will favor alignment on stakes involving countries 
with whom they have a history of interaction, whether positive or negative.  They do this 
as a consequence of domestic constraints on foreign policy-making.  Without a 
convincing story as to why a friend should be helped or an enemy punished, rulers will be 
unable to justify the cost of intervention to a domestic audience that is generally skeptical 
of foreign spending.  Fear, loathing, and obligation can all be used to override that doubt. 
 This logic leads to two straightforward hypotheses.  The first is that rulers will 
take part in alignments where their state can influence the resolution of the stake.  In the 
case of a military dispute, this could mean affecting the military outcome or decreasing 
the cost of conflict to alignment partners and increasing it for opponents.  The latter 
aspect might entail helping legitimize an attack or delegitimize an enemy’s moves.  
Without having that ability, their help would not be appreciated or they would be using 
up scarce resources to benefit an outside power.  The second hypothesis is derived from 
the fact that obtaining domestic support for foreign entanglement is not easy.  In order to 
persuade the public at large, or elites in autocracies, that sacrificing scarce resources for 
foreigners is a worthwhile endeavor, a country’s ruler must have domestic constituencies 
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that could be counted on to support such actions and a memory of past interactions that 
could be used to generate public feelings of hostility or friendship.  Both would shift the 
political cost of intervention from the leader to groups that are willing to bear it.  The 
rationale for past cooperation or conflict is less important than the fact they took place. 
H1: Leaders will partake in alignments in which their state has the capacity to materially 
affect the outcome. 
 
H2: Rulers will be more likely to get involved in disputes in which they have a substantial 
history of cooperation or conflict with one or more of the participants.   
 
3.5 Second Stage of Alignment – Dyadic History and Reciprocation 
The logic of the second stage of alignment extends that of the first stage.  The 
leaders’ motivation remains similar: attempting to court positive alignment, dissuade 
negative alignment, and gauging the likelihood of either.  In order to reach this phase, a 
leader must have made the decision to get involved in the resolution of a stake.  This 
means they believe they can materially contribute to the resolution of a dispute and have 
some history of involvement with one or more of the actors involved in it.  What is 
distinct about this stage of alignment is the importance of the original disputants.  The 
decision to join side A or B must be conditional on the intervener’s relationship with 
those actors, particularly as it relates to future reciprocation.  The most direct 
consideration is the recent history of conflict and cooperation between the states seeking 
alignment and the state providing it.  The second element is the urgency with which the 
intervener themselves needs assistance.  Third, the potential intervener needs a method 
for discerning the likelihood of obtaining that future assistance.  Finally, a dynamic 
component is added to explain breaks in alignment patterns.  With the goal of theoretical 
clarity, I initially assume that all alignments are the same, being influenced by identical 
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factors.  Later, that assumption will be relaxed, to show how the logic of alignment 
changes as the cost and discernibility of an alignment decision are allowed to vary.   
The obvious reason for a statesman to align with or against another state is 
because they have a direct interest in how a disputed stake is resolved and their issue 
position is closer to one of the conflictual parties than to the other.  If Switzerland wants a 
resolution to the Doha Round of WTO negotiations that is similar to the position of the 
US, it would not be surprising to see it back the US bloc.  This rationale for alignment is 
not very informative.  To expect leaders to act in opposition to their own interests would 
be to assume that they are not rational in any sense of the word.  The focus here is 
broader, exploring alignments that are made with a wider set of objectives in mind. 
The starting point for investigating the determinants of the second stage of 
alignment is the role of reciprocity.  If the main objective of alignment is reciprocation, 
then most instances of alignment should themselves be the result of that policy.  Given 
the benefit of obtaining positive alignments and avoiding negative ones, leaders have a 
strong incentive to unequivocally reciprocate both forms.  Building up a reputation for 
reliability means aiding those states that have helped you in the past, even if there is no 
pattern of hostility against the other disputant.  An added benefit of responding to 
positive alignments is that it creates goodwill and domestic constituencies for continued 
cooperation in the other state.  
The role of reciprocity in specific alignment decisions is complex and is based on 
factors relating to the dyadic, monadic, and individual-level preferences and constraints.  
For instance, the utility of future reciprocation can depend on the time horizon in which 
that reciprocation is expected to take place – particularly as it relates to the present ruler 
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still being in power when that future alignment should be made – along with the 
importance of the issue for which assistance is required and the substitutability of this 
country’s assistance.  A ruler might generally value a country’s support, whether because 
it is powerful or exceptionally reliable, and help that country today with the expectation 
that some new issue will arise whose resolution could be aided by this country.  
Major powers might also conceive of reciprocation in terms different to that of 
weaker states.  While the latter might want future assistance in an international dispute, 
the former might prefer to gain influence over the weaker state’s foreign policy.  This 
influence can be used to prevent the minor power from acting in a way that would require 
costly assistance down the line; major-minor military alliances frequently serve this 
purpose.  This does not mean that the major powers do not want reciprocation, however.  
They still value the legitimacy that they can obtain from the minor power’s diplomatic 
support and are in a better position to influence that state’s foreign policy if that state’s 
government does not attempt to resist it every step of the way. 
Next, reciprocating by not abnegating agreements is important because a refusal 
to do so might provide a short-term benefit but poisons relations with the affected states.  
There is little benefit to having a reputation as a spoiler, as the United Kingdom does in 
the European Union, or as a pariah state, like post-Cold War North Korea.  That is not to 
say leaders will always reciprocate.  Sometimes their assistance is not needed.  At other 
times, it would be counter-productive – the reason Israel was dissuaded from joining the 
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US in the first Gulf War.  On balance, leaders who were aided by another state in the past 
will be more likely to support that state than rulers of states with no similar experience.27 
There is also a personality-driven component to reciprocation.  For a leader to 
stay in power, they must care not only about the current dispute but also the next one, and 
that means compensating supporters for their past services.  This is a valuable skill not 
only for the leaders of states but also politicians and military officials who are striving to 
gain control of a state, whether through democratic procedures or not.  Elites who ignore 
this lesson are unlikely to reach the top of their country’s political structure or to stay 
there once they attain that goal.  The elites who do come to power can therefore be 
expected to be skilled at obtaining alignment from other actors.  Moreover, there is 
considerable anthropological evidence pointing to reciprocity being a constant in virtually 
all human societies (Singer 2011, 37).  It would be fallacious to argue that states will 
reciprocate solely because individuals who make up those states do so in their private 
lives.  However, it is reasonable to expect statesmen to not be entirely immune from such 
a fundamental element of human nature.28   
Leaders need to not only reward positive alignment, but also penalize those of the 
negative variety.29  Even though punishing negative alignment with negative alignment 
                                                 
 
27 The same logic applies to the domestic sphere.  Heaney (2004) shows that one of the strongest 
determinants of interest group cooperation in Wisconsin is a history of cooperation.  This holds even when 
a group has a short-term advantage in allying with someone else.  Jou (2010) reaches the same conclusion 
for coalition politics in New Zealand and Japan, where the experience of working together in past coalitions 
increases the likelihood of parties joining forces in future ones, even absent pre-electoral agreements.  
28 One reason why the interstate reciprocation described here might be less effective than most instances of 
inter-personal reciprocation is because the former is more calculated; humans tend to think less of 
assistance that arose neither spontaneously nor out of a desire to do what is right (Singer 2011, 43).    
29 As Singer (2011, 39) points out, “repay benefits” and “revenge injuries” are viewed as being inseparable 
elements of reciprocity.   
67 
 
can create a spiral of hostility, many leaders do not believe they have another choice.  A 
ruler who is first to end this cycle risks being called weak on defense by domestic 
opponents, a charge that can cost them significant public and elite support when the other 
state is viewed as a rival.  Ignoring negative alignments can also send a signal of 
weakness to other states; they would have nothing to fear from ignoring this leader’s 
interests in the future. 
Just as leaders react to past positive and negative alignment, they respond to direct 
acts of conflict and cooperation.  When given a chance to join a dispute on the side of a 
friend or on the side opposite that of a recent enemy, rulers will not hesitate to take the 
opportunity.  As was noted in the description of the first stage of alignment, hostile 
actions against an enemy or cooperative actions with a friend are relatively easy to justify 
domestically.  In fact, a leader not doing so risks paying a significant domestic cost.   
On a psychological level, past negative alignments generate negative affect, 
which feeds mutual antagonism.  Relations between such states are less a function of 
reciprocation than of retaliation.  Negative affect makes actors less interested in the 
inherent costs and benefits of a given alignment and more interested in paying a state 
back for past wrongs.  Every action by the actor is viewed with suspicion and intentions 
are assumed to be negative (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981, 196).  Any move that could 
conceivably be construed as targeting an actor will be interpreted in that manner.  As 
each act of hostility reinforces each side’s impression of the other as being aggressive, 
the end result is a breakdown in trust and an unceasing cycle of violence (Dreyer 2010).30 
                                                 
 
30 In fact, most conflicts are preceded by less intense acts of hostility (Corbetta and Dixon 2005, 42). 
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 The effect of dyadic history is not limited to factors that are measurable and 
observable; it is also a function of the unobserved causes of past and present conflict and 
cooperation.  The factors that steered states toward specific behavior on a specific issue 
in the past will, in all probability, be present in the future.31  We are unlikely to measure 
and operationalize all of those factors.  Instead, recent history can serve as a proxy for the 
unobserved factors that produced positive or negative relations in the past and might do 
so in the future.  It would not be surprising to see a country that fought a war with its 
neighbor siding against that neighbor in a future conflict.  This negative alignment might 
be made not just because of past hostility, but also because the issue over which the 
original conflict was waged was not resolved.  In this case, past conflicts can be seen as 
reflecting opposing interests over a salient issue.  Two hypotheses follow from this logic: 
H3: A ruler will align with the disputant with whom their state has a stronger recent 
history of positive alignment and against a disputant with whom it has a stronger recent 
history of negative alignment. 
 
H4: A ruler will align against the disputant with whom their state has a history of 
conflictual relations and with a disputant with whom it has a history of cooperation. 
 
3.6 Context-driven alignment   
Beyond the universal rationales for alignment, the willingness of a ruler to align 
with another state is most strongly affected by context-specific factors that significantly 
revise the expected benefit from alignment.  One of the dominant factors is the ability of 
one of the main disputants to inflict severe harm for a lack of alignment.  Rulers in this 
                                                 
 
31 As an example, past colonial ties is one of the best predictors of foreign aid.  A state that is undemocratic, 
mismanaged, economically-closed, and a former colony of a donor is more likely to receive aid than a non-
former colony that shares none of those traits (Alesina and Dollar 2000, 33).  It is probable that a colonial 
experience creates unquantifiable ties that lead to a continuation of cooperation after independence. 
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situation are dissuaded from aligning against a state due to an asymmetric relationship of 
dependence, including in the ability of the latter to have a material effect on the political 
process of the former.  The rulers are thus unwilling to align against someone who can 
inflict more damage to them than can the other side  
The classical domestic rationale for the relevance of relationships of dependence 
is when a ruler’s ability to stay in power is in doubt.  Few rulers are immune from 
domestic pressure, and most face a non-zero probability of getting removed from office at 
any given moment.32  However, incumbency has its advantages, and the proportion of 
rulers likely to get overthrown is rarely high.  The ones who do face an acute risk of 
losing power are willing to form alignments that they otherwise would not consider.  
With the emphasis being on staying in power, these rulers will have a strong incentive to 
align with states that have the biggest influence over their political systems and have the 
greatest capacity to affect the leadership struggle in the former’s state.33  They might then 
change sides when the domestic situation stabilizes, putting into question their reliability 
as alignment partners – a factor that will be examined later.  
Recent examples of unstable regimes opting to support a strong or influential 
neighbor include many of the states in Latin America.  In exchange for generous financial 
assistance and ideological support, the governments of Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, 
                                                 
 
32 In parliamentary systems, prime ministers have to be concerned with their party or coalition losing their 
majority in the next election.  Otherwise, the logic is the same.   
33 Barnett and Levy (1991) make a similar argument, though they do not take into account the external 
state’s influence over the potential aligner’s domestic system.  The authors note that Egypt became more 
inclined to back the Soviet Union after Egypt began to face severe internal and external threats in the wake 
of the 1967 war against Israel.  What should be added is that once the Egyptian leader, Nasser died, and his 
successor, Sadat, purged the country of pro-Soviet officials in 1971 (Qureshi 1982, 130), the reduced 
Soviet influence over Egyptian domestic politics allowed Sadat to become notably less pro-Soviet. 
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Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have joined the 
Venezuelan-led Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas.34  This grouping of states mainly 
provides diplomatic support for Venezuela’s international initiatives, and includes a 
smaller economic component.  While an argument can be made that these states align 
with Venezuela against the United States, and occasionally Colombia, due to shared 
ideological interests, it is equally probable that at least several of the leaders of these 
states play up their ideological similarity with Venezuela in order get resources that help 
stabilize their regimes.  Even though the United States is stronger and more prosperous 
than Venezuela, the latter has more influence over these states’ political systems and can 
act as a domestic ally or spoiler depending on how it is treated by them.  Similarly, 
Ukraine faces constant obstacles in disentangling itself from Russian foreign policy 
objectives due to Russia’s deep penetration of Ukrainian society (Wohlforth 2004). 
 The motivation for offering alignment as a reward for assistance is no different 
when that assistance is on an international issue.  No state has the capacity to dedicate 
sufficient resources to all salient international issues.  This leads to specialization and a 
dependence on other states for assistance in issue areas in which the state does not 
specialize.  It follows that a ruler’s choice of alignment partner will depend on whether 
there is an international stake they are deeply interested in.  If such a stake exists, the 
decision will likely be based on the ability of one of the disputing states or blocs to bring 
the leader close to obtaining the best possible resolution of that stake.  For example, a 
revanchist Italy allied with Prussia/Germany in order to reclaim Austria’s Italian 
                                                 
 
34 Cuba is also a member that receives extensive financial support from Chavez’ Venezuela, but it grants 
ideological support to Venezuela and not vice versa. 
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possessions.  Similarly, South Korea sent a total of several hundred thousands of troops 
to Vietnam to fight together with the American military with the expectation that the 
United States would continue to protect it against a militaristic North Korea (Kim 1970).   
 Even when a ruler is not in immediate need of assistance, they can nevertheless be 
compelled to align with a state because of an unequal relationship of dependence.  A state 
that depends on another for defense, as Micronesia and Palau do vis-à-vis the United 
States, dare not jeopardize that relationship by turning against their sponsor.  The same is 
true in the economic arena, where states that are more dependent on continued trade with 
a trading partner than that partner is with them will be loath to endanger the well-being of 
their economy for the sake of assisting someone else with their issue. 
 Accordingly, rulers will avoid aligning against states that impose a severe cost for 
their negative alignment.  Rulers are concerned not just with the resolution of one stake, 
but also of the resolution of other ones that might come up in the future.  Antagonizing 
someone that would be in a strong position to sabotage those efforts is rarely intelligent 
policy.  The stronger the dependence of the aligner on one of the disputants, the more the 
former will have to lose.  As a result, they will have little choice but to ignore their own 
short-term preferences in order to be in a better position for future conflicts.   
H5: Given an asymmetrical relationship between a potential aligner and an original 
disputant, the leader of the former will align with the latter. 
 
3.7 Perceived Reliability of Alignment Partners 
The next part of the alignment story deals with types of domestic institutions and 
conditions that are widely perceived to undermine the prospects of future reciprocation.  I 
focus on two frequently witnessed situations: when a regime faces significant obstacles in 
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responding to positive alignments, and when a regime faces similar impediments in 
countering negative alignments.  In the former instance – generally entailing an 
unrepresentative or unstable regime – the rulers might not compensate others for 
alignment because they are no longer in power or are forced into sharing power with 
previously disenfranchised groups that might resent the support other states have given 
their own when they were not part of the selectorate.35  The rulers might also be deemed 
unreliable because they broke alignment agreements in the past.  In the second case, a 
leader is confronted by numerous salient problems, and cannot dedicate enough resources 
to resolve all of them favorably.  This is the case for states with multiple rivalries, who 
are thus not in a position to respond to every provocation as it is made.  Whether a ruler 
cannot reciprocate positive or negative alignments, the lower expected value of a 
cooperative or conflictual response minimizes the likelihood of that state obtaining 
positive alignment or deterring the negative variety.   
 The more frequent handicap faced by statesmen is of being unreliable partners for 
cooperation, especially if their regime is unrepresentative or unstable.  States can be 
unrepresentative in two respects.  They can be unrepresentative because incumbents place 
severe barriers against anyone seeking to challenge them, as is the case in most 
autocracies.  This type of state has a greater than average chance of reversing its policies 
with a change in leadership.36  While democracies have previously been accused of being 
unreliable allies,37 several important democratic attributes have been overlooked.  
                                                 
 
35 One interesting manifestation of this resentment is that autocratic states that receive extensive American 
assistance end up becoming strongly anti-American as they begin to democratize (Ratner 2009).  
36 Leeds et al. (2009) find that leadership turnover in itself does not lead to abrogation of alliance 
commitments; rather, it leads to termination of alliances only when it happens in nondemocratic states. 
37 See Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004) for one of the latest restatements of that argument. 
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Democracies are better able to commit future rulers to current policies due to a stronger 
respect for the law (Gaubatz 1996, 117).  Democracies tend to have stable foreign policy 
bureaucracies, which augurs well for continuity (Gaubatz 1996, 118).  Democracies also 
find it difficult to mobilize support for change, leading states with this type of regime to 
respect treaties, even when doing so comes at a cost (Gaubatz 1996, 121). 
Furthermore, new rulers of an unrepresentative state are not likely to be chosen by 
the same selectorate, whether due to a coup or an expansion of the selectorate after 
democratization.38  Even when the old leaders are not overthrown, but instead pressed 
into forming a more representative government, foreign policy reversal might very well 
be a condition of the moderation in opposition demands.  This is particularly troubling to 
leaders aligning with a state when that alignment might be viewed as being supportive of 
the other state’s leaders and not its “people”.  Conversely, aligning against a democratic 
state that chooses its leaders through competitive elections will be perceived as an 
alignment against the “people” and not just the leader, with the people having a far longer 
institutional memory than their rulers.  Leaders come and go, but popular grudges remain 
to be stirred by political entrepreneurs over the long term (Brubaker and Laitin 1998). 
States can also be unrepresentative because they systematically exclude citizens 
from the political process on a sectarian basis.  Minorities that are left out of this process 
are unlikely to favorably view past alignments with their state’s leaders, and can be 
expected to not just ignore but retaliate against states providing these alignments.  The 
Tutsi rebels who overthrew the Hutu regime of Rwanda did not appreciate past French 
                                                 
 
38 I focus here on competitive executive elections and not democracy itself due to the former providing a 
clear link between institution and alignment behavior.  Seeing as the argument here is not a normative one, 
the quality of rule is not of great relevance to the subject matter. 
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alignments with Rwanda.  Equally, the Shia-dominated regime of Iraq looks positively 
upon Iran’s history of negative alignment against the former Sunni-dominated Iraqi 
regime.  The uncertainty over the type of future responses one might expect from 
sectarian regimes makes leaders hesitant to sacrifice their limited resources for what 
might end up a negative alignment.  To the extent that alignment might still be 
forthcoming to states with this institutional arrangement, it is likely to come from leaders 
of states that share the identity of the ruling ethnic or religious group.  In these cases, the 
latter are likely responding to domestic pressure for support of “ethnic kin” and might 
decide that the domestic cost of abandoning their “ethnic kin” might outweigh the cost of 
negative alignment if that “kin” is ever removed from power. 
 Rulers tend to avoid not only states with unrepresentative regimes, but also those 
with unstable ones.  Instability can lead to an about-turn in a state’s foreign policy 
direction or at least great variation in the latter.39  The more unstable a regime, the less 
likely it is to view the reciprocation of international favors as a priority.  Unstable 
regimes are also more likely to collapse than stable ones, which leads to the same 
quandary faced by states considering aligning with states that are sectarian or lack 
competitive executive elections.   
 A state’s perceived unreliability is a function not only of its institutions but also of 
its behavior.  States that did not fulfill their commitments in the past are unlikely to fulfill 
those obligations in the future.40  A leader that reneges on their alignment commitments 
                                                 
 
39 Maoz (2000, 126) shows that domestic instability increases the likelihood of alliance termination, though 
the operationalization reflects regional instability more than it is does monadic instability.   
40 Gibler (2008) finds that leaders who violate their alliance obligations are less likely to find alliance 
partners in the future.   
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to one state is unlikely to obtain positive alignment from any state, not because the latter 
might be friendly to the former’s victim, but because it might later be in that state’s 
position.  No one wants to put their well-being in the hands of a “traitor”.  
The mechanism through which the aforementioned institutional and behavioral 
characteristics undercut the ability of that state’s rulers to obtain alignment relates to the 
uncertainty over the regime’s future or its reliability, and therefore its ability or 
willingness to reliably respond to positive overtures.  This means that even leaders of 
states with these same characteristics will tend to avoid aligning with such states, though 
they might be more sympathetic than those not in the same situation.  States that are 
deemed best able to reciprocate will find themselves with more support than those that 
are not.  Even states with unrepresentative regimes will prefer to align with states that do 
not share this characteristic.   
The reverse logic applies to states that have their hands full of rivalries.  Instead 
of being unlikely to respond to positive alignments, such states are not in the position to 
reciprocate negative ones.  A statesman might be unhappy over a rival acting in a hostile 
manner or helping another state do the same, but the desire for action has to be weighed 
against the possibility of other rivals getting involved in the same dispute.  By shifting 
one’s resources to punish one rival for their conflictual policies, a leader creates a cost-
effective path for other rivals to get their way on other issues of importance.  Thus, when 
Iran’s Khomeini broke relations with the United States over America’s assistance to the 
previous Iranian ruler, Shah Pahlavi, he simultaneously invited an invasion by Iraq.  
Hussein, the Iraqi leader, believed that Khomeini’s hostility toward the US would 
preclude any US assistance for Iran and require Iran to use scarce resource to prepare for 
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the possibility of a conflict with America.  Though Hussein ultimately miscalculated 
Iran’s capabilities, the war with Iraq cost Iran a significant amount of blood and money. 
In short, leaders cannot afford to waste resources.  They never have the capacity 
to accomplish each of their objectives.  Prioritization requires those leaders to be 
selective in their foreign entanglements, and the best criterion for choosing those foreign 
partners is to focus on ones that are likely to return the favor.  Any time there are doubts 
about the ability or willingness of another state’s regime to positively reciprocate in the 
future, there is a strong disincentive to avoid assisting them to start with.  The same is 
true in reverse.  If a leader can obtain their objective on the cheap, they will choose that 
option.  When that leader has a strong reason to suspect that the object of their negative 
alignment might not have the ability to retaliate, their decision is made all the easier. 
H6: Rulers are less likely to align with states that are unlikely to reciprocate positive 
alignments and less likely to align against states that are likely to counter negative ones. 
 
3.8 Breaks in Alignment Patterns 
A careful examination of the alignment-inducing factors might lead one to 
question how alignment patterns can ever change.  If positive and negative alignments get 
reciprocated, and certain types of states are consistently denied alignment, then the same 
states could consistently be aligning with and against each other.  There is some truth to 
this analysis.  Maintaining strong relationships with the same states is generally less 
costly than constantly looking for new partners.  Cooperation with a given state creates 
domestic constituencies for continued cooperation, just as conflict with a state produces 
constituencies for continued hostility.  For less important relationships, bureaucratic 
inertia precludes change.  Bureaucrats maintain the policies of their predecessors and are 
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loath to do anything differently unless explicitly ordered to do so by their superiors.  
There are also reputational motivations for maintaining traditional ties.  A state that 
frequently changes sides will not be viewed as being reliable. 
Despite the many reasons for continuity in alignment patterns, change does occur.  
Alignment theory provides several mechanisms through which old alignments can 
fracture and new ones formed.  Each of the mechanisms was implicit in the previous 
section.  To start, many of the governments that are unrepresentative eventually 
democratize or at least remove sectarian limitations on political participation.  As the 
state’s selectorate expands, so do foreign policy demands made by the newly 
enfranchised groups.  As domestic peace takes precedence over foreign policy continuity, 
either the liberalizing regime or the one that replaces it face strong incentives to change 
course. This was the case for numerous Latin American states after their military rule. 
A shift in a state’s alignments can also result from an increase in domestic 
instability.  Rulers who suddenly see their grasp on power weakened or those who seize 
power themselves will be less focused on foreign policy issues than on consolidating 
their rule.  This means reversing foreign policy decisions when necessary.  This reason 
and the previous one point to another cause of a shift in alignment patterns: the 
ascendance of new stakes and the resolution of old ones.  One leader aligns with another 
because he believes the latter can help him achieve an important objective.  If the 
objective changes, the other state might be less able to provide the same assistance they 
did in the past.  For instance, the ruler of a state in a deep recession might attempt to get 
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loans to stabilize their country’s economy,41 and the states willing to provide these loans 
might not be the same ones who helped this ruler in the past.  The new stakes themselves 
do not appear out of nowhere; they usually appear in response to the rise of new critical 
issues.  These critical issues produce a series of crises until the relevant actors figure out 
a way to handle and eventually resolve them.42 
Just as new stakes can lead to fractures in previous relationships, they can help 
mend ties with former rivals.  As stakes over which states disagree disappear or become 
less salient, the rationale for hostility between those states starts to dissipate.  
Occasionally, these stakes are replaced by other ones in which former enemies now have 
common interests or common adversaries.  Hence, the rise of the Nazi threat led to an 
alignment between anti-imperialist and anti-communist Unites States, imperialist Britain, 
and communist Soviet Union.  Likewise, the deteriorating relations between Turkey and 
Israel are creating opportunities for cooperation between Israel and Greece.43   
H7: As a state becomes more representative, its leader will be more likely to change its 
alignment behavior toward previous alignment partners. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
41 Leaders facing large deficits also spend less on foreign aid – unless the media raises the political cost of 
not helping foreigners in need (Drury et al. 2005, 467) – which hurts their ability to pursue international 
objectives, because it presumably affects their ability to pursue more salient domestic objectives. 
42 See Mansbach and Vasquez (1981, 110-3) for a more thorough discussion of critical issues.   
43 The hypothesis relating to the rise of new critical issues and stakes would require a substantial amount of 
space to properly operationalize and test.  For that reason, it will not be directed tested in this dissertation. 
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Table 3.2.  Overview of Alignment Theory 
Alignment Factor Relationship with State A/ 
Changes within State I 
Alignment Outcome 
 
Dyadic history 
History of cooperation (conflict);  Align with A (against A) 
Recently received positive 
(negative) alignment from A 
Align with A (against A) 
Asymmetry favoring A Align with A 
Likelihood of 
reciprocation 
A unlikely to reciprocate to 
positive (negative) alignment 
Align against (with) A 
 
Breaks in alignment 
I becomes more representative; ∆ from previous behavior 
I becomes less stable ∆ from previous behavior 
 
3.9 Role of Cost and Discernibility 
The analysis thus far assumed that all forms of alignment were the same, and that 
only the motivation for alignment differed.  This simplifying assumption was necessary 
for theory development, but is clearly at odds with the empirical world.  States can align 
through, inter alia, joining wars, forming alliances, signing trade agreements, and voting 
at the United Nations.  They can also quickly join military conflicts or wait until they are 
all but over; they can help create an international organization or become the 190th 
member.  The determinants of one type of alignment are unlikely to be the same as the 
determinants of the others.   I now relax this assumption and show what happens when 
leaders are faced with a more complex reality.   
In the first stage of alignment, the cost dimension moderates the importance of 
secondary factors, namely a state’s potential contribution to the resolution of a dispute.  A 
lower cost of alignment allows weaker states to get involved.  The role of dyadic history 
remains constant across alignments of different costs.  There are a substantial number of 
issues for a statesman to get involved in at any given time, and some connection to one or 
more of the original disputants is a necessary for an issue to make the agenda.  Given 
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finite time and material resources at their disposal, leaders have no choice but to stay 
away from disputes involving parties whose amity or enmity they do not desire.  This is 
even true for low-cost situations, where reliable information about the issue might be at a 
premium, and leaders need to feel comfortable working with a specific state or have a 
grudge against it before they get involved. 
H8: The importance of being able to contribute to the resolution of a dispute decreases 
as the cost of alignment decreases.  
 
Unlike cost, discernibility plays no role in the first stage of alignment, because the 
choice of sides is not yet considered.  The same is not true of the second stage, where 
statesmen have to take a specific position on the resolution of a stake.  Rulers, like 
academics, cannot definitively tell whether another state aligns with them incidentally or 
purposively.  The weaker the indications of the alignment being of the purposive type, the 
less compelled leaders will be to reciprocate.  In general, indiscernible alignments are 
less likely to be reciprocated, precisely because they are indiscernible.  This makes it 
easier for leaders to align with states with which they do not have friendly relations, as 
was the case with Arab states during the first Gulf War, and to align against states they do 
not wish to offend.  Thus, on the occasions that leaders do align with non-friendly states 
or against neutrals or friends, they will do as indiscernibly as possible. Italy’s late 
entrance into World War I against its old German ally is a classic example of this. 
Discernibility also modifies context-specific alignment strategies.  A leader barely 
grasping onto power cannot afford to send ambiguous signals to potential saviors.  When 
aligning with the latter, the rulers can be expected to be as discernible as possible with 
their actions, making sure that the other state knows that they are the explicit target of 
that assistance.  The South Vietnamese leaders, for instance, knew that they had to openly 
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and convincingly support America’s initiatives if they wanted support against local and 
North Vietnamese groups attempting to overthrow them.   
Leaders interested in future alignment for international reasons will make their 
own alignments as discernible as circumstances demand.  They will err on the side of 
high discernibility when they anticipate needing assistance on a salient issue or when the 
specific state is particularly equipped to help them in resolving an issue.  The rationale is 
straightforward: discernible alignment risks alienating the state being aligned against, and 
this risk is only worthwhile if the benefit is sufficiently large.  A ruler attempting to join a 
major international organization, for example, will make sure their positive alignments 
with states that can veto this membership are as clear as possible.  A leader looking for 
rhetorical support in a less important arena will be more comfortable with a less 
discernible alignment policy. 
When it comes to discernibility with negative alignment, the rationale is similar.  
Rulers do not want to needlessly antagonize states that can inflict severe damage in 
retaliation, especially if that reprisal comes on an issue of importance to them.  As the 
potential for a menacing response increases, the likelihood of a discernible alignment 
moves in the opposite direction.  A country like Afghanistan, embroiled in a civil war 
that pits the government against externally funded insurgents, being too explicit in 
opposition to politically important states like the US, Pakistan, or Iran carries significant 
risks.  Not unreasonably, the Afghan government is rarely at the forefront in opposing the 
actions of those states, even if it has publicly disproved of their policies.   
Given the visibility of a discernible alignment, the beneficiaries of that alignment 
face pressure to reciprocate by both the domestic public and the state providing the 
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original alignment.  When an alignment is made quietly, on the other hand, there is less 
likely to be outrage over a refusal to respond in kind.  This applies equally to positive and 
negative alignments.  If indiscernible alignments are less likely to be reciprocated, then 
leaders in need of future alignment face a strong incentive to make their own alignment 
as visible as possible, raising the stakes for the actor on the receiving end of that support.  
Similarly, a ruler that wants to negatively align against another state without raising 
tensions would seek to minimize its public role in that alignment, allowing the opposing 
state to save face without feeling the need to retaliate.   
H9: Less discernible alignments are less likely to be reciprocated. 
 
H10: Leaders will make their positive alignments more discernible if they are dealing 
with states whose help is likely to be necessary in the future, and will make their negative 
alignments less discernible as the potential damage caused by retaliation increases.   
 
In essence, cost and discernibility either amplify or mitigate the importance of a 
specific manifestation of alignment, but do not completely reverse the posited direction 
of a theoretical relationship.  At the upper end of each of the two measures of alignment, 
the effects of the theoretically relevant factors are usually magnified.  At the lower end of 
that measure, the effects should be small or non-existent.  In some instances, including 
the entire first stage of alignment, discernibility does not impact alignment decisions at 
all.  In most cases, it is hypothesized to have a pronounced effect.  The cost dimension of 
alignment, the easier to measure of the two, has more notable effect on the first stage of 
alignment.  Where the cost is high, leaders of some types of states will be “priced out” of 
the market.  They may nevertheless feel compelled to engage in costly alignments when 
they are desperate for the other country’s cooperation on other salient issues.   
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3.10 Alternative Hypotheses – Balance of Power and the Democratic Peace 
 The capability research program is premised on several empirical claims and 
assumptions that cannot be reconciled with reciprocal alignment theory.  In particular, the 
capability program assumes that two states’ history of relations does not affect their 
policies toward one another - statesmen care about maximizing power or security right 
now, not who aided or hindered them from achieving that objective in the past – and that 
the best policy to pursue in the event of a war between other states is to support the 
weaker side, which is termed balancing.   
 Balancing is at the center of the realist school of thought, which is situated within 
the capability program.  Though some realists allow for bandwagoning – supporting the 
stronger side – in some situations, few would dispute the balancing logic when the 
potential intervener is a major power and the two combatants are evenly matched.  A 
failure to balance in that situation would cast doubt on other core realist claims.   
 Scholars concerned with the role of capabilities in promoting or preventing war 
pay minimal attention to the history of dyadic relations.  States are assumed to be 
rational, unitary actors whose main objective is to either maximize power or security.  
Domestic actors are assumed to be supportive of whichever foreign policy path their 
leaders benevolently choose.  There is thus no one to prevent countries from siding with 
their past enemies or turning against their former friends.   
HR1: Given a lack of power preponderance between disputants, the leader of a major 
power will intervene on behalf of the weaker disputant. 
 
HR2: Rulers will frequently switch sides in successive disputes. 
 
Chapter 2 went over the main aspects of the homophily research program, of 
which the democratic peace is an integral component.  The key proposition of the 
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democratic peace theory is that democracies do not fight one another.  Of greater interest 
to alignment theory is the question of why that is the case.  Democratic peace theorists 
offer several explanations.  The institutional variant argues that the ability of a 
democratic leader to use force is checked by other institutions.  As a result, force will 
only be used when it is widely supported.  Even then, obtaining such support is a 
cumbersome and time-consuming process.  This delay would allow a leader to resolve 
their disputes with other countries before hostilities are initiated.  If both disputants are 
democracies, then the odds of a non-violent resolution to the conflict is said to be even 
higher.  As an example, supporters of the institutional explanation of the democratic 
peace might point to the need of the US president to gain congressional support for a 
large-scale military action, and such support takes a long time to secure.   
The normative explanation is the other major mechanism used by democratic 
peace theorists.  According to this logic, leaders externalize their domestic conflict-
resolution norms.  In democracies, domestic disputes are resolved peacefully, without any 
threat of force.  The same is not true for autocracies.  Thus, democratic leaders will seek 
to resolve international disputes peacefully, while autocratic ones will not.  In a conflict 
between a democracy and an autocracy, both will play by the rules of the latter. 
Both of the explanations stress the importance of joint democracy for peaceful 
resolution of disputes.  If a democracy does enter a military conflict, it should be against 
an autocratic adversary, as those are the countries that lack the institutional restraints and 
democratic norms to reach agreements without resorting to violence.  However, 
democratic peace theory is ambiguous as to the course of action pursued by autocracies.  
Authoritarian regimes are said to be more violence-prone, but that need not be directed 
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against democracies.  They might have sympathy for other non-democratic regimes, but it 
is not clear if that should lead to military support for those regimes.  What is clear is that 
democratic peace theorists do not expect autocracies to support democracies. 
HD1: Rulers of democratic regimes will be more likely to align with other democratic 
regimes, while rulers of undemocratic regimes will not. 
 
3.11 Conclusion 
In summary, alignment is a two stage process.  In the first stage, a leader decides 
whether to take sides in an ongoing dispute.  The main criteria used by leaders at this 
point are: a connection to the disputants and an ability to make a difference.  If a ruler 
decides that they are willing to join the dispute, they have to make a new calculation 
regarding the specific side to take.  At the heart of this decision is the need to obtain 
future alignment on issues that are deemed salient.  In some circumstances – when the 
potential intervener has a highly cooperative or highly conflictual relationship with one of 
the disputants – the ruler faces severe constraints and will join on the side of the state that 
is supported by domestic interests.  The ruler will also be concerned with a reputation for 
reliability and reciprocate past alignments when there is an opportunity to do so.  
Being concerned with reciprocation, leaders will think twice about siding with 
rulers that might not be in power or have the ability to do their own part in the future.  
Specifically, statesmen will rarely align with rulers of unstable or unrepresentative states 
or those who have a reputation for reneging on alignment commitments.  Leaders of each 
category of states can get overthrown, forced to make major foreign policy concessions to 
domestic opponents, or otherwise be too preoccupied with domestic problems to play an 
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active role in international affairs.  In the end, these rulers find it difficult to obtain 
positive alignment, even from other leaders that find themselves in the same situation. 
3.12 List of Hypotheses 
The following are a list of hypotheses that provide the basis for alignment theory.  
Each refers to either an integral element of the theory or causal mechanism that will be 
tested in chapters five, six, and seven of this dissertation.  The first set of hypotheses is 
derived from the first stage of alignment, which looks at factors that encourage a leader to 
get involved in a dispute between other states.  The second group stems from the second 
stage, relating to the choosing of sides after an initial decision to align is already made.  
Both will be tested quantitatively in Chapter 5.  The remaining hypotheses incorporate 
the cost and discernibility dimensions of alignment types.  The accuracy of these 
hypotheses will be examined in chapter six.  Using the post-Cold War former Soviet 
Union as a case study, Chapter 7 will examine the causal logic of the main hypotheses 
relating to the role of dyadic history and past alignments in current alignment decisions.  
Stage 1 Hypotheses 
H1: Leaders will partake in alignments in which their state has the capacity to materially 
affect the outcome. 
 
H2: Rulers will be more likely to get involved in disputes in which they have a substantial 
history of cooperation or conflict with one or more of the participants.   
 
Stage 2 Hypotheses 
 
H3: A ruler will align with the disputant with whom their state has a stronger recent 
history of positive alignment and against a disputant with whom it has a stronger recent 
history of negative alignment. 
 
H4: A ruler will align against the disputant with whom their state has a history of 
conflictual relations and with a disputant with whom it has a history of cooperation. 
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H5: Given an asymmetrical relationship between a potential aligner and an original 
disputant, the leader of the former will align with the latter. 
 
H6: Rulers will be less likely to align with states that are unlikely to reciprocate positive 
alignments and against states that are likely to reciprocate negative alignments. 
 
H7: As a state becomes more representative, its leader will be more likely to change its 
alignment behavior toward previous alignment partners. 
 
Cost and Discernibility Hypotheses 
 
H8: The importance of being able to contribute to the resolution of a dispute decreases 
as the cost of alignment decreases.  
 
H9: Less discernible alignments are less likely to be reciprocated. 
 
H10: Leaders will make their positive alignments more discernible if they are dealing 
with states whose help is likely to be necessary in the future, and will make their negative 
alignments less discernible as the potential damage caused by retaliation increases.   
 
Alternate Hypotheses 
HR1: Given a lack of power preponderance between disputants, the leader of a major 
power will intervene on behalf of the weaker disputant. 
 
HR2: Rulers will frequently switch sides in successive disputes. 
 
HD1: Rulers of democratic regimes will be more likely to align with other democratic 
regimes, while rulers of undemocratic regimes will not. 
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Chapter 4 – Research Design 
 The current chapter bridges the gap between the theory and the empirical 
findings.  The previous chapter presented a new theory of alignment.  The theory 
emphasizes the direct role of reciprocity, as well as the pitfalls faced by states that are not 
deemed to be reliable in providing that reciprocity.  It does so in the context of an 
alignment measure, which places all forms of alignment on two axes: cost and 
discernibility.  From that alignment theory, the previous chapter derived eleven testable 
hypotheses.  Three hypotheses from alternative explanations were laid out in the previous 
chapter.  In this chapter, I outline a plan for testing those hypotheses.   
 Before turning to matters of model specifications and variable operationalizations, 
I am faced with the challenge of deciding on which of the many methods that are used in 
the field of IR is best-suited for testing the theory of alignment.  In the literature review, 
it was noted that most of the research on this topic has been of a qualitative nature, 
relying either on theory alone or theory coupled with case studies.  Only the homophily 
research program relies predominantly on statistical analysis.   
I take a different approach and start with two quantitative chapters, each with a 
separate objective.  The goal of the first chapter is to establish the importance of past 
alignments and dyadic history in present alignment decisions.  That purpose is best 
accomplished by looking at a large sub-set of alignment cases.  For reciprocal alignment 
to be a viable theory of the phenomena it deals with, it must be able to explain more than 
a handful of cases.  This requires examining as many cases as available data allows, a 
task not suited for qualitative analysis.  The goal of the second quantitative chapter is to 
gauge the accuracy of hypotheses relating to the cost and discernibility of alignment.  
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Given the large number of possible alignment types and the significant variation between 
the costs and variability of different form of alignment, a thorough investigation of the 
two concepts would require examining a large number of cases.   
The downside of using most forms of statistical analysis is that they do a poor job 
of establishing internal validity: evidence that the observed outcome occurred as a 
consequence of the hypothesized explanatory variables.  Internal validity has three 
components: temporal precedence, covariation between the cause and effect, and the 
ability to rule out alternate explanations.  The first two components are easily dealt with 
by standard regression designs, but the last component is a troublesome one.  There is 
always the possibility that a confounding variable is really responsible for the observed 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables.   
Furthermore, concepts in IR are notoriously difficult to measure.  This is 
especially true for concepts like alignment, democracy, and capabilities.  Without the 
ability to measure those concepts directly, IR scholars have no choice but to use proxies 
and arbitrary thresholds.  While the reliability of these measures is rarely in doubt given 
the frequent use of the same datasets and variables, validity is always a concern.  There is 
simply no way to determine how closely the variables approximate the concepts they are 
meant to represent.  This is particularly problematic if the measurement is systematically 
biased, something that is not unlikely in light of much of the data relying on 
governmental sources that have an incentive to twist the truth.  A government might, for 
instance, assert to its citizens that it is more powerful than it is, using that as a 
justification for entering a war.  There is no easy solution to this problem. 
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A secondary quandary rests on the ability to interpret complex statistical models 
when using many of the above-mentioned indirect indicators.  As Achen (2002) has 
steadfastly pointed out, including more than three variables in a regression model 
severely hinders the researcher’s ability to adequately understand the relationships 
between each of the explanatory variables and between those variables and the outcome 
measure.  Including too few variables causes concerns for an opposite set of reasons, 
chief amongst them the possibility of omitted variable bias.44  Though this criticism 
might be easier dismissed when investigating a thoroughly examined topic, it must be 
taken more seriously when looking at an under-investigated area of research. 
I take several steps to address some of the shortfalls with quantitative methods.  
To avoid creating arbitrary measures of alignment, I construct those variables on the basis 
of the work of Crescenzi and Enterline (2001), allowing for minor adjustments for 
reasons of theory.  Achen’s apprehensions with the use of too many variables are 
addressed in two ways.  First, I minimize the number of control variables, avoiding the 
inclusion of any variable that is not of theoretical interest and not theoretically linked to 
both the independent and dependent variables.  Second, I use contingency tables where 
possible to demonstrate the face validity of any proposed statistical relationship, before 
moving on to more complex statistical models.     
Without the ability to run an experiment or quasi-experiment on the topic of 
interest, I attempt to go beyond simple statistical correlations by incorporating a detailed 
case study.  The two methods address each other’s weaknesses.  Large N studies do a 
                                                 
 
44 Clarke (2009) nevertheless warns that adding extra variables to a model does not necessarily reduce bias, 
but could actually increase it.   
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good job of providing generalizable explanations, but a poor job of establishing causality.  
Small N studies face problems with generalizability, but do a better job of demonstrating 
causal mechanisms (Back and Dumont 2007).  Hence, I supplement the two quantitative 
chapters with a qualitative chapter, which uses a combination of the congruence method 
and process tracing to show that the causal mechanism postulated to explain the results in 
the quantitative chapters is really at play in a small sample of alignment cases.   
4.1 Introducing the Dataset 
The most basic issue that needs addressing when creating a dataset is what exactly 
is being investigated.  That is no easy question when it comes to alignment, a concept that 
has been incredibly difficult to pin down in the extant literature.  However, I have earlier 
provided a definition of alignment, which serves as the basis for identifying the unit of 
analysis and observation, namely: the stance a state takes on a well-defined proposal that 
is intended to resolve a stake over which two or more states have conflicting positions.  
This definition rules out several possibilities.  The unit of analysis cannot be a general 
foreign policy direction as the emphasis is on specific stakes over which states dispute.  
The unit of analysis also cannot be the initiation or participation in a dispute as that 
would violate the “more than two states” criterion.  Instead, I use a position on a stake as 
the unit of analysis.  This involves two states disputing some value and the leader of a 
third state deciding whether to intervene, and if so, which side to take.   
The question is intervene into what, and that is a question without an easy answer.  
Ideally, it would be possible to quantify all forms of alignment, create an index on the 
basis of each form’s cost and discernibility, and then attempt to explain variations in that 
index with the variables of interest.  Unfortunately, that is not possible for a variety of 
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reasons.  A lot of the alignments are not codified, many are not directly comparable, and 
there is a systematic bias in terms of which kind of countries are able to keep detailed 
records of their alignments.  These complications shorten the list of potential alignments.   
One possibility would be to follow the joining literature and use only MIDs or 
wars as the sole form of alignment.  That would risk conflating all forms of alignment 
with one very costly kind, however.  It would also restrict the domain of alignment to the 
military sphere.  Instead, I use four forms of alignment - wars, dangerous MIDs, non-
dangerous MIDs, and sanctions – as a compromise.  There is sufficient variation in the 
cost dimension between the four alignment types, and there is variation in discernibility 
within each form of alignment.  Data for these events is readily available and compiled 
by independent researchers, not governments.  Though the operationalization of each 
event contains a degree of arbitrariness – a war requires 1,000 battlefield fatalities for 
example – it still does a solid job of representing the underlying concepts. 
The unit of observation used in the statistical analysis is the potential intervention 
into an ongoing dispute.  This leads to two further questions: who can join and when.  
One can conceivably come up with a countless number of criteria for selecting potential 
interveners.  One strategy would be to include only the neighbors of the disputants.  
Doing so would entail deciding a priori the determinants of the first stage of alignment.  
It would also exclude the numerous instances of states getting involved in faraway 
disputes.  Another strategy would be to only include those states that have a reasonable 
likelihood of aligning with one of the disputants, what would be the equivalent to 
politically relevant dyads.  This solution, however, faces the same pitfall as the one 
above: we would be assuming up front what needs to be proven.  The only way to avoid 
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this problem would be to include the entire population of states that exist at the time of 
the dispute.  Every state can plausibly intervene, even if we know that a vast majority will 
not.  I thus follow in the footsteps of Corbetta (2010) and Melin and Koch (2010) by 
allowing any state to intervene in the first stage of alignment.  The existence of a distance 
variable at both stages of alignment ameliorates the effect of observations where 
alignment is unlikely to take place for loss of strength gradient reasons. 
 The second issue is deciding when the intervention is empirically allowed to take 
place.  The two studies mentioned in the previous paragraph allow an intervention only 
into new disputes.  The intervention, in turn, can only take place against the two initial 
participants in that dispute.  Hence, everyone joining World War I was aligning with 
Austria-Hungary or Serbia and no one else.  Similarly, all alignments in World War II 
were either pro-German or pro-Polish.  Yet we know that many of the countries that did 
eventually join those conflicts did not make that choice – assuming they were not 
themselves attacked – solely on the basis of the original participants.  A country like 
Brazil would clearly not willingly join a war involving two distant European powers.   
In light of the problem outlined above, I allow states to intervene into every new 
dyadic dispute.  I will illustrate this strategy using the Crimean War as an example.  The 
initial disputants to that conflict were the Ottoman and Russian Empires.  Thus, every 
state in existence in 1853 other than the two combatants – all 38 of them – is merged into 
the dispute dyad, leading to 38 initial observations.45  Out of those 38 observations, 3 – 
Italy, France, and the United Kingdom – are coded as having aligned with one of the 
                                                 
 
45 The list of states in existence during every year is obtained from COW’s State System Membership data.  
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participants, all aligning for the Ottomans and against the Russian Empire.  The coding 
does not end there.  France and the UK joined the Crimean War before Italy.  What this 
means is that France forms a dispute dyad with Russia, as does Britain.  For each of those 
dispute dyads there are a potential 38 interveners – every state in the world, including 
Ecuador which entered the system in 1854, minus the Ottomans, Russia, and the state in 
the dispute dyad with the Russian Empire.  As the UK and France joined the conflict 
simultaneously, each is allowed to align in the other’s dispute dyad.  Thus, France and 
Italy are coded as aligning with the UK in the UK-Russian dispute dyad, and the UK and 
Italy are coded as aligning with France in the French-Russian dispute dyad.  The Ottoman 
Empire is not included because its decision to enter the conflict took place before British 
and French involvement.  Lastly, Italy – the last joiner – gets its own dispute dyad with 
Russia.  Two more states, Iran and Egypt, enter the system by the time of that 
intervention, but there are no alignments with either Italy or Russia at this point. 
There is one major limitation to strategy adopted above, which is that states are 
forced to align with or against every other state that was involved in a conflict at the 
moment of the state joining it.  Consequently, Mongolia, which entered World War II 
four days before the conflict’s conclusion, is coded as aligning against Germany and 
Japan – the only Axis Powers still in the War in August 1945 – and aligning for 
Australia, Canada, China, New Zealand, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the UK, and the 
US.   A case can be made that Mongolia did not intend to support or oppose each of those 
countries.  But this intention does not change the fact that it indeed formed the 
alignments.  At the heart of alignment theory is that alignments get reciprocated, 
regardless of the reason for the initial decision to enter a dispute.  The Mongolian 
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alignment might matter less than the British one in 1939, but this factor is already 
incorporated theoretically through the discernibility dimension of alignment. 
To summarize, the unit of analysis is the intervention into an ongoing dispute.  
This unit allows the investigation of the determinants of specific alignment decisions 
instead of arguing about the highly ambiguous concept of foreign policy direction.  The 
unit of observation is every potential intervention into a dyadic dispute, which means 
allowing every state in the world that has yet to take a side in the dispute to join that 
dispute.  This step allows for examining the characteristics of the intervener and its 
relationship with the states that are already taking part in the conflict.  The intervention 
need not take place in the original dispute; countries are given an opportunity to join both 
the initial dispute dyad and every succeeding dispute dyad that is formed by other states 
entering the dispute.  This allows countries to align with states that were themselves 
joiners, as was the case for Brazil’s alignment with the US in World War II.  When a 
state is coded as joining a dispute, it joins it either on the side of or the side against every 
other state that is already party to that dispute.  Though not perfect, this procedure is 
consistent with the theoretical assumption that alignments will be reciprocated whether 
they are made purposively or incidentally.   
4.2 Methodology 
 This dissertation attempts to explain why leaders take part in interstate alignments 
and whose side they take when they do become involved.  Given that the dependent 
variable is a dichotomous variable, a logistic regression is used in a majority of the 
statistical models.  The first stage regression models attempt to explain entrance into an 
ongoing dispute, and the second stage models explain the choice of sides.    
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One of the assumptions of regression models is that the observations are 
independent of one another.  In IR research, that would mean that there is no temporal or 
spatial interdependence.  In practice, such interdependence is frequently present and 
researchers are normally advised to take concrete steps to minimize its impact.  I treat 
temporal interdependence as part of the explanation of alignment decisions, and not a 
problem to be solved.  Several independent variables, including the past alignment 
variable, incorporate a history component.   
Another issue relates to spatial interdependence.  The interdependence is a 
function of results within a class of units being correlated with one another, and ignoring 
the interdependence frequently leads to inflated standard errors.  Those inflated standard 
errors, in turn, make it easier to achieve statistical significance.  The class of units within 
this study where this could be an issue is the triad.  The intervening state might have a 
long-standing relationship with the two disputants and its alignment decisions for each of 
their disputes would thus not be independent of one another.  One possible solution is to 
use fixed effects, which is essentially adding each class, as a right-hand side variable.  
However, that is impractical in this case due to the low number of observations within 
each cluster.46  Instead, I use robust standard errors that are clustered around the triad.   
Selection is also a concern in this study, as it is in most research in IR.  The same 
factors that empower states to enter into alignments might make those same states prefer 
a specific side in the ongoing dispute.  For example, it has been hypothesized here that 
                                                 
 
46 A relatively low intra-class correlation of 0.18 was obtained by running a random effects model that 
included all of the independent variables and used war joining as the dependent variable.  A Hausman test, 
recommended by Green et al. (2001) as a way to decide between the use of fixed and random effects, is not 
able to run due to the low number of observations within each cluster.   
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high military capabilities should increase the likelihood of a state taking part in a military 
alignment.  It is conceivable that those same capabilities might also make a state side 
with the weaker party in the dispute, on the basis of balancing logic.   
The standard response to selection in IR is to use a two-stage model, usually a 
version of a Heckman selection model.  This is true despite many flaws with the 
Heckman Correction.  These include a poor performance in the presence of collinearity 
issues, inefficiency in the face of high selection bias, and a general inferiority to full-
information maximum likelihood estimators (Puhani 2002).  However, Monte Carlo 
simulations show that a Heckman estimator is only slightly less efficient than the 
alternatives when the collinearity and high selection bias problems are absent (Puhani 
2002, 65).  The estimator is also valuable for exploratory statistical analysis (Heckman 
1979, 160), though perhaps not as the main source of results.  For these reasons, a 
Heckman probit is used in an initial model in order to determine whether selection bias is 
an issue that needs to be addressed in further analysis.   
One set of models in the dissertation do not have dichotomous outcomes.  The 
models testing hypothesis 10, which deals with the causes of discernible alignments, use 
an integer as the outcome variable.  It is an integer indicating the number of states that 
had entered a dispute before the current intervener.  The variable is truncated in that it 
can take no value smaller than one.  An OLS regression would be inappropriate due to 
the variable not being continuous.  Instead, a truncated negative binomial regression 
model (Hilbe 2011, 346-53) is used to test the discernibility hypothesis.  As is the case 
with the other statistical models, the standard errors are clustered around the triad to 
control for any traits unique to a specific set of states. 
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 The temporal domain for this dissertation is 1816 to 1999.  That comprises nearly 
the entire modern era in international relations, starting from the post-Napoleonic era to 
the end of the millennium.   More recent years are not used due to the unavailability of 
post-1999 data for one of the independent variables.  As a partial compensation for 
ignoring the present in the statistical analysis, most of the qualitative chapter focuses on 
alignments made in the previous two decades, including one in 2013.   
4.3 Dependent Variables 
 This dissertation employs eight core dependent variables, four at each stage of 
alignment.  Those variables are war joining, dangerous MID joining, non-dangerous MID 
joining, and participation in a sanction regime.  The war variable is taken from the 
Correlates of War (COW) Interstate War 4.0 dataset.  To be classified as a war, a conflict 
must involve at least 1,000 battlefield fatalities.  To be considered a participant in a war, 
a state must contribute at least 1,000 troops to the war effort or suffer at least 100 battle-
related deaths.  The two MID variables are derived from Maoz’ Dyadic MID dataset, 
based on the COW Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset.  An MID is a dispute between 
states that involves the threat, demonstration, or use of force.  All wars are MIDs, but 
most MIDs are not wars.  I differentiate dangerous MIDs, which involve fatalities or are 
fought over territory – which can be expected to increase the salience of the conflict – 
from non-dangerous MIDs, which do not meet either criterion.47  The final dataset used to 
                                                 
 
47 Though it is possible that a leader might intervene in an MID without knowing whether it is “dangerous” 
or not, it is not very likely given the two criteria.  Leaders should be aware what the issue under dispute is 
long before they make the decision to commit their state to the conflict.  Additionally, while it is possible 
that a ruler can agree to join a conflict not expecting any casualties, it would make little sense to commit 
troops to a dispute and not expect some casualties to result from it. 
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create the outcome variables is the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions Dataset, which 
defines sanctions as “actions that one or more countries take to limit or end their 
economic relations with a target country in an effort to persuade that country to change 
one or more of its policies” (Morgan et al. 2006).  All the data is directed.48 
Table 4.1.  Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables 
 Total 
Observations 
Stage 2 
Observations 
Percent involving 
Alignment 
War intervention   51,650 3,476 6.73 
Dangerous MID intervention 242,206 3,446 1.42 
Non-dangerous MID intervention 467,196 8,532 1.83 
Sanction joining 249,266    398 0.16 
 
 These variables were chosen for a variety of reasons, primary among them being 
the variation in the cost of alignment between them.  Wars are obviously more costly than 
MIDs.  Dangerous MIDs are clearly more costly than other MIDs.  The latter make use of 
different tools from economic sanctions, though the costs of the two are usually not very 
different.  Sanctions were also included to diversify the issue areas over which alignment 
takes place.  A theory of alignment should not be limited to the military sphere. 
 The other main reason for these choices was, unfortunately, data availability.  
Problems arose from two sources.  First, many forms of alignment do not lend themselves 
well to being quantified, at least not in a time series cross-sectional design.  This served 
as the main impetus for including a qualitative chapter in this dissertation, which should 
                                                 
 
48 Directed data consists of directed dyads.  For example, in the Crimean War, there is a Russian-Ottoman 
and an Ottoman-Russian dispute dyad.  Directed data creates a symmetry in the data between the two 
disputants, which makes it possible to examine the correlates of joining state A. 
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be able to get at the many types of alignment that are more context or issue-specific.  
While the ideal dependent variable for alignment would include all sorts of multilateral 
agreements formed by states, which are much more frequent than military disputes and 
sanctions, there is no relevant comprehensive data available.  Even if there was such data, 
determining which states had the opportunity to join would be a highly problematic task. 
 The other obstacle to having a wider range of alignment types is the sheer 
inability of most international events to satisfy the criteria for alignment.  Most meetings 
between heads of state or their representatives do not result in a well-defined proposal to 
resolve a particular issue.  When agreements are made, a sub-section of them, usually 
relating to sensitive matters, are not made publicly available.  These agreements cannot 
be considered a form of alignment as there is no opportunity for domestic constituencies 
or other states to feel encouraged or slighted by the outcome.  An even larger segment of 
agreements is bilateral, and intentionally so.  Other states could not be said to have 
remained non-aligned on a stake on which they were not allowed to make their 
preferences known.  Finally, many agreements, especially those reached through some 
international forum, do not have two more conflicting sides.  In the UN GA, for instance, 
a vast majority of resolutions pass by consensus.  Trade agreements are frequently 
regionally-based, meaning that extra-regional states are not allowed to join them, and 
nearly all states within the region are party to the agreements.  An argument could be 
made that alignment should not require opposition; states might be considered aligned 
with each other even if they are not aligning against anyone else.  However, the definition 
of an issue requires there to be disagreement.  If everyone agrees on the resolution of an 
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issue, that issue ceases to exist.  As a result, it is inappropriate to label entirely 
cooperative behavior as being a form of alignment.   
The hurdles outlined above point to the advantage of using wars and MIDs as 
dependent variables.  The data for each is readily available.  Considerable research has 
been carried out using those variables, giving them a high face value.  Military disputes 
by definition require at least two sides.  They are rarely carried out entirely in secret.  
Based on past experience, we also know that any state can potentially join a military 
dispute, even if most states do not have the opportunity or willingness to take that step. 
4.4 Alignment Independent Variable   
 The main explanatory variable in this dissertation is the one representing past 
alignment.  Rulers that do not reciprocate past alignments face a severe penalty both 
domestically and internationally.  Domestically, the supporters of the status quo, who are 
usually numerous, would do their best to prevent an about-turn in their country’s foreign 
policy direction.  They tend to be invested in current positive and negative relationships, 
and do not look kindly on politicians that aim to undermine those relationships.  
Internationally, a refusal to reciprocate positively is viewed as a betrayal, which 
undermines a ruler’s ability to obtain alignment from the same state in the future.  A lack 
of negative reciprocation makes one an easy target for potential foes.   
The underlying mechanism for generating the alignment variable is taken from 
Crescenzi and Enterline (2001), who create a variable to represent a dyad’s history of 
interaction.  Their variable is composed of multiple elements.  First, the authors change 
the interaction score whenever an event occurs in a dyad.  That score is influenced by the 
severity of the event and the amount of time since the last such event took place.  The 
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more severe the event and the lower the duration between the current event and the 
previous one, the larger the change in the interaction score. 
Crescenzi and Enterline (2001) further create a decay function, which lowers the 
interaction score over time.  The decay is based not only on the passage of time, but also 
the amount of activity that preceded the initiation of the decay.  The interaction score of 
dyads that had a greater amount of cooperation or conflict decays at a slower rate than of 
states with fewer previous interactions.  The score is bounded between -1 and 1. 
I leave the basic structure of the variable, but make several changes to make it 
more consistent with the concept of alignment introduced in this dissertation.  The first 
difference is that dyadic events are replaced by past alignments.  Instead of using an MID 
between the states in a dyad as the basis for coding the conflict aspect of the variable, I 
do the same with one of the states in the dyad aligning for or against the other state in a 
dispute in which it was not an original participant.  The state that aligned in the past is 
either state A or state B, meaning that the potential intervener, state I, is responding to 
that past alignment.   
The second change is that the severity aspect of the variable is created on the 
basis of the previous alignment type and not the severity of the MID.   The original 
variable used the hostility level of the MID as the proxy for severity.  The severity 
therefore ranged from 2 to 5 depending on whether the MID involved a threat of force, a 
demonstration of force, a use of force not involving 1,000 battlefield fatalities, and a use 
of force that resulted in over 1,000 battlefield fatalities.  I code an alignment into a war as 
producing a severity level of 3, an alignment into a dangerous MID as producing a 
severity level of 2, and an alignment into a non-dangerous MID or a sanctions regime as 
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producing a severity level of 1.  This is more consistent with the cost of alignment 
concept than the version used by Crescenzi and Enterline (2001). 
The last change to the variable is to include a discernibility component.  Every 
alignment has its score multiplied by a factor of 0.04 depending on how late the 
alignment took place.  The first state to take part in an alignment has its score multiplied 
by 1, the second state by 0.96, the third by 0.92, etc.  Due to the sanctions dataset not 
including the timing of the sanction initiation, I instead use the number of sanctioners to 
denote discernibility.  The greater the number of sanctioners, the less discernible the 
alignment.  The number of sanctioners ranges from 2 to 5.  A state that was part of a 3-
state alignment would see its alignment score multiplied by 0.92.  That number decreases 
to 0.84 for a four state alignment, and 0.76 for a five state alignment.  The purpose of this 
step is to reduce the importance of alignments that were made less discernibly.   
4.5 Operationalization of Other Independent Variables 
 Some form of the other theoretically important factors is available in other studies 
of the subject, and their operationalization is thus more straightforward.   To start, the two 
factors hypothesized to affect the likelihood of a state joining an ongoing dispute is the 
ability to make a material contribution to the resolution of that dispute and a connection 
to the disputants.  The latter plays a key role in persuading a leader’s winning coalition to 
support their spending of resources on international objectives, something that is rarely 
domestically popular.  I use two variables to operationalize the first factor: military 
capabilities and proximity to the disputants.  The latter allows a state to employ their 
resources in a dispute, and the former determines how many resources they can employ.  
Specifically, the military capabilities variable is coded as a state’s amount of military 
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personnel, as determined by COW’s National Material Capabilities dataset.  The 
proximity variable is a count of the number of states in the dispute dyad that are within 
100 miles of the potential intervener. 
 Two variables are used to denote a connection to the disputants.  The connection 
can be either positive or negative.  The first counts the amount of states in the dispute 
dyad that are allied to the potential intervener, using the data from the Alliance Treaty 
Obligations and Provisions Project (ATOP).  The second counts the number of countries 
in the dispute dyad that fought an MID with the potential intervener within the previous 
five years.  The five year span is the same as the one used to construct the alignment 
variable.  Using behavioral proxies for ties is also consistent with alignment theory, 
which argues that past behavior of other states affects the relative strength of domestic 
hardliners and accommodationists as it pertains to the foreign policy toward those states. 
 I now turn to operationalizing the factors hypothesized to affect the second stage 
of alignment.  The coding rules for the past alignment variable have already been 
discussed.  The dyadic history factor, central to hypothesis 4, is split into two parts.  The 
hostility aspect is operationalized as a dyadic version of the past alignment variable.  It is 
calculated on the basis of Crescenzi and Enterline’s (2001) conflict interaction level 
variable.  That variable is coded on the basis of the severity of MIDs in a dyad, 
moderated by the frequency of interaction in the dyad, the amount of time between 
disputes, and the amount of time since the last dispute.  I make one change to this 
variable, replacing the severity of MIDs with my measure of dispute severity.  Hence, 
instead of the severity taking the values 2, 3, 4, or 5 on the basis of the hostility level of 
the MID, it takes the value 3 for a war, 2 for a dangerous MID, and 1 for non-dangerous 
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MID and sanctions.  The final version of the variable is calculated as the intervener’s 
score with state A minus its score with state B.   
 The cooperative side of the variable is coded in terms of the intervener’s alliance 
ties with the two disputants, on the basis of the ATOP database.  To get the maximum 
value for this variable, the intervener has to be allied with state A but not state B.  For 
example, if a war is being fought between Britain and Germany, the US is allied to the 
former but not the latter, and the US is considering joining the war, the variable would 
have the maximum value.  To get the minimum value, the reverse must be true.   
 The fifth hypothesis deals with asymmetry.  Rulers want to avoid offending states 
whose continued cooperation matters more to the intervener than to the other state.  One 
of the most obvious examples of this form of a relationship is when there is an 
asymmetrical trade relationship.  Using COW’s International Trade Data 3.0 dataset, a 
sensitivity to country-specific trade is calculated for State I vis-à-vis states A and B.  The 
higher the portion of state I’s exports and imports to State A as percentage of its GDP 
compared to the reverse relationship, the more dependent State I is on the continued 
goodwill of state A.  The same figure is calculated for State I’s trade ties with state B, and 
this number is then subtracted from its IA counterpart.  Due to the lack of availability of 
GDP statistics before 1950, this variable does not take any values before that year, 
meaning that any model using this variable also examines the time period from 1950. 
 The sixth hypothesis is crucial to alignment theory and claims that states that are 
assumed to be unreliable at reciprocating positive alignment will fail at obtaining that 
form of alignment, and states unlikely to reciprocate negative alignment are very likely to 
end up with the negative variety of alignment.  The first form of unreliability is captured 
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by variables denoting the representativeness and stability of a country’s ruling regime.  
An easy way of operationalizing the former would be to use a ready-made democracy 
variable, such as widely used Polity score.  However, that variable and others like it 
consist of many components, many entirely unrelated to the perceived reliability of the 
state’s ruler.  What matters for alignment theory is whether the selectorate for the 
executive office is likely to expand in the future, thereby leading to a reversal in foreign 
policy priorities.  The variable that best approximates this situation is Polity IV’s 
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment variable.  According to this variable, an 
executive could be selected through a non-democratic process, elected through a fair 
election, or be somewhere in between.  To be deemed reliable, a state’s executive must be 
chosen democratically.  Other forms of regimes risk being overthrown by factions with 
other foreign policy goals or being expanded to include those same groups.  One is added 
to the representativeness variable if State A has the maximum executive recruitment 
score of 3, and one is subtracted if the same is true for state B.   
 Operationalizing the instability variable is a more complex task.  There are no 
available variables that directly measure the concept.  Instead, the instability variable is a 
composite of two factors that stoke instability: whether the state is experiencing a civil 
war and whether the state is newly independent.  COW’s Intra-State War Data is used for 
the former and COW’s State System Membership is used for the latter.  One is added to a 
state’s instability score if it is experiencing a civil war and if it obtained independence in 
the previous five years.  As is the case with the other stage 2 variables, the instability 
score for State B is subtracted from state A’s score to form the final variable.  
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 I also use a behavioral version of reliability, which looks at whether a ruler had 
reneged on their alliance commitments with both the potential intervener and all states in 
general.  It is a marked difference from the previous two reliability variables, which were 
concerned with the functioning of a country’s institutions or lack thereof.  The alliance 
reliability variable is borrowed from Crescenzi et al. (2012).  The variable is coded in a 
very similar manner to the dyadic history one.  Rulers can lower their state’s reliability 
score by not carrying out their alliance commitments to either the intervener or any other 
state in the system.  The score is weighed toward alliance decisions with states that are 
similar to the intervener.  The reliability score decays over time, and the decay is more 
rapid for states with fewer alliances.  The final version of this variable subtracts state B’s 
alliance reliability vis-à-vis the intervener from the same score for state A. 
 To code the distraction variable that precludes states from reciprocating negative 
alignment, I count the number of Thompson strategic rivals a state possesses in the given 
year excluding a possible rivalry with the intervener.49  The greater the number of rivals, 
the less able is a state to retaliate for any specific rivals’ negative alignment.  Responding 
to every slight risks creating an opening for other rivals; it also uses up resources that can 
be better used to deter the other rivals from pursuing their objectives more aggressively.   
 Variables relating to discernibility are coded in a manner similar to past 
alignment.  The earlier a state joins a dispute relative to other interveners, the more 
discernible is their alignment.  Leaders that join disputes late can reasonably claim that 
                                                 
 
49 See Thompson (2001) for the coding scheme used to generate the rivalries.  The reason this rivalry 
measure is used instead of Klein et al.’s (2006) enduring rivalries is due to the latter being defined in terms 
of MIDs.  That variable can therefore not be used to predict MIDs.  The Thompson rivalry variable, on the 
other hand, is based on psychological factors and therefore avoids this quandary.   
108 
 
their entrance was less a function of their opposition to the state they aligned against than 
as a favor to one of the states on the other side.  Historically, states that joined conflicts 
later did not become victim of the same kind of victor’s justice that the primary 
combatants ended up dealing with.  The coding of discernibility makes use of a count 
measure, and corresponds to the number of states that were involved in the dispute before 
the particular state’s alignment.  A higher number corresponds to a less discernible form 
of alignment.  The coding rules apply to the war and MID variables; sanction variables 
are treated differently for reasons outlined above.  A more discernible alignment for those 
cases is one where there are fewer parties to the sanction regime.   
Two control variables, which correspond to a leader’s opportunity and willingness 
to get involved in a dispute, are used.  One is the distance between the intervener and the 
two combatants.  A positive value denotes that the intervener is geographically closer to 
State A than to state B.  A negative value does the opposite.  The main reason this control 
is included is due to its potential role in generating selection bias: proximate states are 
more likely to have extensive contact with their neighbors, which might lead to both 
alliances and conflict with interveners on one the hand and intervention into those 
disputes on the other.  In terms of methodology, this variable and the next one were 
partially included because they were not strongly correlated with any of the independent 
variables, which would otherwise complicate the interpretation of the latter’s effects.   
The second control variable is the similarity in alliance portfolios (Signorino and 
Ritter 1999) between the disputants and the intervener.  The variable, also called the S-
Score, is traditionally used as a proxy for interest similarity.  The thinking is that if two 
states have similar allies, they also share common interests.  If we take this claim at face 
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value, then controlling for this variable blunts a possible attack against the alignment 
variable, namely that states align due to similar interests and not past behavior.  Including 
this variable would remove another potential source of omitted variable bias.  This 
variable, like most of the other ones in this section, is coded by subtracting the S-Score 
for the IB dyad from its IA counterpart.  Accordingly, if the US is looking to intervene in 
a conflict between India and Pakistan, and has an S-Score of 0.5 with India and 0.1 with 
Pakistan, the value for this variable would be 0.4.  The coding rules for the other 
variables are detailed in the results section.   
Table 4.2.  Summary of Concepts and Measures 
Concept Variable Operationalization 
First stage alignment Joining a war 
Joining a dangerous MID 
Joining a non-dangerous 
MID 
Joining a sanction regime 
Dichotomous variable denoting 
whether a country joined an ongoing 
dispute 
Second stage alignment Taking sides in above Joined on side A: yes or no. 
Contribution to issue 
resolution 
Military personnel 
Distance from disputants 
Number of military personnel 
Less than 100 miles to how many sides 
Connection to disputants Recent MIDs 
Ongoing military alliance 
MIDs within 5 years and ongoing 
alliances with how many sides 
Past alignment Recipient of alignment Past recipient of positive or negative 
alignment, adjusted for the cost, 
discernibility, and decay over time 
Dyadic history Recent MIDs 
Ongoing military alliance 
MID within 5 years with A – B 
Ongoing alliance with A - B 
Asymmetry  Economic dependence Trade as proportion of GDP with A- B 
Unreliability Unrepresentative 
Unstable 
Unreliable behavior 
Unlikely to retaliate 
How is executive chosen (Polity IV) 
Civil war or newly independent 
Reneged on alliance, decay over time 
Number of Thompson rivalries 
Cost War > dangerous MID > 
other MID = sanctions 
Refers to alignment type 
Discernibility Order of joining dispute 
Taking part in sanctions 
Number of states joining dispute first 
Number of states involved in sanctions 
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4.6 Hypothesis Testing 
In Chapter 5, I begin the testing of alignment theory by examining the descriptive 
statistics for each dependent and independent variable.  This is followed by a set of 
contingency tables, pitting first stage alignment variables on one side and the first stage 
alignment dependent variable on the other.  The goal is to see whether there is a 
sufficiently clear association between the two groups of variables to continue with more 
formal statistical models and hypothesis testing.  Once that is taken care of, a logistic 
regression is used to determine the effectiveness of the first stage independent variables 
in explaining the variation in alignment joining.  Those variables are military personnel 
and contiguity, used to denote a state’s ability to make a difference in a dispute, and the 
existence of alliance ties and recent military conflicts with the disputants, used to denote 
a connection to the conflictual parties.   
Following the logistic regression for the stage one variables and predicted 
probabilities that assess the substantive effect of those factors, the same is done for the 
second stage of alignment.  The three variables used to represent the history of relations 
are past alignment, recent dyadic conflict, and ongoing alliance ties.  Each signifies an 
element of diplomatic relations that would strengthen domestic forces in the intervening 
state that would push toward involvement in the dispute.  These variables are examined 
in contingency tables, before they are included in a probit regression.  These factors are 
joined by variables used to denote a state’s unreliability in reciprocating positive or 
negative alignments, and a variable indicating a dependence of the intervener on the 
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disputants.  With no sufficiently similar research in existence to justify omitting some of 
the variables from the model, they are all included in the same probit regression.50 
After investigating the separate effects of the first and second stage variables on 
alignment decisions, the two sets of variables are included in the same Heckman probit 
selection model.  The object is to see whether errors in the two stages of alignment are 
correlated, thereby representing the existence of selection bias.  If selection bias is 
present, future statistical models need to take that factor into account.   
Finding no selection, I re-examine the previous model under unfavorable 
conditions to see how robust it is to model specifications.  A logistic regression is used in 
models that exclude the world wars – which comprise a large portion of the data – and 
split the empirical domain into the pre and post 1945 time periods.  This is followed by 
the examination of the seventh hypothesis, dealing with changes in alignment behavior 
due to changes in regime characteristics, through the use of a contingency table.  A more 
advanced analysis is not possible given the lack of relevant observations. 
I conclude Chapter 5 by looking at critical tests that seek to isolate the empirical 
predictions of reciprocal alignment theory from those of balance of power and democratic 
peace theories.  Critical tests against both competing explanations of alignment make use 
of a combination of contingency tables and logistic regressions.  In both cases, one model 
performs the test under neutral conditions, while at least one other model does so under 
conditions favorable to the alternative explanations of alignment.   
                                                 
 
50 A probit is used instead of a logit in these models to make the results more comparable to the ones 
obtained in the Heckman probit model.   
112 
 
The first half of Chapter 6 expands upon the results of Chapter 5 by including non-
war dependent variables in every table.  Instead of gauging the impact of the alignment 
and unreliability measures on only one form of costly alignment, the chapter broadens the 
scope of the testing to alignments of a lower cost.  Thus, most of the tables have four 
separate dependent variables – the joining of wars, dangerous MIDs, non-dangerous 
MIDs, and sanction regimes – whose correlates are examined with the aid of logistic 
regressions.  The same is true for the critical tests that compare reciprocal alignment 
theory to the competing frameworks.  The only difference from the previous chapter is 
that the theories are tested for each of the four types of alignment instead of just on wars.   
One difference from Chapter 5 is that the theoretically relevant variables are used 
to individually predict alignment decisions.  Using 50 percent as the baseline probability, 
I check how much the predictive power of a logistic regression model improves with the 
inclusion of the individual variables.  For example, does including only the past 
alignment variable in a model lead to predicted probabilities of alignment that are more 
consistent with the historical record than could be expected through pure chance. 
Lastly, the discernibility hypothesis is examined with the help of a zero-truncated 
negative binomial regression.  The dependent variable in these models is the order of a 
state’s intervention into a dispute.  According to the proposed theory, the earlier the 
intervention, the more discernible it is perceived to be, and the more likely it is to be 
reciprocated.  The models are zero-truncated because the number counting the order of 
intervention cannot be zero or negative.  A negative binomial model is used because it 
examines count data and that data is over dispersed, meaning there is greater variation in 
the dependent variable that would otherwise be expected.  This is the case because in 
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every multilateral war, some country will be the second to join the dispute, while only a 
handful of disputes are large enough to allow a country to join eighth or tenth.  These 
models look at whether theoretically important variables affect the order of intervention. 
4.7 Former Soviet Union Case Study 
In Chapter 7, I tentatively test the causal mechanism of the reciprocal alignment 
theory through the use of case studies.  When proposing a new theory, as is the case here, 
it is insufficient to demonstrate a statistical link between the independent and dependent 
variables.  It is also necessary to show that the proposed causal mechanisms have real 
explanatory power.  This requires eliminating the possibility of the mechanism being 
spurious or vacuously true.  Case studies are adept at addressing these shortcomings.    
 Case studies do face the challenge of external validity.  Explanations that fully 
explain a few cases might not be generalizable onto a wider population.  A related issue 
is the degrees of freedom – a researcher tries to explain a single or a few cases with 
multiple variables – which is part of a bigger problem of indeterminate research designs.  
In those designs, evidence can be consistent with an infinite number of potential 
explanations (George and Bennett 2005, 30).  A small-N weakens one’s ability to rule out 
those potential explanations.   
One way to expand the number of observations within a few cases is to use a 
within-case analysis.  By examining the same country at different points in time, a 
researcher can eliminate many confounding variables.  Though history is always messy, 
making it impossible to isolate the effects of a single variable even within a single case, 
within-case analysis minimizes the effect of omitted variables, thereby leading to a more 
efficient estimate of the explanatory variables’ effects.   
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The specific case study method that will be used in Chapter 7 is the method of 
congruence.  It aims to determine whether an outcome is congruent with the hypothesized 
explanation for it (George and Bennett 2005, 181).  For instance, if one is testing balance 
of power theory, the Soviet alignment against Nazi Germany in 1941 – a major power 
siding against the stronger side in a war - would be congruent with the claims of that 
theory.  For reciprocal alignment theory, a positive past alignment coupled with a 
reciprocated alignment by the other side would be evidence of congruence.  Two states 
with a negative history of bilateral relations would be expected to negatively align against 
each other when given the opportunity.  A failure to do so would suggest incongruence.   
A major weakness with the congruence method is that it does a poor job at 
eliminating alternative explanations for the same phenomena.  The outcome might be 
congruent with the proposed theory, but also be congruent with other explanations.  We 
would thus have no way of determining which of the theories have greater explanatory 
power.  In the Soviet-Nazi Germany example, it is obvious that the reason the Soviet 
Union aligned against Germany was because it was attacked.  Congruence does a poor 
job of ruling out such vacuous explanations.  One way around this problem is to couple 
the congruence method with process-tracing, investigating whether proposed causal 
mechanisms were responsible for the outcome (George and Bennett 2005, 183).   
The relative simplicity of the causal mechanism in the reciprocal alignment theory 
does not entirely allow us to dismiss other possible explanations of alignment even if the 
causal mechanism did lead to the hypothesized result.  To rectify this flaw, the alignment 
theory is tested against two alternative explanations: balance of power and homophily, 
operationalized in terms of regime type.  Thus, for every alignment decisions, two steps 
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are taken.  First, I check whether the outcome is consistent with the theoretical 
expectations of reciprocal alignment theory and those of the balance of power and 
homophily theories.  Second, I determine whether the congruence can be attributed to 
spuriousness.  If the latter is true, then the congruence cannot be considered evidence in 
support of a given theory (George and Bennett 2005, 185). 
The congruence method is sensitive to the possibility of selection bias.  If cases 
are chosen in a manner that favors the hypothesized link, then any potential congruence 
can easily be attributed to the research design rather than to a legitimate causal link 
between the independent and dependent variables.  Consequently, the cases need to be 
chosen on the basis of clear criteria that does not privilege some explanations of 
alignment over others.  What those criteria are depends on the subject matter and the 
characteristics of the proposed explanations for the outcome variable.   
To take advantage of the strengths of the congruence method, case studies must 
be chosen that limit the potential number of explanations for a given phenomenon.  One 
way of accomplishing this objective is to choose countries that did not yet have an 
opportunity to develop a complex set of relationships with a multitude of states.  Having 
fewer relationships means having fewer actors attempting to influence the relevant 
decisions.  It would also be useful to choose countries with a limited exposure to the rest 
of the world.  By limiting the number of interconnected issues that could influence a 
specific outcome, it becomes easier to isolate motivations for the taking of specific issue 
positions.  Both of these criteria lessen the impact of equifinality.51 
                                                 
 
51 The concept of equifinality holds that there are multiple casual paths, which can be used to produce 
multiple explanations for the same outcome.    
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 The non-European parts of the former Soviet Union meet both of the criteria.  
Most of the states in that region do not have a history of independent rule, and only 
obtained their current independence in 1991.  As a result, they did not have an 
opportunity to build up many international relations and are less intertwined in global 
decision-making.  The lack of history all but eliminates alignment explanations on the 
basis of ancient grievances, especially when many of the nations in the region have only 
recently been imagined.  The recent independence also limits the number of actors that 
care sufficiently about the region to attempt to influence foreign policy outcomes there.   
 Using states that are landlocked and/or are far away from the centers of 
international politics makes it easier to eliminate a wide range of potential explanations 
for the alignment decisions.  Few issues are handled entirely independent of one another, 
and the fewer issues a country is concerned with, the less complex will be the 
determinants of its foreign policy behavior.  Central Asian states in particular rate highly 
on this criterion given their landlocked status, their distance from Europe, the Middle 
East, and the Pacific, and their limited opportunities for joining a wider bloc of states, 
whether the EU or ASEAN.     
From the subset of possible post-Soviet cases, I looked for cases that showed 
within-case variation on the independent variables and cases that provided multiple 
points in time to revisit the same decision.  Both factors would maximize the amount of 
leverage that could be gained from analyzing a low number of cases.  Lastly, I tried to 
avoid alignment decisions that were not salient and did not have much written about 
them.  The purpose was to isolate cases where the proposed causal mechanism was 
clearly present and there was sufficient data to determine its effect on the outcome. 
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The criteria above led me to choose two widely-reported cases of alignment.  The 
first involved Uzbekistan’s policy on the Collective Security Treaty (CST).  The case 
provided one of the few instances in the region of a clear alignment that took place in the 
middle of two decisions on the same issue.  The alignment involved Russia’s refusal to 
withdraw its troops from Uzbekistan’s neighbor, Tajikistan, after the latter’s civil war 
came to an end.  With the aid of process-tracing, it would be possible to isolate the effect 
of that negative alignment decision on Uzbekistan’s future decisions regarding the CST. 
The other case – Kyrgyzstan’s policies pertaining to the Manas military base – 
was chosen due to the variation on the dyadic history independent variable.  Kyrgyzstan’s 
rulers received significant economic benefits each time they aligned with Russia, benefits 
that the US was unable or unwilling to match.  This gradual progression toward the 
creation of strong pro-Russian constituencies should generate clear differences in Kyrgyz 
alignment behavior over time.  Like the Uzbek case, the case involved multiple decisions 
on the same issue, and was sufficiently salient to produce a sizable amount of news 
reports and academic articles on the topic.   
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Chapter 5 – Correlates of Political Alignment 
 The main objective of this chapter is to establish that reciprocation lies at the heart 
of alignment decisions.  Each of the statistical models in this chapter is intended to tie 
back to this conjecture.  Reciprocal alignment theory is tested against two other theories 
that deal with alignment.  It is first tested against two predictions of realism: that states 
balance against the stronger side in a dispute, particularly if the intervening state is a 
major power and neither disputant has preponderance in capabilities,52 and that states turn 
on allies and side with past enemies if doing so happens to be in their interest in a given 
conflict.  Alignment theory is also tested against a claim frequently made by democratic 
peace theorists, namely that the reason democratic states do not fight one another is 
because of a similarity in their regimes.  Alignment theory suggests that the reason has 
more to with the reliability of democracies as alignment partners.   
This chapter only examines the determinants of aligning with disputants in an 
ongoing war, an enormously costly form of alignment.  This is consistent with the 
traditional study of alignment, which focused on high profile events.  The results 
obtained here would thus be most readily comparable to other theories and empirical 
studies on the subject.  Chapters 6 will broaden the scope of alignment to include less 
costly interventions, and differentiate alignment on the basis of discernibility; that chapter 
will build upon the results obtained here.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: the key variables will be briefly reintroduced, 
and hypotheses relating to the first stage of alignment will be tested. This will be 
                                                 
 
52 This test is similar to the one used by Jones (1994), who found evidence for the balancing hypothesis. 
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followed by a two-stage model that incorporates the first stage results and includes all of 
the key variables.  These include the dyadic history variables, variables relating to 
unreliability, and a variable denoting an asymmetrical relationship.  Several robustness 
checks are then undertaken to determine whether the effect of the variables is limited to a 
specific epoch or type of wars.  Next, I check whether states that are unstable or 
unrepresentative are indeed unreliable alignment partners.  Lastly, alignment theory is 
tested against two competing theories, realism and the democratic peace – taken from the 
capabilities and homophily frameworks, respectively.  In all stage 2 models, intervention 
into an ongoing war is the sole dependent variable.  This is changed in Chapter 6.   
5.1 Results – First Stage 
 A cursory look at the war intervention dependent variable shows that states join 
wars very infrequently.  States had 51,650 opportunities to join ongoing wars.  They 
openly joined the military effort in only 3,476 of those cases.  The latter number is 
somewhat inflated by interventions into large wars counting as alignments with or against 
all other dyads that were already fighting.  If the range of cases is reduced to those 
involving at least one war participant who borders the potential intervener, the probability 
of intervention increases from 0.067 to 0.250, highlighting the importance of proximity.   
In the second stage of alignment, when states get to choose which side to join, the 
mean of all the variables is zero, due to the directed nature of the dataset. The dependent 
variable in the stage 2 models is whether the intervener joined side A.  As a result, most 
of the independent variables subtract B’s value of the original variable from A’s.  For 
instance, the difference in dyadic alliances variable takes the value -1 if the intervener is 
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allied with state B, but not state A. The alignment variable takes its maximum value if 
state A recently sided with state I in a dispute, and State B sided against state I.     
Table 5.1.  Descriptive statistics of the War Intervention dataset 
 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Stage 1 variables    
War intervention 0 1 0.07 
Intervener’s military capabilities* 0 8 0.17 
Proximate to disputants 0 2 0.08 
Recent conflict with disputants 0 2 0.12 
Allied to disputants 0 2 0.16 
Stage 2 variables    
Choice of sides (IA) 0 1 0.50 
Difference in dyadic conflicts (IA – IB) -0.95 0.95 0 
Difference in dyadic alliances (IA – IB) -1 1 0 
Difference in past alignments (IA – IB) -1.51 1.51 0 
Difference in alliance reliability (A – B) -0.63 0.63 0 
Difference in executive recruitment (A – B) -1 1 0 
Difference in instability (A – B) -2 2 0 
Difference in other rivals (A – B) -6 6 0 
Difference in dependence (IA – IB) -1099.67 1099.67 0 
*to improve the ease of interpretation, the military capabilities variable is divided by 1,000 
 
 I now test the first two hypotheses, both relating to the first stage of alignment. 
They put forth two conditions that make intervention more likely.  First, a state must have 
the ability to affect the outcome of the dispute.  Otherwise, the intervention might not be 
valued or uses up scarce resources.  Second, rulers will partake in disputes in which they 
have a history of conflict or cooperation with the disputants.   Only under these 
circumstances can a leader expect to gain sufficient domestic support for involvement.   
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Table 5.2.  Cross-tabulations for First Stage Alignment and Dyadic History 
 0 Enemies 1 Enemy 2 Enemies 
Did not take part in alignment 38,594 
91.0% 
3,480 
8.2% 
346 
0.8% 
Took part in alignment 2,084 
64.9% 
974 
30.3% 
152 
4.7% 
Total 40,678 
89.1% 
4,454 
9.8% 
498 
1.1% 
χ2 = 2100, pr. χ2 = 0.000 
 0 Allies 1 Ally 2 Allies 
Did not take part in alignment 38,282 
87.9% 
4,840 
11.1% 
426 
1.0% 
Took part in alignment 1,966 
61.0% 
850 
26.4% 
406 
12.6% 
Total 40,248 
86.1% 
5,690 
12.2% 
832 
1.8% 
χ2 = 3100, pr. χ2 = 0.000 
Before turning to complex statistical tests, I run a simple cross-tabulation of the 
dyadic history variables and entrance into a war.  If dyadic history plays a major role in 
the decision to choose sides, then there should be a large observable difference in the 
incidence of alignment when varying the extent of a potential intervener’s relationship 
with the warring parties.   This is indeed the case according to Table 5.2.  Observations 
where the potential intervener has recently engaged in MIDs with both disputants make 
up 1.1 percent of the population of cases, but 4.7 percent of the cases in the alignment 
category.  Thus, in this situation, the country was nearly six times more likely to 
intervene than to remain on the sidelines.  The alliance statistics paint a similar picture.  
A potential intervener was allied with both war participants in 1.8 percent of the cases, 
but that category was responsible for 12.6 percent of the interventions. 
122 
 
Table 5.3.  Determinants of the Decision to Intervene in a War, 1816-2001 
 Model 1 
Intervener’s military capabilities 0.66 *** 
(.04) 
Proximate to disputants 0.74 *** 
(.05) 
Recent conflict with disputants 0.84 *** 
(.05) 
Allied to disputants 1.10 *** 
(.04) 
LR χ2 (df = 4) 2591.66 *** 
Pseudo R2 0.173 
N 41,902 
*** p-value < 0.001, ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value < 0.05; standard errors clustered around the triad in parentheses 
 
Table 5.3 uses a logistic regression to test the first stage hypotheses.  The results 
are strongly consistent with those hypotheses.  Military capabilities of the intervener, as 
well as proximity to the conflict make intervention into that war more likely.  Positive 
and negative relations with the disputants are both associated with intervention, as 
expected.  One might argue that, individually, these variables reflect common knowledge 
in conflict studies, not providing any unique insights.  However, the tendency of past 
research is to study these concepts in isolation, either including a few of the above 
variables or not having a coherent story about how they work together.  As an example, 
Venezuela under Chavez promoted close economic, political, and military ties with 
Russia.  Yet when Russia got into a military conflict with Georgia in 2008, neither 
Venezuela nor Russia expected Venezuela to get directly involved in the dispute.  This is 
partially because Russia did not expect great resistance from Georgia, but also because 
the Venezuelan leader did not have a capacity to affect the resolution of the dispute and 
would not be able to obtain domestic support for such an undertaking.  Next, I examine 
the substantive effects of the specified variables.   
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Table 5.4.  Predicted Probabilities of the Decision to Intervene in a War, 1816-2001 
 Model 1 Percent Change 
Baseline probability 0.046  
Intervener’s military capabilities (5th percentile) 0.041  
Intervener’s military capabilities (95th percentile) 0.062     +51% 
Proximate to neither disputant 0.043  
Proximate to both disputants 0.165    +284% 
Recent conflict with neither disputant 0.042  
Recent conflict with both disputants 0.190    +352% 
Allied to neither disputant 0.039  
Allied to both disputants 0.267    +585% 
Alignment-suppressing combination 0.030  
Alignment-inducing combination 0.909 +2,930% 
Main entries are predicted probabilities derived from Model 1; in the baseline model, all variables are set at 
their means (there are no dichotomous variables). 
   
 Table 5.4 provides the predicted probabilities for the first model.  The baseline 
probability of war-involvement is 0.046, or one in twenty-two.  This number differs from 
that in Table 5.1 due to missing data for some of the variables.  Changing each of the 
variables from the minimum to the maximum, or from the 5th percentile to the 95th 
percentile for the military capabilities variables, substantially increases the probability of 
joining a war.  The dyadic history variables increase the probability of intervention by at 
least 350 percent.  This table does not tell us whether the intervener took the side of their 
ally or fought against their rival, but it is clear that some connection to the disputants is 
necessary before a statesman would entertain the notion of a costly intervention.  
However, whenever there is an ability to contribute, in terms of having sufficient military 
resources and being proximate to the disputants, and a strong connection to the 
disputants, the probability of joining an ongoing war shoots up to 0.909, making the 
intervention all but certain.  I now turn to the second stage of alignment. 
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5.2 Results – Second Stage 
Before turning to formal hypothesis-testing, I examine cross-tabulations of the 
dyadic history variables and choice of sides in alignment decisions.  If interveners are 
more likely to support someone with whom they have a positive history and support the 
opponent of anyone they have a negative history with, then they should align with their 
ally and against their military enemies greater than half the times; they should also help 
those states that aligned with them in the past.  Table 5.5 provides tentative support for 
that logic.  When an intervener was allied with state A but not state B, it opted to align 
with the former over 70 percent of the time.  Similarly, the intervener sided against their 
military enemy, defined in terms of recent MIDs, 71.3 percent of the time.  In situations 
where the alignment difference was positive, meaning that A was more supportive of the 
intervener than was B, the latter obtained positive alignment 58.6 percent of the time.  In 
these simple tests, past relations seem to matter a great deal when making decisions.   
Table 5.5.  Cross-tabulations for Second Stage Alignment and Dyadic History 
 Opposed A Neutral Favored A 
Did not align with A 543 
58.6% 
783 
50.0% 
383 
41.4% 
Aligned with A 383 
41.4% 
783 
50.0% 
543 
58.6% 
Total 926 
100% 
1,566 
100% 
926 
100% 
χ2 = 55.3, pr. χ2 = 0.000 
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Table 5.5 (cont.) 
 Enemy B Neutral Enemy A 
Did not align with A 249 
29.4% 
864 
50.0% 
597 
70.6% 
Aligned with A 597 
70.6% 
864 
50.0% 
249 
29.4% 
Total 846 
100% 
1,728 
100% 
846 
100% 
χ2 = 286.3, pr. χ2 = 0.000 
 Ally B Neutral Ally A 
Did not align with A 303 
71.3% 
1,186 
50.0% 
122 
28.7% 
Aligned with A 122 
28.7% 
1,186 
50.0% 
303 
71.3% 
Total 425 
100% 
2,372 
100% 
425 
100% 
χ2 = 286.3, pr. χ2 = 0.000 
Table 5.6 directly tests hypotheses 3 through 6, relating to the effect of past 
interactions, reliability of alignment partners, and asymmetrical dependence.  Model 2 
tests all but the asymmetry hypothesis.  Model 3 includes the asymmetry variable, which 
unfortunately sharply reduces the N.  Model 4 makes use of a Heckman probit model to 
verify whether a two-stage model is necessary for future tests.  A statistically significant 
ρ would indicate that the error terms in the two stages are correlated, suggesting the 
existence of selection bias.  If the term is not significant, then including both stages of 
alignment in every model would become unwarranted.  A Heckman model is used instead 
of alternative specifications for theoretical reasons: the two stages of alignment are 
viewed as taking place sequentially, not simultaneously.  The latter would require 
replacing a Heckman model with a multinomial probit.   
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Table 5.6.  Probit and Heckman Probit Models of War Intervention, 1816-1999 
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Y1: War involvement 
 
   
Intervener’s military capabilities    0.37 *** 
 (.02) 
Proximate to disputants    0.41 *** 
 (.03) 
Recent conflict with disputants    0.44 *** 
 (.02) 
Allied to disputants    0.56 *** 
 (.02) 
Y2: Choosing of sides 
 
   
Difference in dyadic conflicts (IA – IB) -1.31 *** 
 (.15) 
-1.47 *** 
 (.41) 
-1.41 *** 
 (.16) 
Difference in dyadic alliances (IA – IB)  0.75 *** 
 (.07) 
 0.62 ** 
 (.23) 
 0.68 *** 
 (.08) 
Difference in past alignments (IA – IB)  1.29 *** 
 (.22) 
 5.06 * 
 (2.32) 
 1.17 *** 
 (.21) 
Difference in executive recruitment (A 
– B) 
 0.56 *** 
 (.05) 
 0.97 *** 
 (.17) 
 0.60 *** 
 (.05) 
Difference in instability (A – B) -1.08 *** 
 (.09) 
-0.63 ** 
 (.21) 
-1.05 *** 
 (.09) 
Difference in alliance reliability (A – 
B) 
 2.23 * 
 (.89) 
-18.36 ** 
(5.58) 
 0.20 
 (.96) 
Difference in other rivals (A – B) -0.12 *** 
 (.01) 
-0.64 *** 
 (.08) 
-0.11 *** 
 (.01) 
Difference in dependence (IA – IB)   0.23 *** 
 (.06) 
 
Difference in distance (IA – IB) -0.07 *** 
 (.01) 
-0.17 *** 
 (.04) 
-0.06 *** 
 (.01) 
Difference is S-Scores (IA – IB) -0.33 *** 
 (.08) 
-0.09 
 (.30) 
-0.37 *** 
 (.09) 
ρ    0.00 
 (.05) 
LR χ2 (df = 9, 10, 9) 729.49 *** 186.56 *** 657.81 *** 
Pseudo R2 0.292 0.772  
N (uncensored obs.) 3,186 620 41,878 (2,724) 
*** p-value < 0.001, ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value < 0.05; standard errors clustered around the triad in parentheses 
127 
 
 Model 4 makes clear that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the error terms 
are uncorrelated.  There is no obvious selection bias, and it is sufficient to use one-stage 
models instead.  To make for an easier comparison of the three models, Models 2 and 3 
use a probit.  The results do not appreciably change from one model to the other.  In all 
three, a recent history of conflict increases the likelihood of being aligned against, while a 
recent history of positive dyadic relations or alignments has the opposite effect.  Both sets 
of results are consistent with the alignment theory, and provide a strong reason to include 
a dyad’s history when attempting to explain conflict.  The entire reciprocation rationale 
can partially account for the moderation of revolutionary regimes.  States that refuse to 
compromise on most issues because of ideological rigidity would end up aligning against 
potential friends even when they gain little concrete advantage from doing so.  In the end, 
they are not able to get support on issues that are salient to them.  Eventually, and 
sometimes too late, comes the realization that the success of the revolution depends on 
some degree of outside support.  This, in turn, leads to a more moderate foreign policy. 
The variable representing regime type increases the likelihood of positive 
alignment.  The broader the selectorate in a state, the more likely is its leader to obtain 
outside assistance.  It will later be shown this is not entirely a consequence of 
democracies supporting democracies, but rather because a representative regime is more 
likely to ensure foreign policy continuity than one where leaders are chosen by narrow 
cliques.  Just as states are unwilling to back unrepresentative regimes due to uncertainty 
over future policy, they are loath to support unstable regimes.  The more unstable a 
regime, the less it can count on external support.  The flip side of the same hypothesis 
also gains support: the more rivalries a disputant is engaged in, the less able they are to 
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counter negative alignment.  They are thus more likely to be the negative aligned against.  
One can conceive of Turkey’s attempt at a “zero problems with neighbors” policy as an 
attempt to make use of this insight; by limiting the hostility emanating from most of its 
neighbors, Turkey would be in the strongest position to take on its chief rival, Greece. 
Dependence, proxied by the portion of the intervener’s trade with a disputant 
relative to the portion of the disputant’s trade with the intervener, is shown to have a 
statistically significant effect on alignment decisions.  Rulers consistently align with 
states on whom their own country is dependent, knowing that they will face severe 
consequences for failing to do so.  Kazakhstan, for instance, might have an interest in 
opposing Russia’s annexation of the Crimea because of the precedent it sets and its own 
vulnerabilities.  Yet precisely because of this vulnerability vis-à-vis Russia, Kazakhstan 
has no choice but to remain neutral or even provide some implicit pro-Russian support. 
The effect of the control variables is mixed.  The distance control variable has a 
negative effect on being aligned with, meaning that interveners are likelier to side with 
the disputant they are geographically closer to.53 The S-Score variable, which is meant to 
signify common interests as a function of common alliance ties fails to increase the 
likelihood of positive alignment in each of the models.  The implication is that states with 
common allies cooperate with one another only if they also have positive relations with 
one another; having a similar set of friends is not sufficient, evidenced by the strains in 
the Turkish-Israeli relationship despite both states being reliable US allies.   
                                                 
 
53 The result is consistent with Gartzke and Gleditsch’s (2004, 788) finding that a state is more likely to 
defend its ally if it is geographically contiguous to that ally. 
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The one major difference between the models is the effect of a state’s reputation 
for maintaining alliance commitments.  The variable has the posited effect in the full 
probit model, but does not behave in accordance with the hypothesis in the truncated 
dependence model and in the Heckman probit.  On the face of it, this finding is difficult 
to reconcile for the negative effect for instability and the positive effect for having a 
representative regime.  However, unlike the latter two variables, the reputation variable is 
concerned only with alliances.  It seems that alliances have become less important over 
time to the extent that violating them is no longer considered a cardinal sin.  This point 
will be examined further when the sample is split into the pre and post-1945 era. 
Table 5.7.  Predicted Probabilities of the Decision to Align with Side A, 1816-1999 
 Model 2 
Baseline probability 0.500 
Difference in dyadic conflicts, favoring A (95th percentile) 0.208 
A allied with I, B is not 0.774 
Difference in past alignments, favoring A (95th percentile) 0.660 
A has maximum competitive executive recruitment, B does not 0.713 
A less stable than B (95th percentile) 0.141 
Difference alliance reliability, favoring A (95th percentile) 0.597 
A has more other rivals than B (95th percentile) 0.279 
Alignment-inducing combination 1.000 
Main entries are predicted probabilities derived from Model 2; in the baseline model, all variables are set at 
their means (there are no dichotomous variables). 
 
 Table 5.7 provides the predicted probabilities for Model 2 from the prior table.  
The baseline probability of a state intervening on behalf of State A is 0.5.  Any increase 
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in the likelihood of support for State A must, by definition, lead to an equivalent decrease 
in the likelihood of support for B.  Each of the variables has a sizable effect on the choice 
of sides in a war.  Interveners join on the side of the disputant which has been much more 
hostile to them only 20 percent of the time, and side against countries with five or more 
rivals more than two thirds of the time.  States that are stable or have competitive 
elections for their executive face no difficulty in obtaining alignment, especially if their 
opponents do not share those traits. 
As a result of a sizable majority of the observations in the dataset having no 
recent alignments and not wishing to inflate the effect of the alignment variable, I use the 
95th percentile of that variable instead of the maximum value.  The alignment score at the 
95th percentile is 0.32, out of a maximum score of 1.51.  At that value, the probability of 
support for A is 0.664, 0.164 over the baseline probability.  Figure 1 shows the predicted 
probabilities of this key variable at values ranging from the variable’s minimum to its 
maximum.  At each tail, positive or negative alignment is nearly guaranteed, but the 
variable rarely takes values close to those extremes. 
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Figure 5.1.  Predicted Probabilities for Effect of Past Alignments on War Interventions 
 
Figure created using Stata’s predxcon command; predicted probabilities derived from Model 2; all 
variables other than past alignments are set at their means (there are no dichotomous variables). 
 
 In addition to examining the effects of each individual variable, it is useful to see 
the extent of their combined impact on alignment decisions.  When each of the 
theoretically important relevant variables is set at their alignment-detracting value, the 
likelihood of being aligned with falls virtually to zero.  Setting the same variables at the 
levels at which they are supposed to promote alignment all but ensures a favorable 
intervention. What this demonstrates is that the key variables can by themselves explain 
numerous alignment decisions, even when the values of some of those variables are not 
set to their extremes.  The next step is to check the robustness of the results. 
Due to the manner in which observations were coded, the two world wars have a 
disproportionately large influence on the results, making up nearly a quarter of all the 
observations.  For that reason, Model 5 re-runs Model 2 without the world war 
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observations.  The results do not greatly differ.  All the variables remain significant and 
in the same direction as they were before.  Interestingly, the S-Score variable not only 
does not have a positive effect on gaining alignment, but rather has a negative one.  This 
casts doubt on the usefulness of the concept as a proxy for common interests.   
Table 5.8.  Robustness Checks for Stage 2 War Interventions 
 Model 5 
No World War 
Model 6 
≤ 1945 
Model 7 
>1945 
Difference in dyadic conflicts (IA – IB) -4.10 *** 
 (.99) 
-2.28 *** 
 (.29) 
-2.56 ** 
 (.82) 
Difference in dyadic alliances (IA – IB)  1.51 *** 
 (.24) 
 1.19 *** 
 (.15) 
 1.57 *** 
 (.30) 
Difference in past alignments (IA – IB)  2.54 ** 
 (0.77) 
 2.23 *** 
 (.38) 
13.24 ** 
(4.16) 
Difference in executive recruitment (A – 
B) 
 2.15 *** 
 (.21) 
 0.78 *** 
 (.10) 
 1.78 *** 
 (.23) 
Difference in instability (A – B) -1.33 *** 
 (.20) 
-0.61 
 (.44) 
-1.70 *** 
 (.26) 
Difference in alliance reliability (A – B) 131.43 ** 
(40.99) 
 3.53 * 
(1.60) 
-10.06 
(24.74) 
Difference in other rivals (A – B) -0.56 *** 
 (.06) 
-0.15 *** 
 (.02) 
-0.93 *** 
 (.09) 
Difference in distance (IA – IB) -0.28 *** 
 (.05) 
-0.09 *** 
 (.02) 
-0.35 *** 
 (.07) 
Difference is S-Scores (IA – IB) -1.36 * 
 (.34) 
-0.47 ** 
 (.16) 
-0.42 
 (.41) 
LR χ2 (df =9, 9, 9) 350.47 *** 266.83 *** 287.51 *** 
Pseudo R2 0.549 0.139 0.762 
N 1,348 2,262    924 
*** p-value < 0.001, ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value < 0.05; standard errors clustered around the triad in parentheses 
 
 An argument can also be made that the post-World War II era is qualitatively 
different than the one that came before it.  This could be due to the bipolarity that marked 
most of the post-1945 period, the creation of the United Nations, the proliferation of 
states from the third world, or a host of other factors.  Existing theories of alignment do 
not limit themselves to one epoch, and the theory proposed here follows their lead.  
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Though the coefficients show considerable variation, the overall results in Models 6 and 
7 provide support for most of the hypotheses examined thus far.  The only variables that 
do not have the hypothesized effect are instability in the pre-1945 model and the alliance 
reputation variable in the post-1945 period.   
Though the reason for the first disparity is not entirely certain, it is likely a 
consequence of the low variation in instability prior to the post-World War II period.  The 
variable takes the value 0 in 51 percent of the cases post-1945, but in nearly 92 percent of 
the cases beforehand.  The second disparity, relating to alliance reputation, is consistent 
with the above suggestion that alliances have lost their importance over time.  Dyadic ties 
are no longer defined entirely in military terms.  Though the US might get offended that 
its NATO allies are not pulling their weight when it comes to issues of international 
peace and security, it will not retaliate against them, which would worsen strong ties. 
Table 5.9.  Democratization and Changes in Alignment Behavior 
 Not Democratizing Democratizing 
No Alignment change 70 
92.1% 
2 
50.0% 
Alignment change 6 
7.9% 
2 
50.0% 
Total 76 
100% 
4 
100% 
χ2 = 7.49, pr. χ2 = 0.006 
 Table 5.9 provides a simple test for the hypotheses relating to changes in 
alignment behavior, a change from hypotheses that generally expect friends to remain 
friends and foes to remain foes.  To be coded as an alignment change, a state has to side 
with and against the same state in successive wars within a twenty year period of time.  
The low N precludes a more thorough examination of the relationship between 
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democratization and changes in alignment.  We can draw a tentative conclusion that 
states whose executive recruitment recently became more competitive are much more 
likely to change their alignment behavior.  Half of an admittedly small number of such 
regimes decided to turn on their previous partner, compared to less than 10 percent for all 
other regimes.  As a result, this hypothesis will be reexamined in the following chapter in 
the context of MID alignment, where the N is much larger.    
Having tested all the hypotheses not relying on cost or discernibility or requiring a 
qualitative component, I now turn to examining alignment theory in light of alternative 
explanations for the same phenomena.  I focus on two opposing theories: realism and the 
democratic peace.  Unlike reciprocal alignment theory, realism assumes the existence of 
rational, unitary states which subordinate all objectives to the pursuit of security or 
power.  One of the central predictions of realism is that states, particularly major powers, 
will balance against the stronger disputant in a war.  They do this because they are “more 
appreciated and safer there” (Waltz 1979, 126-7).  Balancing might, however, fail if one 
side in a war has an overwhelming advantage in capabilities. 
5.3 Results – Alternative Explanations 
Table 5.10 provides raw data for the realist claim that states – at least powerful 
ones – will opt to support the weaker side in a war.  This argument would receive support 
is state A was more likely to obtain support when it was the stronger state in the dispute 
dyad.  Only observations where the intervener is a major power and neither disputant is 
substantially stronger than the other are included, consistent with balancing theory.  The 
contingency table does not provide evidence supportive of that theory.  The weaker state 
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in a dispute dyad obtained alignment only 49.4 percent of the time, slightly better than it 
would do through pure chance.   
Table 5.10.  Cross-tabulations for Balancing Hypothesis 
 A weaker A stronger 
Did not align with A 76 
49.4% 
78 
50.6% 
Aligned with A 78 
50.7% 
76 
49.4% 
Total 154 
100% 
154 
100% 
χ2 = 0.1, pr. χ2 = 0.820 
Table 5.11 tests the balancing hypothesis in a model with all of the variables 
central to the reciprocal alignment theory.  The empirical domain of Model 8 is limited to 
dyadic wars where neither state is more than three times as powerful as the other; in 
Model 9, the potential intervener is also a major power, identical to Table 5.10.   
Table 5.11.  Testing the Balancing Hypothesis on Cases with no Power Preponderance 
 Model 8 
All States I 
Model 9 
Major Power I 
CINC A > CINC B  0.33 
 (.17) 
-1.19 ** 
 (.42) 
Difference in dyadic conflicts (IA – IB) -2.31 *** 
 (.47) 
-5.69 *** 
 (.93) 
Difference in dyadic alliances (IA – IB)  1.68 *** 
 (.23) 
  4.32 *** 
 (.82) 
Difference in past alignments (IA – IB)  2.78 *** 
 (.74) 
 7.64 *** 
(1.40) 
Difference in executive recruitment (A – B)  1.06 *** 
 (.15) 
 1.82 *** 
 (.47) 
Difference in instability (A – B) -1.69 ** 
 (.27) 
-0.21 
 (.58) 
Difference in alliance reliability (A – B)  1.79 
(2.50) 
38.35 * 
(16.83) 
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Table 5.11 (cont.) 
 
  
Difference in other rivals (A – B) -0.26 ***  
 (.05) 
-0.68 *** 
 (.14) 
Difference in distance (IA – IB) -0.14 *** 
 (.03) 
-0.04  
 (.12) 
Difference is S-Scores (IA – IB) -0.93 *** 
 (.24) 
-0.83 
 (.74) 
LR χ2 (df = 10, 10) 236.45 *** 94.58 *** 
Pseudo R2 0.339 0.572 
N  1,036    290 
*** p-value < 0.001, ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value < 0.05; standard errors clustered around the triad in parentheses 
 
  The sign for the balancing variable is negative in Model 9, whose empirical 
domain is closer to the one generally discussed by realists, but not in Model 8, which 
includes minor powers.  The implication is that balancing theory might apply only to the 
narrow major power group of cases.  This finding would make the results consistent with 
the claims of some prominent realists, but of limited use in a world composed 
predominantly of states that are not now and have no hope of becoming major powers.  
Despite the small sample size and a theoretically uninformative empirical domain, only 
some of the unreliability variable fail to achieve statistical significance in either of the 
models.  The alignment variable and dyadic history variables all have the hypothesized 
effect.  The same cannot be said for the balancing variable. 
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Figure 5.2.  Effect of Balancing Variable  Figure 5.3.  Effect of Alignment Variable 
 
Figure created using Stata’s predxcon command; main entries are predicted probabilities derived from Model 9; all 
continuous variables are set at their means and all dichotomous variables at their median. 
 
 Though Model 9 shows that major power interveners tend to join wars on behalf 
of the weaker of the disputants, it does not tell us how often this is the case.  Figure 2 
graphs the predicted probabilities for the variable in a model whose sample is limited by 
the two conditions described above and one that includes the entire population of war-
joining cases.   The graph shows that interveners support the weaker state in a dispute 
about 59 percent of the time.  This result provides some support for realism, but it is 
unlikely that most realists would be satisfied with major powers bandwagoning 41 
percent of the time. 54  The probability is even less impressive when compared to that of 
                                                 
 
54 These results are not atypical of the recent empirical literature.  Levy and Thompson (2005, 23) find that 
great power adversarial alliances aimed at the lead state were formed in 190 out of 445 cases.  Valeriano 
(2009, 197) shows that great powers joined wars on the side of the weaker coalition in 16 instances, and on 
the stronger side 13 times.  Corbetta (2010, 75) similarly finds that interveners neither balance nor 
bandwagon reliably.  The qualitative evidence points to the same conclusions.  Healy and Stein (1973) 
show that most of the great powers of the time supported France during the Franco-Prussian War when 
France was winning, and then supported Germany when Germany gained the upper hand.  Bismarck’s 
Germany itself did not balance against Russia when the latter looked to be in the ascendancy, and did not 
balance against Britain despite Britain’s naval superiority (Gellman 1989, 177).  The case for balancing is 
even weaker in the Chinese Warring State period, which saw 51 expansionist wars initiated by the Qin, but 
only 8 attempts at balancing this aggressive power by the other warlords (Hui 2004, 191).  In the most 
ambitious qualitative study of balancing, Wohlforth and eight co-authors (2007) find that systemic 
hegemonies regularly form and when they do not, it is rarely because of balancing behavior. 
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the alignment variable.  The latter increases the probability of being aligned with to 
nearly .90 at its 95th percentile, a result obtained in a sample highly favorable to realism. 
Table 5.12.  No Permanent Friends Hypothesis: Alignment in Successive Conflicts 
 Kept Alignment Changed Alignment Total 
War 409 
90.7% 
42 
9.3% 
451 
100% 
Dangerous MID (territory or fatalities) 382 
91.2% 
37 
8.8% 
419 
100% 
Non-dangerous MID 2451 
95.6% 
112 
4.4% 
2563 
100% 
Sanctions 64 
95.5% 
3 
4.5% 
67 
100% 
 
 Another claim frequently made in the realist literature is that states have no long-
term friends.  For that reason, the “no permanent friends, only permanent interests” quote 
by Palmerston is viewed favorably in realist circles. Even alliances are transitory, being 
formed to address a joint threat and disintegrating shortly thereafter.55  The substantive 
effect of the past alignment variable in previous models already provided some evidence 
against this hypothesis.  Table 5.12 examines every set of consecutive alignments that 
happened within a short period of time of one another.56  It provides a count of the 
number of times the intervener aligned on the same side and the number of times it 
aligned with and then against the same state or vice versa.  Though there is no hypothesis 
test, the data shows that interveners choose the same side in successive disputes over 90 
percent of the time.  While it is conceivable that states might occasionally work together 
                                                 
 
55 This was the rationale for the realist claim that NATO would disappear shortly after the end of the Cold 
War, with no common enemy to unite the United States and its Western European allies. 
56 The alignments had to take place within 20 years for wars, 10 years for dangerous MIDs, and 5 years for 
non-dagnerous MIDs and sanctions.   
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for a prolonged period of time because of a persistence of a common threat, that factor is 
unlikely to produce numbers as extreme as those seen in Table 5.12. 
Table 5.13.  Cross-tabulations for Democratic Peace Hypothesis 
 A less 
democratic 
Equally 
democratic 
A more 
democratic 
Did not align with A 369 
67.7% 
664 
50.0% 
176 
32.3% 
Aligned with A 176 
32.3% 
664 
50.0% 
369 
67.7% 
Total 545 
100% 
1,328 
100% 
545 
100% 
χ2 = 136.7, pr. χ2 = 0.000 
Reciprocal alignment theory does not expect outcomes vastly different from that 
of the democratic peace theory when it comes to the role of regime type.  Democracies 
are expected to avoid other democracies in wars, though not for the reasons expected by 
the democratic peace theorists.  The two main strains of the democratic peace theory are 
the institutional and normative branches.  The former expects democracies to not side 
against other democracies in wars because they have domestic institutions that make it 
difficult to initiate a war, a factor that is presumably recognized by both sides.  The latter 
explanation argues that as long as both sides in a dispute are democracies, they each 
adopt the same methods of peaceful conflict-resolution in the international sphere as they 
do domestically.  Both branches of the democratic peace theory expect democracies to 
side with other democracies, and expect non-democracies to be either indifferent toward 
other regime types or to support fellow autocracies.  Reciprocal alignment theory takes a 
different view.  It suggests that states governed by unrepresentative regimes make for 
unreliable alignment partners, whether for democracies or non-democracies.  The 
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expectation is that all types of regimes will refrain from siding with unrepresentative 
regimes, even ones that are themselves unrepresentative. 
Table 5.13 look at whether non-representative states have historically been more 
likely to support similar countries or whether preferred supporting other regime types.  
The empirical domain is thus limited to alignments where the intervener did not have a 
representative regime.  As can be seen from the table, that autocratic aligner sided with 
the more democratic regime two thirds of the time, providing a strong indication that the 
pragmatic need for future alignment outweighs the importance of regime similarity.   
Table 5.14.  Democratic Peace Hypothesis: Democracies Supporting Democracies 
 Model 10 
Xrcomp I=3 
Model 11 
Xrcomp I<3 
Model 12 
Polity I<6 
Difference in dyadic conflicts (IA – IB) -9.93 *** 
(1.64) 
-1.89 *** 
 (.26) 
-2.04 *** 
 (.26) 
Difference in dyadic alliances (IA – IB)  0.32  
 (.40) 
  1.33 *** 
 (.13) 
 1.20 *** 
 (.13) 
Difference in past alignments (IA – IB)  6.17 *** 
(1.68) 
 2.36 *** 
(.42) 
 2.39 *** 
 (.42) 
Difference in executive recruitment (A – 
B) 
 1.23 *** 
 (.29) 
 0.81 *** 
 (.10) 
  
 
Difference in Polity democracy (A – B)    0.69 *** 
 (.09) 
Difference in instability (A – B) -2.64 *** 
 (.40) 
-1.70 *** 
 (.22) 
-1.56 *** 
 (.20) 
Difference in alliance reliability (A – B) 10.63 ** 
(3.51) 
3.20 
(1.67) 
 3.33 * 
(1.66) 
Difference in other rivals (A – B) -0.33 *** 
 (.06) 
-0.17 *** 
 (.02) 
-0.19 *** 
 (.02) 
Difference in distance (IA – IB) -0.23 *** 
 (.04) 
-0.10 *** 
 (.02) 
-0.12 *** 
 (.02) 
Difference is S-Scores (IA – IB) -0.07  
 (.31) 
-0.74 *** 
 (.14) 
-0.81 *** 
 (.14) 
LR χ2 (df = 9, 9, 9) 250.05 *** 340.32 *** 367.62 *** 
Pseudo R2 0.573 0.197 0.186 
N    984 2,202 2,340 
*** p-value < 0.001, ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value < 0.05; standard errors clustered around the triad in parentheses 
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 Table 5.14 provides a critical statistical test between the two sets of explanations.  
In Model 10, where the intervener has a representative regime, each theory expects the 
regime variable to be positively associated with supporting state A.  The result is thus 
consistent with both theories.  In Models 11 and 12, however, the intervener is not 
democratic, whether based on the executive recruitment or overall Polity score.  This 
leads to opposing expectations for alignment and democratic peace theories.  The result 
provides strong support for reciprocal alignment theory: non-democracies are more likely 
to side with democracies than they are with non-democracies.  Thus, any regime that is 
concerned with not obtaining reciprocation for a costly intervention is likely to stay away 
from regimes that might not be around or be forced into major policy concessions. 
5.4 Conclusion 
 This chapter provided empirical support for the primary quantitative hypotheses 
of reciprocal alignment theory.  It showed that history plays an integral part in alignment 
decisions, that institutional determinants of unreliability stifle attempts to obtain positive 
alignments just as being overstretched attracts alignments of the negative variety, and that 
the results are more consistent with alignment theory than with either the balancing logic 
of realist theory or the democratic peace.   
 The history variables received strong support throughout the chapter.  Past 
alignment consistently predicted future alignment, whether for all wars, wars pre-1945, 
wars post-1945, or wars between states without an enormous capability disparity.  The 
variable denoting a history of conflict delivered the hypothesized outcomes in each 
model.  These results are not surprising to historians of the Anglo-American alliance, 
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NATO, or the Holy Alliance, but might be to those who assume that all statesmen are 
clones of von Bismarck or Cardinal Richelieu.57   
 Part of the reason for those consistent results is the undesirability of appearing an 
unreliable ally.  This mechanism is tested more directed by looking at regimes that are 
either not representative or unstable.  Both characteristics make a state less likely to 
reciprocate their present alignments, and thus to obtain those alignments in the first place.  
The results generally bear this out.  The regime type variable remains significantly 
associated with alignment in each of the models, even when the intervener is itself 
autocratic.  The results for the instability variable are more mixed.  Though instability 
leads to negative alignment in the main models, it is shown to have no effect in the pre-
1945 era and in the realism model that only looks at major powers interveners.  The 
related alliance reliability measure has similarly mixed results. 
The results for states that are not in a position to retaliate are more 
straightforward: they are shown to be targets of negative alignment in every model.  In 
numerous tests, states that have an overabundance of rivals find themselves to be on the 
wrong side of alignment decisions.  Time and time again, leaders find it convenient to 
align against countries that are not in a position to retaliate.  The opposite is true of states 
that benefit from an asymmetrical relationship with a potential intervener.  Knowing the 
damage the former can unleash if aligned against, rulers find it in their interest to support 
these types of states.  “Selling out” is viewed as being preferable to the alternative. 
                                                 
 
57 It might surprise some adherents of realpolitik that Bismarck himself was not a fan of abstract principles, 
and preferred to deal with every situation as they arose (Ford 1905, 198).   
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 In several critical tests, alignment theory is shown to outperform realism and the 
democratic peace.  In the stringent balancing model, past alignment is shown to make 
alignment more likely, while the capabilities of disputants seem to have only a moderate 
effect.  Rulers are shown to support former friends, contrary to Palmerston’s beliefs.  
Tested against the democratic peace expectation that only democracies support other 
democracies, the alignment theory prediction that all regimes types will opt to support the 
latter receives strong support.  One does not need to be a democrat to realize that despite 
the rapid rotation of executives, representative regimes offer more long-term continuity 
than those with a metaphorical Sword of Damocles hanging over their heads.   
 A word of caution about the results in this chapter: nearly all relied on war 
intervention as the dependent variable.  As the theory chapter makes clear, war is far 
from the only type of alignment that states engage in.  For that reason, Chapter 6 removes 
the assumption that all alignment types are the same, and investigates the role of cost and 
discernibility in bringing about alignment.  Several of the hypotheses that received mixed 
support in this chapter are also reexamined in light of different forms of alignment.  
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Chapter 6 – Effect of Cost and Discernibility 
 This chapter continues where the previous one left off.  Whereas Chapter 5 was 
concerned with only one form alignment – intervention into ongoing wars – Chapter 6 
seeks to show that alignment theory is applicable across many alignment types.  
Furthermore, it aims to highlight the importance of cost and discernibility in producing 
alignment decisions.  Despite the change in emphasis, the underlying rationale for 
alignment decisions remains the same.  All forms of alignment are pursued for broadly 
similar reasons, but some factors make states less or more hesitant to follow through on 
the reciprocity-oriented logic of alignment described in the previous chapters.  
 Throughout the first half of this chapter, most of the Chapter 5 hypotheses – 
including those related to reciprocation and the reliability of alignment partners - are 
retested.  Unlike the previous chapter, this one makes use of four dependent variables: 
war, dangerous MIDs – military conflicts fought over territory or those involving 
fatalities – non-dangerous MIDs, and sanction initiations.  The expectations over the 
previously introduced variables do not greatly differ.  In the first stage of alignment, 
leaders still need to have the ability to make a difference and have some connection to the 
disputants before they are willing to take part in other countries’ disputes.  However, the 
amount of resources necessary to make such a contribution decreases along with the cost 
of alignment, allowing weaker countries to take part in the less costly alignments. 
In the second stage of alignment, domestic, leaders still expect to be rewarded for 
past alignments, meaning that the effect of that variable should remain undiminished 
across different alignment types.  Given that leaders do not want to use scarce resources 
toward unproductive ends, they will still be hesitant to align with states that face strong 
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constraints on future reciprocation.  Just as in Chapter 5, these explanations are tested 
against several realist and democratic peace hypotheses.  The purpose of this first half of 
the chapter is to demonstrate the robustness of reciprocal alignment theory by showing 
that it is applicable across vastly different forms of alignment in marked contrast to other 
theories of alignment that tend to focus one type of alignment. 
 The second half of the chapter concerns the discernibility dimension of alignment, 
the last component of the alignment theory to be quantitatively tested.  Discernibility 
provides a mechanism for interveners to demonstrate the depth of their support or to 
allow a regime that is aligned against to save face without retaliation.  By making their 
alignments less discernible – in practice, this means being one of the later states to join a 
dispute or joining a large-scale sanction regime – leaders decrease the amount of credit 
they would receive within the political arena of the state they are supporting.  Conversely, 
they do not create as much negative effect within the state they are aligning against.  
 I consider two scenarios where rulers would be strongly tempted to either increase 
or decrease the discernibility of their involvement.  In the first, a leader is aligning with a 
state whose assistance will be needed in the near future.  Due to the necessity of that 
assistance, the alignment will be made as discernibly as possible.  In the second situation, 
the intervening state cannot afford to be retaliated against by the state it aligns against, 
whether because of the intervener’s weakness of the disputant’s unique influence over the 
former’s political system.  In either case, the incentive is to align indiscernibly.   
 In sum, Chapter 6 retests each of the major hypotheses while varying the cost of 
the potential alignment.  This is done both to demonstrate the similarity of all alignments 
and stress the role of cost in mediating or moderating the effect of some determinants of 
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alignment.  This task is accomplished by using four different types of alignment as 
dependent variables instead of just one.  Chapter 6 concludes by testing the discernibility 
hypotheses and interpreting the quantitative results from chapters 5 and 6.   
6.1 Results – First Stage 
 Most of the independent variables used throughout this chapter are identical to 
their Chapter 5 counterparts.  What does change is the outcome variable.  Instead of 
relying entirely on intervention into wars, this chapter uses four dependent variables to 
test most of the cost and discernibility hypotheses.  The four variables are intended to 
represent four different costs of alignment decisions.  The first outcome variable is war 
intervention, which is the same variable used in the previous chapter.  For obvious 
reasons, it is deemed the costliest option.  The second alignment type that is used to test 
the proposed hypotheses is dangerous MID; these are MIDs that are either fought over 
territory or involve fatalities.  Based on the literature, these kinds of disputes are assumed 
to stir greater domestic and international passions than other types of militarized disputes.  
The third alignment type is non-dangerous MIDs, which includes all MIDs that do not 
meet the dangerous MID criteria.  The last form of alignment examined in this chapter is 
sanction initiation, viewed as costly as non-dangerous MIDs but in a different manner.   
 For the discernibility hypotheses, I look at the order of a state’s intervention into a 
dispute.  The first state that takes sides in an ongoing dispute is considered to have made 
the most discernible alignment.  The same applies for all but the sanction models.  Due to 
a lack of data over the timing of the sanction joining, the discernibility variable is based 
on the total number of states that imposed sanctions; the more states do so, the less 
discernible is each of their actions. 
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 I start by retesting the hypotheses relating to stage one, but also add a cost 
component to the calculations.  The results in the previous chapter confirmed that states 
need to have the capacity to make a difference to the resolution of a dispute and have a 
connection to the disputants before it will partake in alignment.  By adding lower-cost 
alignment outcome variables, I aim to show that states do not need the same amount of 
resources to join a low-cost dispute as they would a high-cost one.   
Table 6.1.  Determinants of the Decision to Intervene in a War across Alignment Types 
 Model 1 
War 
Model 2 
Dang. MID 
Model 3 
Non-dang. MID 
Model 4 
Sanctions 
Intervener’s military 
capabilities 
0.60 *** 
(.04) 
0.10 *** 
(.02) 
-0.06 *** 
 (.02) 
0.09 
(.11) 
Intervener’s 
economic capabilities 
0.29 *** 
(.06) 
0.09 
(.05) 
 0.36 *** 
 (.02) 
0.50 *** 
(.06) 
Proximate to 
disputants 
0.69 *** 
(.05) 
0.03 
(.06) 
 0.12 ** 
 (.04) 
1.02 *** 
(.17) 
Recent conflict with 
disputants 
0.88 *** 
(.05) 
1.93 *** 
(.04) 
 1.79 *** 
 (.03) 
0.36 ** 
(.14) 
Allied to disputants 0.97 *** 
(.04) 
0.80 *** 
(.03) 
 1.08 *** 
 (.02) 
0.91 *** 
(.06) 
LR χ2 (df = 5, 5, 5, 5) 2,379.37 *** 5,064.54 ***  8,641.03 *** 1,175.94 *** 
Pseudo R2 0.163 0.182  0.215 0.098 
N 41,388 228,826  441,288 238,582 
*** p-value < 0.001, ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value < 0.05; standard errors clustered around the triad in parentheses 
 
The results in Table 6.1 broadly support hypothesis 8, which relates to the amount 
of resources necessary to take part in alignments of differing costs.  As Model 1 shows, 
military and economic resources, as well as proximity to the disputants – all factors that 
improve the quality of a state’s contribution to a dispute – positively affect intervention 
into a costly war.  As the cost of intervention decreases, some of those variables stop 
being important.  When it comes to dangerous MIDs, neither economic resources nor 
proximity predicts dispute joining.  The limited nature of MIDs increases the range of 
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leaders that can join them without stretching thin the resources of their country.  Military 
resources are still necessary for dangerous MIDs due to the elevated risk arising from 
fatalities and territorial issues present in such MIDs.  In the event of a future military 
conflict between Iran and Israel, we can thus expect different states to get involved 
depending on the severity of the dispute.  A dispute that escalates to a war would likely 
see the participation of only those states with substantial military capabilities, such as the 
United States or perhaps the United Kingdom.  If the dispute is at a much lower level of 
hostility, however, we can expect economically-strong but militarily-weak states like 
Germany or Canada to seek a role in the dispute’s resolution.  
Non-dangerous MIDs are at a very lower chance of escalating to war;58 
unsurprisingly, states are in less of a need for military resources to participate in them.  In 
fact, the relationship between military resources and MID joining is negative, suggesting 
that states with smaller militaries are most likely to join these less dangerous MIDs.  It is 
unclear why this would be the case.  The results for sanctions are more consistent with 
expectations: a state does not need military resources to engage in a low-cost alignment 
that is unlikely to degenerate into a full-blown war, while the lack of economic resources 
would make sanctions ineffective, making a certain level of wealth a precondition for the 
joining of a sanction regime.  Domestically, each form of alignment needs a justification 
to ensure public and/or elite support, and this means that a conflictual or cooperative 
history with the disputants is necessary to enable a leader to make a strong case.  With the 
empirics largely supporting the stage one hypotheses, I turn to testing second stage ones. 
                                                 
 
58 See Senese and Vasquez (2008) for substantial evidence for this assertion. 
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6.2 Results – Second Stage 
 For the variables in Table 6.2, the theoretical expectations are the same as for 
their Chapter 5 equivalents.  Leaders are still hypothesized to be unwilling to align with 
states that are unrepresentative or unstable, and quite willing to align against states with 
many rivals.   With several exceptions, the results bear out the relevant hypotheses.  In 
the four models, only one marker of unreliability is not associated with negative 
alignment, that being the alliance reliability variable in the MID model.  Rulers are still 
unwilling to align with states that are unstable or unrepresentative even when doing so 
carries a large cost.  Leaders also target states with multiple allies for negative alignment.   
Table 6.2.  Logit Models of Intervention across Alignment Types 
 Model 5 
War 
Model 6 
Dang. MID 
Model 7 
Non-dang. MID 
Model 8 
Sanctions 
Difference in dyadic 
conflicts (IA – IB) 
-2.40 *** 
 (.27) 
-2.95 *** 
 (.25) 
-3.22 *** 
 (.27) 
-2.30 
(1.53) 
Difference in dyadic 
alliances (IA – IB) 
 1.31 *** 
 (.13) 
 1.69 *** 
 (.11) 
 2.61 *** 
 (.09) 
 8.88 ** 
(2.66) 
Difference in past 
alignments (IA – IB) 
 2.47 *** 
 (.41) 
 3.77 *** 
 (.44) 
 4.48 *** 
 (.52) 
 3.42 
(2.67) 
Difference in executive 
recruitment (A – B) 
 0.95 *** 
 (.08) 
 0.90 *** 
 (.10) 
 1.58 *** 
 (.08) 
 6.86 *** 
(1.89) 
Difference in instability 
(A – B) 
-1.90 *** 
 (.17) 
-1.67 *** 
 (.15) 
-0.46 *** 
 (.10) 
-2.39 ** 
 (.71) 
Difference in alliance 
reliability (A – B) 
 3.80 * 
(1.67) 
 4.29 ** 
(1.28) 
-1.17 
 (.66) 
222.62 * 
(94.12) 
Difference in other 
rivals (A – B) 
-0.19 *** 
 (.02) 
-0.22 *** 
 (.02) 
-0.27 *** 
 (.03) 
-1.37 ** 
 (.42) 
Difference in distance 
(IA – IB) 
-0.12 *** 
 (.02) 
-0.15 *** 
 (.03) 
-0.07 ** 
 (.02) 
-0.45 * 
 (.18) 
Difference is S-Scores 
(IA – IB) 
-0.60 *** 
 (.13) 
-0.43 *** 
 (.11) 
-0.08 
 (.09) 
 3.18 *** 
 (.91) 
LR χ2 (df =9, 9, 9, 9) 635.38 *** 750.54 *** 1,516.18 *** 46.13 *** 
Pseudo R2 0.292 0.475 0.695 0.853 
N 3,186 3,230 8,294    398 
*** p-value < 0.001, ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value < 0.05; standard errors clustered around the triad in parentheses 
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 The exceptions to the supportive results are in the sanctions model, which covers 
a much narrower time frame – 1971 to 1999 – and is coded in different manner.  In that 
model, history of conflict and alignment variables fail to reach statistical significance.  
Part of the reason is the low number of observations in the sample.  This is supported by 
the signs for both of the non-significant variables pointing in the proper direction.  It is 
also possible that military dimensions of alignment and dyadic history do not do a good 
job of predicting non-military alignments.  This would explain why the same variables 
that are not significant in the sanctions model are significant in the MID model. 
The previous chapter established the substantive effect of the alignment variables 
by examining the differences in predicted probabilities when the values of those variables 
were changed from the minimum to the maximum or the 5th percentile to the 95th.  In this 
chapter, I use a different approach, and attempt to ascertain how much adding those same 
variables to a model improves the latter’s predictive power.  Given that an intervener has 
only two options – join state A or join state B – a random model would be able to predict 
50 percent of the cases accurately.  The question is how much the predictive power of the 
model improves by adding each of the variables separately. 
Table 6.3.  Percentage of Correct Alignment Predictions across Alignment Type 
 War Dang. MID Non-dang. MID Sanctions 
Baseline model 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 
Alignment variable 59.95 63.93 73.42 77.64 
Dyadic history variables 63.13 81.25 90.17 86.18 
Reliability variables 72.04 79.77 85.15 81.66 
Ability to retaliate variable 72.58 76.44 83.88 68.84 
All variables 80.26 86.71 93.06 98.74 
* A prediction is correct if the predicted value for an observation is > .5 and the observed value is 1 or if the predicted 
value is < .5 and the observed value is 0. 
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 As Table 6.3 makes clear, each set of variables does a good job of improving the 
predictive power of their associated statistical models.  The alignment variable by itself 
moves 10 percent of the observations from the “wrong” column to the “correct” column.  
When all the variables from Model 5 are placed together, the model is able to accurately 
predict over 80 percent of the war alignments.  The results are even more impressive for 
the other alignment types.  For sanctions, the variables in Model 8 were able to correctly 
predict the outcome in 393 out of the 398 observations.  The implication of these findings 
is that reciprocation-oriented variables are sufficient to explain a vast majority of 
interstate alignments, though there might be other variables that can improve the model.59  
Running similar models for individual wars shows that the full alignment model is able to 
correctly predict which side three quarters of the joiners took in the Crimean War and is 
accurate for every joiner in the first Gulf War. 
Table 6.4.  Democratization and Alignment Behavior across Alignment Types 
War Not Democratizing Democratizing 
No Alignment change 70 
92.1% 
2 
50.0% 
Alignment change 6 
7.9% 
2 
50.0% 
Total 76 
100% 
4 
100% 
χ2 = 7.49, pr. χ2 = 0.006 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
59 The predictions for stage 1 results are roughly as accurate.   Models incorporating all the variables from 
that stage are able to predict 76 percent of alignments into wars, 93 percent of the MID alignments of both 
categories, and 96 percent of the sanction alignments.   
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Table 6.4 (cont.) 
Dangerous MID Not Democratizing Democratizing 
No Alignment change 208 
91.2% 
8 
80.0% 
Alignment change 20 
8.8% 
2 
20.0% 
Total 228 
100% 
10 
100% 
χ2 = 1.44, pr. χ2 = 0.230 
Non-dangerous MID Not Democratizing Democratizing 
No Alignment change 778 
83.8% 
22 
45.8% 
Alignment change 150 
16.2% 
26 
54.2% 
Total 928 
100% 
48 
100% 
χ2 = 44.59, pr. χ2 = 0.000 
Sanctions Not Democratizing Democratizing 
No Alignment change 96 
100% 
0 
Alignment change 0 
0% 
0 
Total 96 
100% 
0 
 
 Table 6.2 showed that states viewed as being unreliable are unlikely to procure 
positive alignment.  Table 6.4 examines whether leaders are reasonable in assuming that 
unrepresentative states are likelier to alter their alignment behavior than other states.  
Table 5.9 in the previous chapter examined that assertion for war intervention, finding 
moderate support.  Table 6.4 here adds to that evidence.  Whereas less than 9 percent of 
states not underdoing democratization change their alignment partners in successive 
153 
 
dangerous MIDs, the same is true for double the number of democratizing states.60  For 
non-dangerous MIDs, the difference is even starker: when given the chance to align with 
the same state as before while undergoing democratization, rulers are more likely than 
not to align against their former alignment partner.  Non-democratizing regimes engage 
in the same kind of actions only a sixth of the time.  No conclusion can be drawn about 
the role of democratization in reversing alignments for sanctions due to the non-existent 
sample of democratizing regimes having the opportunity to change sides.  I now turn to 
testing the alignment explanations against competing theories, starting with realism. 
6.3 Results – Alternative Explanations 
The previous chapter provided evidence that major powers “balance” against the 
stronger disputant in less than 60 percent of the cases.  That substantive effect was far 
lower than that exhibited by the other variables in the model.  Model 9 reproduces those 
results, while Models 10 and 11 extend that assessment to dangerous and other MIDs.61  
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
60 One possible mechanism through which this takes place can be seen in the work of Leeds and Savun 
(2007).  The authors find that changes in domestic political institutions increases the likelihood of alliance 
termination.  A lack of an alliance, in turn, weakens constituencies supporting continued cooperation.  If 
the proper situation presents itself, this could ultimately lead to a change in alignment partners.   
61 There are insufficient observations to run a sanctions model. 
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Table 6.5.  Testing the Balancing Hypothesis across Alignment Types 
 Model 9  
War 
Model 10 
Dang. MID 
Model 11 
Non-dang. MID 
CINC A > CINC B -1.19 ** 
 (.42) 
-0.37 
 (.42) 
 0.05 
 (.30) 
Difference in dyadic conflicts (IA 
– IB) 
-5.69 *** 
 (.93) 
-5.33 *** 
(1.04) 
-3.39 
 (.65) 
Difference in dyadic alliances (IA 
– IB) 
  4.32 *** 
 (.82) 
 1.57 ** 
 (.60) 
 1.97 *** 
 (.27) 
Difference in past alignments (IA – 
IB) 
 7.64 *** 
(1.40) 
 1.57 *** 
 (.60) 
 2.56 * 
(1.06) 
Difference in executive recruitment 
(A – B) 
 1.82 *** 
 (.47) 
 1.18 ** 
 (.32) 
 0.89 ** 
 (.28) 
Difference in instability (A – B) -0.21 
 (.58) 
-2.36 *** 
 (.56) 
-0.52 
 (.27) 
Difference in alliance reliability (A 
– B) 
38.35 * 
(16.83) 
-45.09 *** 
(10.65) 
-0.36 
(1.79) 
Difference in other rivals (A – B) -0.68 *** 
 (.14) 
-0.57 *** 
 (.12) 
-0.24 ** 
 (.09) 
Difference in distance (IA – IB) -0.04  
 (.12) 
-0.15  
 (.10) 
 0.04 
 (.08) 
Difference is S-Scores (IA – IB) -0.83 
 (.74) 
 1.76 ** 
 (.66) 
 0.20 
 (.36) 
LR χ2 (df = 10, 10, 10) 94.58 *** 98.79 *** 237.15 *** 
Pseudo R2 0.572 0.649 0.684 
N    290    366    834 
*** p-value < 0.001, ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value < 0.05; standard errors clustered around the triad in parentheses 
 
 The outcome is even more lopsided.  In both MID models, the standard errors for 
the balancing variable are larger than the coefficients.  Thus, balancing does not provide 
an empirically accurate account of alignment behavior in the examined model.  The 
truncated sample does remove the statistical significance of several alliance reliability 
measures, though the dyadic history and past alignment variables consistently have the 
hypothesized effect.  Next, Table 6.6 examines the democratic peace hypothesis. 
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Table 6.6.  Testing the Democratic Peace Hypothesis across Alignment Types 
 Model 12 
War 
Model 13 
Dang. MID 
Model 14 
Non-dang. MID 
Difference in dyadic conflicts 
(IA – IB) 
-1.89 *** 
 (.26) 
-2.80 *** 
 (.33) 
-3.40 *** 
 (0.34) 
Difference in dyadic alliances 
(IA – IB) 
  1.33 *** 
 (.13) 
 1.67 ***  
 (.12) 
 2.36 *** 
 (.13) 
Difference in past alignments 
(IA – IB) 
 2.36 *** 
(.42) 
 7.26 *** 
(1.31) 
 4.34 *** 
 (.57) 
Difference in executive 
recruitment (A – B) 
 0.81 *** 
 (.10) 
 0.32 * 
 (.13) 
 1.12 *** 
 (.11) 
Difference in instability (A – B) -1.70 *** 
 (.22) 
-1.55 *** 
 (.19) 
-0.46 ** 
 (.14) 
Difference in alliance reliability 
(A – B) 
3.20 
(1.67) 
 3.98 ** 
(1.25) 
-1.06 
 (.67) 
Difference in other rivals (A – B) -0.17 *** 
 (.02) 
-0.22 *** 
 (.03) 
-0.22 *** 
 (.03) 
Difference in distance (IA – IB) -0.10 *** 
 (.02) 
-0.11 *** 
 (.03) 
 0.15 *** 
 (.03) 
Difference is S-Scores (IA – IB) -0.74 *** 
 (.14) 
-1.17 *** 
 (.16) 
-0.72 *** 
 (.14) 
LR χ2 (df = 9, 9, 9) 340.32 *** 424.93 *** 710.31 *** 
Pseudo R2 0.197 0.367 0.504 
N 2,202 1,896 3,184 
*** p-value < 0.001, ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value < 0.05; standard errors clustered around the triad in parentheses 
 
 Model 12 is a copy of Model 11 from Chapter 5, examining whether 
unrepresentative regimes are less likely to support their representative counterparts 
during wars.  The two subsequent models inspect the same hypothesis when the 
dependent variables are dangerous and non-dangerous MID; there are an insufficient 
number of observations to run the sanctions model.  The two MID models provide 
evidence that is strongly supportive of the alignment theory and in clear opposition to the 
democratic peace theory.  In those models, states without representative regimes are 
statistically more likely to support democracies than they are to support states with which 
they share a regime type.  Consequently, there is good reason to believe that autocracies 
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are indeed more likely to support democracies than other autocracies.  With that, I finish 
the examination of the cost-related hypotheses and turn to discernibility.   
6.4 Results – Cost and Discernibility 
Discernibility is a key component of the alignment variable that has been used 
throughout this dissertation.  Alignments that were less discernible – operationalized as 
the order of joining a dispute for all but the sanction model – were assumed to have a 
diminished ability to induce positive or negative alignment.  Table 6.7 examines the 
accuracy of that assumption.  Simple correlations are run between the discernibility of the 
previous alignment62 and the willingness of a leader to partake in a new alignment.   
Table 6.7.  Pearson Correlations of Discernibility of Past Alignment and Joining Similar Disputes 
 War order Dang. MID 
order 
Non-dang. 
MID order 
Number of 
sanctioners 
War 
involvement 
-0.124 
N = 810 
-0.032 
N = 515 
-0.076 
N = 393 
-0.290 
N = 23 
Dang. MID 
involvement 
-0.105 
N = 3,647 
-0.003 
N = 2,717 
-0.095 
N = 1,324 
-0.038 
N = 129 
MID 
involvement 
-0.121 
N = 7,810 
 0.115 
N = 6,314 
-0.060 
N = 4,182 
-0.132 
N = 421 
Sanction 
involvement 
-0.007 
N = 5,135 
-0.015 
N = 4,389 
 0.045 
N = 3,194 
-0.029 
N = 1,194 
 
 According to hypothesis 9, the correlation between the discernibility of past 
alignments and the decision to enter a current alignment should be a negative one: the 
earlier a state joined the previous dispute, the higher the chance of the recipient of that 
alignment taking part in the state’s future dispute.  This is because the earlier a state joins 
a dispute, the more discernible its alignment is assumed to be.  Given that numerous other 
                                                 
 
62 As long as it took place within 20 years for wars, 10 years for dangerous MIDs, and 5 years for non-
dangerous MIDs and sanctions. 
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factors affect alignment decisions, there is no reason to expect that negative correlations 
to be very strong ones.  With that in mind, 14 out of the 16 Pearson correlations support 
the discernibility hypothesis, though this is tempered by the lack of formal significance 
tests in these models.  Discernibly joining wars in particular was consistently associated 
with higher odds of coaxing the other state to engage in future alignment.  This leaves 
only one hypothesis left to test – the one dealing with the determinants of discernibility.   
Table 6.8.  Using a Truncated Negative Binomial Regression to Test the Correlates of 
Discernibility for Positive Alignment 
 Model 15 
War 
Model 16 
Dang. MID 
Model 17 
Non-dang. MID 
Model 18 
Sanctions 
Difference in alliances 
(IA – IB) 
-0.28 *** 
 (.06) 
-0.10 
 (.07) 
-0.40 *** 
 (.08) 
-0.03 
 (.04) 
Military resources (I) -0.03 
 (.02) 
-0.01 
 (.02) 
-0.00 
 (.04) 
 0.11 * 
 (.05) 
Economic resources (I) -0.56 *** 
 (.06) 
-0.24 
 (.14) 
-0.49 *** 
 (.06) 
-0.18 *** 
 (.05) 
Difference in distance 
(IA – IB) 
 0.01 
 (.01) 
0.08 *** 
 (.01) 
 0.01 
 (.02) 
 0.00 
 (.01) 
Difference is S-Scores 
(IA – IB) 
 0.33 *** 
 (.06) 
-0.29 *** 
 (.07) 
-0.23 * 
 (.09) 
 0.06 
 (.05) 
LR χ2 (df =5, 5, 5, 5) 130.66 *** 125.23 *** 164.05 *** 16.43 ** 
N 1,313 1,547 4,128    199 
*** p-value < 0.001, ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value < 0.05; standard errors clustered around the triad in parentheses 
 
 Hypothesis 10 has two components: it posits that leaders will make their positive 
alignments more discernible if the recipient of that alignment will be helpful in pursuing 
their own objectives, and that rulers will make their negative alignments less discernible 
as the potential damage caused by retaliation increases.  Table 6.8 investigates the first 
part of that hypothesis.  For a lack of a better alternative, the proxy for potential 
usefulness is the presence of a military alliance.  The assumption is that leaders would not 
seek an alliance with someone unless they expected to get something from it.  Models 15 
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and 17 have results that are consistent with the above hypothesis, while the other two 
models do not.   Nevertheless, both of the latter have a coefficient in the proper direction 
– having an alliance with a state makes that state join a dispute sooner – and alliances do 
not serve the same function for sanctions as they do for military disputes.   
 One interesting aspect of the results is the role of military and economic resources 
in producing discernible alignment.  Having a large military did not make leaders more 
willing to join any of form of disputes, but having substantial economic resources did just 
that.  These results suggest that the economic ramifications of alignment play an integral 
role in a leader’s decision as to the timing of their intervention into a dispute.  This was 
true for the Second Gulf War, which saw Britain and Australia – both members of the G-
20 bloc of major global economies – join immediately, while economically weaker states 
opted to wait until the outcome and cost of the war was no longer in doubt. 
Table 6.9.  Using a Truncated Negative Binomial Regression to Test the Correlates of 
Discernibility for Negative Alignment 
 Model 19 
War 
Model 20 
Dang. MID 
Model 21 
Non-dang. MID 
Model 22 
Sanctions 
Difference in military 
resources (IA – IB) 
 0.09 *** 
 (.01) 
 0.03 
 (.02) 
 0.03 
 (.01) 
 0.05 ** 
 (.02) 
Civil war (I)  0.34 ** 
 (.13) 
 0.61 *** 
(.09) 
1.01 *** 
 (.18) 
-0.45 ** 
 (.14) 
Military resources (I) -0.10 ** 
 (.03) 
-0.04 
 (.02) 
 0.09 * 
 (.04) 
 0.11 * 
 (.05) 
Economic resources (I) -0.68 *** 
 (.09) 
-0.22 
 (.18) 
-0.72 *** 
 (.07) 
-0.20 *** 
 (.05) 
Difference in distance 
(IA – IB) 
 0.01 
 (.01) 
-0.09 *** 
 (.02) 
-0.07 ** 
 (.02) 
-0.01 
 (.01) 
Difference is S-Scores 
(IA – IB) 
-0.06  
 (.06) 
 0.41 *** 
 (.06) 
 0.31 *** 
 (.08) 
 0.05 
 (.06) 
LR χ2 (df =6, 6, 6, 6) 176.47 *** 158.68 *** 177.26 *** 43.77 *** 
N 1,157 1,411 3,918    191 
*** p-value < 0.001, ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value < 0.05; standard errors clustered around the triad in parentheses 
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 The logic for wanting to make positive alignments discernible and negative 
alignments indiscernible are mirror images of one another.  Whereas the former is 
premised on the possibility of gains, the latter depends heavier on avoiding losses.  The 
state being aligned against can make life difficult for the intervener if the former is 
especially strong or if the latter happens to be vulnerable.  I denote these possibilities 
with the difference in military personnel and the presence of a civil war in the intervening 
state.  The intervener’s alignment should become less discernible as the object of 
negative alignment becomes stronger.  Similarly, a state in the middle of a civil war 
should aim to downplay its foreign alignments in order to minimize the likelihood of 
external actors enflaming the ongoing civil conflict.  This part of the tenth hypothesis is 
generally supported.  Leaders join conflicts at a later stage against states with powerful 
militaries.  The coefficients for that variable are not significant for the MID models, but 
are in the hypothesized direction.  At the same time, civil wars make rulers weary of 
jumping straight into other countries’ disputes, though the same is not true for joining 
sanction regimes.  It is possible that the latter can be explained by sanctions not being 
considered sufficiently hostile for a military retaliation.  In light of sanctions being an 
economic tool, it is also conceivable that economic, not military, weakness would serve 
as a deterrent for intervention. 
6.5 Conclusion 
 The results for this chapter are less conclusive than those for the previous one.  At 
least one of the independent variables did not have hypothesized effect in many of the 
models involving low-cost alignment.  The cross-tabulations are not as clear-cut as one 
would like.  The sanction models in general underperform.  One must keep in mind, 
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however, that most of the hypotheses in this chapter are based on a newly created 
alignment measure, whose dimensions have no precedence in the alignment literature.   
 Some inconsistencies aside, the key theoretical insights over the importance of 
past relations have been given strong support, and varying alignments based on cost and 
discernibility produced many theoretically and empirically informative results.  To start, 
Table 6.1 showed that the ability of a state to make a difference to a dispute becomes less 
important as the cost of the alignment decreases.  While the results might seem like 
common-sense, this was the first attempt to theoretically and empirically specify a basis 
for the costs of different forms of alignment.  These results have implications for research 
that treats all MIDs as being equivalent, having either the same causes or effects.   
The stage 2 results reinforced the importance of reciprocation and the perceived 
likelihood of obtaining reciprocation in determining alignment behavior.  Past alignment 
consistently predicted present alignment, a finding that supports the key theoretical 
insight that leaders will reciprocate in order to obtain additional assistance in the future.  
When combined with the connection to disputants finding from the first stage, we see a 
picture of foreign policy behavior where rulers feel pressured by domestic groups to enter 
disputes based on past experience with the combatants, not on the merit of the issue.  At 
that point, the need for future support compels them to support those who had helped 
them in the past and oppose those who had engaged in the opposite behavior. 
The logic of reciprocation is dependent on leaders being reasonably certain 
aligning with a state now will lead to the other state returning the favor in the future.  
That certainty does not exist for states that have unrepresentative or unstable regimes.  
The two variables predict negative alignment in nearly all of the models, across all forms 
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of alignment.  The behavioral alliance reliability variable offers a more mixed set of 
results.  On the opposite side of the spectrum are states that are unlikely to respond to 
negative alignment, proxied by a state’s amount of rivals at a given time.  The results for 
this variable are consistent with the relevant hypothesis in all but one of the models. 
The findings for discernibility are similarly supportive of alignment theory, but 
not uniformly so.  Table 6.7 shows that joining disputes in a less discernible manner 
decreases the likelihood of the other side taking part in one’s future disputes.  The other 
discernibility hypothesis finds weaker support.  Rulers joined disputes involving a state 
whose help might be necessary in the future at an early stage of that dispute in only wars 
and non-dangerous MIDs.  The expected consequences from retaliation made rulers less 
willing to join that state’s disputes discernibly in all but the sanctions model.  Having a 
civil war in particular pushed states to temper their opposition to the state they were 
aligning against.  The non-findings for military resources in two of the models can 
possibly be explained by the imprecise nature of that variable: states cannot use their 
military resources equally against all opponents.   
The expansion of the dependent variable in this chapter does not alter the 
explanatory power of alignment theory relative to alternative explanations of alignment.  
Table 6.5 provided additional evidence that states neither balance nor bandwagon 
reliably.  They do, however, align with the states that have helped them in the past, a 
result that is wildly at odds with realist expectations.  Alignment theory also stands up 
well to the democratic peace: unrepresentative regimes are shown to favor aligning with 
democracies instead of with states with the same type of regime.   
162 
 
In the next chapter, I turn to tracing and testing the causal mechanism postulated 
by the proposed theory, focusing on the role of past alignments and dyadic history.  I do 
so in the context of a case study that examines the behavior of several states from the 
former Soviet Union from 1991 to the present.  Specifically, I examine Uzbekistan’s two 
alignment decisions related to its membership in the Russian-led Collective Security 
Treaty, and Kyrgyzstan’s policies pertaining to the presence of foreign military bases on 
its soil.  The results build upon those obtained in this and the previous chapter.  
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Chapter 7 – Former Soviet Union Case Study, 1991-2013  
 The previous chapters put forth a theory of reciprocal alignment and provided 
statistical support for the hypotheses derived from that theory.  In brief, state leaders are 
faced with a scarcity of resources to accomplish their preferred objectives, and obtaining 
outside assistance is one way in which those leaders can resolve salient issues in a 
manner of their choosing.  Other states have no incentive to let these leaders free-ride and 
require similar alignment in exchange.  Thus, a ruler who wants alignment himself would 
be wise to help states who had helped his own in the past and to align with states as a 
down-payment on future assistance from them.   
 Decisions about alignment are taken in a domestic context.  Various parts of the 
leader’s selectorate must consent to their foreign policy or the leader risks it being 
undermined in advance, not implemented properly, or rolled back after they leave office.  
Moreover, those constituent groups occasionally have strong preferences over 
cooperation and conflict with other states.  Specifically, states that are friendly with the 
potential intervener will help generate interest groups that are supportive of future 
cooperation with those states, while hostile states help produce interest groups that lobby 
their government for a policy of conflict.  When an international issue comes up that calls 
for a ruler to choose a side, that leader will be pressured by domestic groups to side with 
the friend and against the enemy.  The very interpretation of the issue would depend on 
past relations with the disputants.  Hence, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, 
that invasion was viewed through the prism of anti-Soviet lenses; whether the Soviet 
enemy might have been in the wrong did not cross the minds of most US lawmakers.   
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 The previous two chapters provided evidence in support of hypotheses derived 
from this theory.  They showed that past alignment, recent hostility, and an ongoing 
alliance consistently predict current alignment behavior.  This holds for the entire 1816 to 
1999 period, as well as for the pre-1945 and post-1945 sample.  It holds for autocratic 
states and for major powers.  The results also vary little when the alignment type in the 
dependent variable changes.  Past alignment and dyadic history are shown to have a 
statistically and substantively significant effect on the decision to align with a specific 
state when the dependent variable is war, MIDs involving territory and/or fatalities, and 
other MIDs.  Only the sanctions models do not provide the hypothesized results. 
 In this chapter, I use a case study to go beyond the question of statistical 
correlation and seek to determine whether past alignments and dyadic history have the 
posited effect on current alignment for the reasons stated in reciprocal alignment theory.  
I also aim to compare the ability of the proposed theory to outperform two competing 
explanations for the same phenomena: balance of power and homophily.  This is done in 
two steps.  First, the method of congruence is used to establish whether the outcomes in 
each alignment decision were consistent with those predicted by the applicable 
hypotheses.  The goal is to see whether reciprocal alignment theory can outcompete the 
two opposing explanations.  Second, limited process tracing is undertaken to unveil the 
mechanism that leads to the ultimate alignment decisions.  A good theory is one that not 
only generates hypotheses that are supported by statistical analysis, but is also able to 
show that the results took place for the reasons specified in the theory. 
 The full rationale for the selection of the specific cases is detailed in the research 
chapter.  The main reason for focusing on the former Soviet Union was to rule out as 
165 
 
many potential alternate explanations for the alignment decisions as possible.  For that 
reason, a lack of a history of independence made the FSU an attractive region to examine.  
The cases chosen are Uzbekistan’s two decisions on membership in the Collective 
Security Treaty and Kyrgyzstan’s three decisions on allowing US and Russia military 
presence on its territory.  They were selected due to variation in the key independent 
variables – past alignment for the Uzbek case and dyadic history for Kyrgyzstan – and 
the timing of the alignments.  Having the same countries, and in Uzbekistan’s case, the 
same ruler, make decisions on the same issues over a prolonged period of time minimizes 
the heterogeneity of the circumstances that led to the alignments.  The ensuing analysis 
shows that past alignment or dyadic history were integral in three out of the four 
alignment decisions where they could have played a role.   
As Table 7.1 makes clear, only the result of the 2009 Kyrgyz alignment was 
inconsistent with the alignment theory.  Where the previous history of dyadic relations or 
alignments between a given Central Asian state and Russia was positive, the end result 
was a positive alignment in two of the three cases.  Where such history was negative, the 
consequence was a negative alignment.  The results were consistent with the balancing 
explanation in three out of five cases and with homophily in two of the five cases.  In the 
former instances, Uzbekistan was sufficiently powerful to at least attempt to stave off a 
Russian challenge to its desires for regional supremacy, but did so in only one of the two 
decision points.  Kyrgyzstan was never strong enough to challenge designs on Central 
Asia, but still defied Russia in one out of the three scenarios.  For the homophily 
explanation, Russia and the particular Central Asian state had similar regimes in two of 
the cases, one of which ended up with a pro-Russian alignment and one in an anti-
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Russian one.  In the three decisions where regime similarity was low, Russia was able to 
obtain positive alignment twice.  Yet even when the outcome matched the expectations 
for the alternate theories of alignment, the reasons for those outcomes were inconsistent 
with the underlying logic of those theories.  
Table 7.1.  Overview of Theoretical Expectations and Results 
Case Past alignment/ 
Dyadic history 
Balance 
of power 
Homophily Expectation Outcome 
Uzbekistan 1992 N/A Medium Low N/A / - / - + 
Uzbekistan 1999 Negative Medium Low - / - / - - 
Kyrgyzstan 2002 Positive Low High + / + / + + 
Kyrgyzstan 2009 Positive Low High + / + / + - 
Kyrgyzstan 2013 Very positive Low Low + / + / - + 
 
7.1 Uzbekistan pre-1992 
In this section, I examine the Uzbek decision to align with Russia by joining the 
Russian-led Collective Security Treaty in 1992, a year after independence.  At this time, 
Uzbekistan had no history of inter-state relations with Russia.  Uzbekistan did consider 
itself the natural leader of Central Asia, something that caused unease in some of its 
neighbors.  Its highly autocratic regime was also markedly different from Russia’s, with 
the Uzbek leader making no move to reform the Soviet-era political structure that gave 
him power.  Hence, while reciprocal alignment theory is agnostic as to what decision 
Uzbekistan should have made, balance of power theory leans in the direction of 
Uzbekistan siding against Russia, as does the homophily explanation.  This section will 
show that the opposite was case, challenging both alternative explanations of alignment. 
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The collapse of the USSR was as sudden as it was unexpected.  This was doubly 
true for the leaders of Central Asia, who were not privy to the meetings that led to the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union.  The public of those states was no less taken aback by the 
sudden turn of events.  The nationalist murmurings and disaffection for the multi-national 
state were limited mainly to the Caucasus and Slavic lands.  The Uzbek population in 
particular voted strongly in favor of maintaining the unity of the Soviet Union in 
Gorbachev’s 1991 union referendum (Gleason 2001, 1081).  Independence nevertheless 
came to each of the fifteen constituent republics of the USSR.  With that independence 
came the task of crafting a foreign and domestic policy virtually from scratch.  
Unlike the leaders of some of the European successor states to the USSR, Islam 
Karimov, the ruler of Uzbekistan since 1989, had never prioritized economic reforms.  
Whereas the rulers of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine implemented “shock therapy” in 
order to rapidly liberalize their countries’ economies upon the Soviet Union’s collapse, 
Karimov implemented only minor reforms, and did so at a glacial pace (Kazemi 2003, 
213-4).  The result was economic stagnation coupled with political stability in 
Uzbekistan, and relatively high economic growth after a period of severe recession in the 
aforementioned European states.  The economic downturns cost the Ukrainian and 
Belarusian leaders their political careers and undermined the domestic credentials of the 
Russian president; the Uzbek stagnation has yet to claim Karimov’s presidency. 
 What has consistently mattered to the Uzbek ruler was stability, a stability 
challenged by Islamist, and to a lesser extent, pro-democracy elements in Central Asia.  
Not infrequently, the two traits have been shared by the same groups.  This stability was 
hard to come by in a poverty-stricken, land-locked region with, in 1991, no strategic 
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importance.  The states of Central Asia had no standing army, no nationalist history to 
promote solidarity, and few resources to cajole regime opponents into switching sides.  
The external options were only marginally better.  China was wary of complete 
international isolation so soon after the Tiananmen Square Massacre, and thus avoided 
antagonizing Russia (Fravel 2005, 75).  The US interest in the FSU was limited to 
securing nuclear weapons located outside of Russia and to maintaining the domestic 
legitimacy of the newly elected Russian regime.  If Karimov was to obtain assistance in 
maintaining stability in Uzbekistan and in neighboring states, he would need Russia’s 
assistance.  Fortunately for him, initial Russian disillusionment with the subsidization63 
of non-Slavic territories of the FSU was replaced by a willingness to recreate some form 
of political ties in the region (Bremmer and Bailes 1998, 137). 
Uzbekistan Joining the Collective Security Treaty 
 The immediate impetus for a security treaty in the FSU was the start of civil 
conflict in Tajikistan.  By the time the Collective Security Treaty was signed in May 
1992, Tajikistan was on the verge of descending into a bloody civil war.  All members of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) were invited to join the new Russian-led 
security framework.  At the time, all of the successor states to the USSR, other than 
Georgia and the three Baltic states, were invited to sign the treaty.  Six out of those 
eleven states accepted invitation.64  Other than Russia, whose political ambitions were 
well-served by the new security regime, the biggest proponent of the treaty was 
                                                 
 
63 Turkmenistan was the only Central Asian republic in the Soviet Union to give more than it received in 
subsidies (Zhukov 2002, 356).   
64 The six states were Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (Splidsboel‐
Hansen 1997, 1508) 
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Kazakhstan (Menon 1995, 174).65  Armenia signed the treaty in order to maintain 
Russian support over the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute with Azerbaijan (Papazian 2006, 
239).66  Each of the other signatories was affected by the events in Tajikistan. 
 Karimov’s decision to align with Russia by formally joining the Collective 
Security Treaty was made on the basis of three uncertain factors.  First, the main object of 
the treaty was to protect predominantly Central Asian regimes against domestic, not 
international, opponents.  Most of those regimes faced threats from newly empowered 
Islamists, democrats, and embittered ethnic minorities.  It did not help that the Russian-
backed government of Afghanistan fell in 1992, with a new wave of violence and 
extremism threatening to spill over into Central Asia.67  The Uzbek alignment was thus 
more a sign of Karimov’s domestic weakness than it was a show of support for Russian 
foreign policy interests.  Unlike Armenia, Uzbekistan had no foreign foe.  Unlike 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan was not dependent on Russia politically and not nearly as 
dependent on it economically.68  Second, Russia did not provide the highest bid for 
Uzbek support; rather, it made the only bid.  Other states did not make serious offers to 
protect the Uzbek regime from internal or external foes, and no state but Russia was 
interested in Uzbekistan’s resources.  Desperate to contain the violence in Tajikistan, the 
                                                 
 
65 Due to its dependence on Russian pipelines and Russia’s ability to stir up trouble among ethnic Russians 
in the northern half of the country, Kazakhstan has consistently pursued a foreign policy that avoided 
antagonizing Russia.  In fact, in 1995, Kazakhstan was one of only two states to join a Russian-led customs 
union that was overwhelmingly favorable toward Russia (Hancock 2006, 128). 
66 Russia has been Armenia’s main military sponsor since 1991, selling it a substantial amount of 
weaponry, and occasionally getting involved more directly in the dispute.   
67 A substantial portion of Afghan mujahideen were ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks, who were in a better 
position to spread their ideas to Central Asia after the fall of the Soviet Union and its security apparatus. 
68 Karimov had quickly consolidated power, and therefore did not have to fear Russian meddling in Uzbek 
affairs.  Uzbekistan does not have any secessionist territories and does not border Russia, both of which 
limit the ability of Russia to blackmail Uzbekistan.  Uzbekistan also has a relatively closed economy and 
exports a moderate amount of natural gas, making Russian economic assistance unnecessary.   
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Uzbek ruler had no choice but to accept assistance from wherever it came.  Whether this 
would remain the case was contingent on events outside of Moscow’s and Tashkent’s 
control.  Last, the alignment was conditional on the events in neighboring Tajikistan.  A 
conclusion to the Tajik civil war would potentially undermine the basis for the Russo-
Uzbek alignment.  Tajikistan not only faced a democratic, Islamist rebellion that could be 
copied in Uzbekistan, but was also home to a sizeable Uzbek minority.  Any threats to the 
well-being of that minority threatened to create a nationalist backlash in Uzbekistan, 
which Karimov might not have the ability to control.  If the civil conflict ended, Russian 
meddling in the region would become a much more salient issue.   
7.2 Uzbekistan between 1992 and 1999 
In this section, I examine Uzbekistan’s 1999 decision to end its participation in the 
Collective Security Treaty, which was viewed as a strongly anti-Russian move at the 
time.  The decision took place in the context of worsening relations between Russia and 
Uzbekistan due to the former’s unwillingness to withdraw its military presence from 
Tajikistan, over Uzbekistan’s protests.  Uzbekistan still considered itself the primary 
contender for Central Asian leadership.  Its regime remained highly autocratic, in contrast 
to Russia’s borderline democracy.  All three theories thus expected Uzbekistan to align 
against Russia, which is consistent with the eventual outcome.  However, the rationale for 
that outcome was inconsistent with the logic of balancing and homophily explanations.   
The Collective Security Treaty was officially ratified in 1994, with the proviso that 
it would have to be renewed at five-year intervals.  The seven years between the initial 
signing of the treaty and the deadline for renewing it were eventful for the Uzbek leader.  
A national myth for Uzbekistan needed to be created for the sake of national unity.  An 
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economy had to be shifted from the cotton-export model foisted upon Uzbekistan by the 
Soviet Union.  Most importantly for the alignment story, Uzbekistan had to create a 
foreign policy from scratch, having no prior history of independence.   
 Being less dependent on Russia than his Central Asian counterparts and being in 
charge of a state with the largest population in the region, Karimov sought to make 
Uzbekistan into a dominant regional power.  The move was tenable because of the 
weakness of the other states in the region, each of whom faced some combination of 
severe economic problems, political instability, potential for secessionism, dependence 
on outside states, or an inward-looking foreign policy.  The Uzbek ruler thus had a large 
variety of resources at his disposal to pursue his goals.  He also did not face cooperation-
supporting domestic constituencies due to a lack of past cooperation with Uzbekistan’s 
neighbors.  Combined with Uzbekistan’s lack of dependence on Russia, these factors put 
Karimov in a strong position to maximize his value from every stake before him.   
Given Uzbekistan’s strengths, the Tajik civil war was the only source of potential 
conflict.  When it became clear that the violence was not going to spill over the Tajik 
border, the Tajik situation lost its importance.  No longer needing Russia for security 
purposes and seeing Russia as an obstacle to his regional ambitions, Karimov strove to 
minimize Russian influence in Central Asia (Kazemi 2003, 208).  This purpose was best 
served by drawing foreign powers into the region and by weakening Russian-led 
institutions.  The first task was accomplished by joining NATO’s Partnership for Peace 
program in 1996 (Gleason 2001, 1089) and forming bilateral agreements with the United 
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States.69  The second objective entailed working together with other disgruntled FSU 
states to minimize the effectiveness of the CIS.  The latter proved to be wildly successful.   
 By 1994, Karimov no longer viewed Russian military involvement in Tajikistan 
as beneficial to Uzbekistan’s interests (Akbarzadeh 2005, 46; Fumagalli 2007, 256).  
Russia’s apparent intention to station its troops in Tajikistan indefinitely provided 
additional motivation for Karimov to strive to weaken Russia’s influence in Central 
Asia.70  Karimov was not alone in pursuing this goal.  A bloc united by little more than 
their opposition to Russian policy – GUAM - was formed in 1997, consisting of 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.  Turkmenistan did not join any coalition 
opposed to Russia, but neither did it pursue multilateral cooperation with that state (Bohr 
2004, 499).  It did not help Russia’s case that the CIS was badly mismanaged.  The 
organization suffered from high absenteeism (Sakwa and Webber 1999, 395), trade and 
investment targets were missed (Kubicek 2009, 243), and most acts of cooperation took 
place on a bilateral basis outside of the organization (Sakwa and Webber 1999, 397).   
 The other pillar of Uzbek foreign policy was drawing the US into the world of 
Central Asian politics, an undertaking in which Uzbekistan was only marginally 
successful before 2002.  By 1995, Karimov was having some success in getting US 
attention (Grodsky 2004, 329).  Uzbekistan even supported a US trade embargo against 
Iran that year, though it eventually backed off that support (Akbarzadeh 2005, 59).  When 
                                                 
 
69 This included agreeing to expand military contacts economic ties with the US (Winter 1998), allowing 
the US to help decommission a Soviet-era chemical weapon plant (Hogan 1999), and joining GAUM, the 
only CIS regional organization consistently supported by the US (MacFarlane 2004, 453). 
70 Karimov also sought to reduce support for Russia from his domestic audience.  Uzbek news from 1992 
until 1996, operating under severe restrictions imposed by the Uzbek government, was the second most 
hostile in the Central Asia/Caucasus region after Azerbaijan (Carney and Moran 2000, 184). 
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the Taliban made significant advances in neighboring Afghanistan in 1997, Karimov 
turned to the West, and not to Russia, for assistance (Akbarzadeh 2005, 43-4).  This 
provided the context for the 1999 negotiations to renew the CST. 
Refusal to Extend the Collective Security Treaty 
 Karimov’s unwillingness to see Russia monopolize power in Central Asia was 
unaffected by domestic or international events.  Though the US still played a minor role 
in the region, the Uzbek president maintained his belief that US power would be 
sufficient to curtail Russian influence in the region.  As such, Karimov did not take the 
less costly option of simply allowing Uzbekistan’s participation in the Collective Security 
Treaty to expire.  Doing so would avoid antagonizing Russia while increasing 
Uzbekistan’s foreign policy maneuverability.  Karimov went a step further.   
First, Uzbekistan withdrew from the CST in February of 1999, citing discomfort 
at Russian attempts to closely integrate the CIS and Russia’s stationing of troops in 
multiple FSU states (Pannier 1999a).   Karimov did not reverse course when Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan’s capital, was hit by several explosions carried by out terrorist groups two 
weeks later (Pannier 1999b).  This was a marked change from his behavior in the early 
1990s, when a similar attack would have led to closer relations with Russia.  Second, 
Karimov added insult to injury by joining the anti-Russian GUAM organization, renamed 
GUUAM upon Uzbekistan’s entry, the same April.  A month later Uzbekistan signed 
several agreements with the United States, including those concerned with issues of 
security (Pannier and Echanova 1999).  The message was clear: not only was Uzbekistan 
unwilling to play a subordinate role to Russia in Central Asia, it was willing to enlist 
American support on the same issues that Russia believed itself to have a monopoly on 
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resolving.  Two years later, when Uzbekistan joined the Sino-Russian Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, Karimov stated that he would not allow the organization to be 
used as a propaganda vehicle against US initiatives (EurasiaNet 2001). 
7.3 The Case of Uzbekistan and Reciprocal Alignment 
 The Uzbek case provides two points in time where alignment decisions were 
made on the same issue, with the same party being the potential recipient of that 
alignment.  The case is particularly interesting due to the lack of a history of inter-state 
relations between Uzbekistan and Russia, even if the former was subordinate to the latter 
as part of the Soviet Union.  Unlike Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and the Baltic states, 
Uzbekistan had no long-lasting grudge against Russia.  Uzbekistan was also not 
dependent on Russia’s goodwill, as was the case with Armenia and Kazakhstan.  Given 
that there were at least some states aligning with and against Russia in both time periods, 
it is not unreasonable to conclude that Uzbekistan had a legitimate opportunity to choose 
a side without being forced to pay an unbearable cost.  
 The chief question is what role, if any, reciprocation played in the two alignment 
decisions.  Additionally, the utility of using reciprocation in this case needs to be weighed 
against the accuracy of other possible explanations, notably balancing of power and 
regime similarity.  The Uzbek case was chosen intentionally to vary the reciprocation 
factor in the two alignment decisions: Uzbekistan had few opportunities to receive 
alignment from Russia or the US within the first year of its existence.  It also did not have 
time to form a cooperative or conflictual bilateral relationship with either of those states.   
Unsurprisingly, the initial Uzbek alignment decision had little to do with 
reciprocation.  Karimov was too busy consolidating his domestic authority to worry about 
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an active role in international affairs.  The decision to join the Collective Security Treaty 
was intended to prevent additional domestic threats from arising in Uzbekistan, especially 
ones that might interfere with Karimov’s careful nation-building project.  The civil 
conflict in Tajikistan served as a warning about what Karimov can expect in his own 
country if there are no military forces capable of standing up to Islamist opponents.   
Though it was too early to expect Uzbekistan to act on the basis of reciprocation 
in 1992, Uzbekistan was free to act on the basis of the balancing or homophily 
explanations of alignment.  Uzbekistan considered itself the natural leader of Central 
Asia and was not overly dependent on Russia for its economic and political well-being.  
By 1992, it was also obvious what shape the Uzbek regime would take; the end product 
of the Russian regime was less obvious, but the latter was already substantially more 
democratic than Uzbekistan.  According to the balancing explanation, Uzbekistan should 
have taken every available opportunity to align itself against Russia.  Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, the Baltic states, and Turkmenistan refused to join 
the CIS security regime, many of them due to Russian military interference within their 
territories.  Yet Uzbekistan, with a larger population than all but one of those states and 
geographically more distant from Russia’s reach chose not to balance against Russia. 
 Karimov was even less concerned with the lack of similarity between the regime 
type of his state and that of Russia.  He did not view the Russian model as a viable 
alternative for his own domestic opponents, and was therefore unconcerned with Russian 
flirtation with democracy.  Furthermore, the rulers of a majority of the states that refused 
to join the Collective Security Treaty had some democratic credentials, while Armenia 
was the only state other than Russia to join the treaty that was not an overt autocracy.  In 
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the end, the states that joined Russia were either highly dependent on it – Armenia, 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan – or wanted future Russian assistance.  There is no evidence that 
considerations of regime type ever entered into their calculations. 
 By the time of the second alignment decision, Uzbekistan had over seven years of 
independence, and had multiple opportunities to interact with Russia on a bilateral and 
multilateral basis.  One Russian alignment decision in particular bothered Uzbekistan: 
Russia’s unwillingness to remove its troops from neighboring Tajikistan.71  Uzbekistan’s 
insistence on the removal of these troops has not altered the Russian position; in fact, an 
agreement was recently signed to keep those troops in Tajikistan until at least 2042 
(Matveeva 2013, 7).  When Karimov made the final decision to withdraw from the 
Collective Security Treaty, the Russian negative alignment on the Tajik military presence 
issue was to the forefront of his mind.72  The bilateral sniping between the Uzbek and 
Russian leaders and Uzbekistan’s attempt to draw in the US did not help matters either. 
On the surface, the 1999 negative alignment is a classic example of balancing.  
Uzbekistan feared Russian power and took the appropriate steps to limit it.  This 
explanation for Uzbekistan’s refusal to renew its treaty membership is flawed for two 
reasons.  First, it does not account for Uzbekistan’s earlier support for Russian actions, 
most notably in 1992, and would fail to explain Uzbekistan’s actions post-2005, when the 
state renewed a cooperative relationship with Russia.  Second, the balancing explanation 
                                                 
 
71 Russia also had troops in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, without explicit support from all but 
the Armenian government.  Though these actions reinforced Karimov’s belief that Russia wanted to 
dominate the FSU, the troops in question were too far away to be an immediate concern to Karimov.   
72 On the day Uzbekistan confirmed its refusal to extend its involvement in the CST, the Uzbek Foreign 
Ministry released a statement blaming Russia’s policies in the CIS.  A Russian newspaper, Vremya MN, 
specifically referenced Uzbekistan’s displeasure at Russian provision of heavy arms to Armenia and the 
continued Russian military presence in Tajikistan (RFE/RL 1999). 
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has little concrete evidence in its support.  Karimov did consider limiting Russian power 
in Central Asia a priority in the late-1990s, but those policies were influenced more by 
specific Russian actions than by Russian capabilities per se.  In fact, Karimov spent the 
early 1990s supporting the Russian Central Asian policy even as Karimov sought Uzbek 
hegemony in the region.  It is quite likely that if Russia did not spend most of the 1990s 
sending its troops all over the FSU and did not attempt to leverage its economic 
hegemony throughout the region to enrich itself, Uzbekistan and other states would be 
more willing to work with Russia.  Similarly, it is not a coincidence that Armenia and 
Belarus, the recipients of extensive Russian support, have maintained strong ties with 
Russia, while there is no pro-Russian constituency in either Azerbaijan or Georgia, both 
of whom previously found themselves on the wrong side of Russian foreign policy.   
The regime similarity explanation for alignment is equally unappealing when 
applied to the Uzbek case.  Though Russia was substantially more democratic than 
Uzbekistan in 1999, neither Russia’s marginal democratic credentials nor Uzbekistan’s 
unflinching autocracy were considered important issues by either party to the proposed 
alignment.  Instead, it was the United States that was chiding Uzbekistan over its abysmal 
human rights record (Grodsky 2004), a fact that did not deter Karimov from pursuing 
closer relations with that democracy.  In sum, the 1999 alignment decision itself was 
consistent with each of the three alignment explanations examined here.  However, a 
close look at the events leading up to that decision makes it clear Karimov was displeased 
with specific Russian alignment decisions of the 1990s.  His preference for a multi-
vectored foreign policy was based more on his distrust of Russian motivations than it did 
his desire to undermine Russian power in Central Asia.  Finally, Karimov’s refusal to 
178 
 
stay within the CST had absolutely nothing to do with the regime types of the states 
involved, something that became even clearer in the context of the close relationship 
between Uzbekistan and the US in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.73 
7.4 Kyrgyzstan pre-2002 
In the wake of September 11 terrorist attacks, Central Asia gained a newfound 
prominence in the eyes of American lawmakers.  The states of Central Asia were all 
proximate to Afghanistan, making them valuable for logistical purposes and potentially 
stationing NATO troops.  Kyrgyzstan was willing to accept the US request for military 
bases on its soil, something that did not please Russia.  Nevertheless, Russia was no fan 
of the Taliban, whose enemies it had been funding for years, and was initially not 
vehemently opposed to a temporary US presence in Central Asia.  Russia did want to be 
compensated for its tolerance of the new status quo, and for that it was rewarded with 
Kyrgyz military bases of its own.  This alignment decision took place at a time when 
Kyrgyzstan was dependent on Russia economically and militarily, and was a recipient of 
Russian assistance in both areas, partially as a check against a resurgent Uzbekistan.  This 
dependence made it impractical for Kyrgyzstan to stand up to Russian power, even if it so 
desired.  Kyrgyzstan was the least autocratic state in Central Asia, but not one that 
anyone would confuse with a democracy; the Russian regime type was still marginally 
                                                 
 
73 In the decade and a half since his refusal to extent the CST, Karimov’s foreign policy has been shaped by 
factors similar to the ones discussed in this chapter.  Karimov’s Uzbekistan eagerly joined the United States 
in its conflict against Afghanistan and the broader “war against terror” in order to obtain further leverage 
against a disliked Russia.  This assistance did not quiet American criticism of Uzbekistan’s human rights 
record, however.  When that criticism gained the potential to undermine Karimov’s regime in the wake of 
the Andijan massacre, Karimov ceased cooperation with the US and sought a rapprochement with Russia.  
As the domestic situation in Uzbekistan stabilized, Karimov has attempted to improve ties with the US. 
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democratic, but President Putin had already begun to position itself as a burgeoning 
autocrat.  Based on this situation, all three theories of alignment examined here would 
expect Kyrgyzstan to side with Russia, which is broadly what it did.  As in the previous 
case, however, that alignment had little to do with the logic of homophily.  
Prior to 2002, Kyrgyzstan’s main claim to relevance outside of Central Asia was 
its role as a poster child for economic neoliberalism. The state did not have substantial oil 
reserves, unlike Kazakhstan.  Kyrgyzstan did not possess natural gas, unlike Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.  In contrast to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan did not experience a 
civil war or face substantial domestic threats to its security.  Despite these disadvantages 
in terms of attracting foreign aid, or perhaps because of them, Kyrgyz president Askar 
Akayev did his best to present his country as the model of modernity in a region full of 
authoritarian regimes, the latter of whom resembled 19th century Central Asian khans 
much more than they did Western liberal democracies.  This perception of modernism, 
not entirely warranted, provided moderate returns for the Kyrgyz leader.  Kyrgyzstan was 
the second highest recipient of US aid in Central Asia throughout the 1990s (O’malley 
and McDermott 2003, 84), and in 1998 was the first post-Soviet state, along with Latvia, 
to join the World Trade Organization (WTO 1998).   
The economic reforms and foreign aid did little to stem the economic turmoil 
associated with the transition to a post-communist economy.  The Kyrgyz GDP per capita 
fell by half between 1990 and 1995, and did not surpass its 1990 level by 2009 
(Mogilevsky and Omorova 2011, 5).  While the decline in GDP was not unusual by post-
Soviet standards, the Kyrgyz economy was already operating from a low base.  The 
country’s GDP per capita by 2002 was significantly under $2,000 (Mogilevsky and 
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Omorova 2011, 5).  To make matters worse, Kyrgyzstan’s external debt increased from 
nothing to 140 percent of GDP between 1990 and 1999, before falling to 110 percent in 
2002 (Mogilevsky and Omorova 2011, 15).  The relatively strong economic growth 
starting from the mid-1990s did not appreciably improve the standard of living of most 
Kyrgyz citizens, a factor that undoubtedly affected the legitimacy of the Kyrgyz regime.   
On the security front, Kyrgyzstan faced low to moderate external threats and a 
similar level of domestic threats, though neither jeopardized Kyrgyzstan’s stability or 
independence.  Domestically, Kyrgyzstan was an occasional target of the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which took 13 hostages in 1999 (O’malley and 
McDermott 2003, 73).  It also faced armed elements of the drug trade, which used 
Kyrgyzstan as a transit point (O’malley and McDermott 2003, 75).  Internationally, most 
of Kyrgyzstan’s problems stemmed from Uzbekistan’s economic and foreign policy.  
Uzbekistan hurt the already weak Kyrgyz economy by imposing currency controls and 
other autarkic measures after leaving the ruble zone in 1993 (Kazemi 2003, 214).  
Kyrgyzstan also had reason to fear Uzbek nationalism.  While the nationalism was aimed 
predominantly at Uzbekistan’s domestic audience, it nevertheless had the potential to 
enflame tensions among the substantial Uzbek minority in the major Kyrgyz city of Osh, 
which was already a site of conflict between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in 1990 (Menon 
and Spruyt 1999, 95).74  Uzbekistan’s claims to regional dominance throughout the 1990s 
were also less than welcome in Bishkek.   
                                                 
 
74 Osh would become the primary location for a new round of Kyrgyz-Uzbek bloodshed, with the Uzbeks 
being on the receiving end of the violence, during the 2010 regime change in Kyrgyzstan (BBC 2010).   
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Given the poor state of Kyrgyzstan’s military – possibly due to the Kyrgyz 
leadership attempting to ward off a coup similar to the one attempted in 1991 (O’malley 
and McDermott 2003, 77) – Kyrgyzstan was never in a position to protect itself against 
potential foreign aggression.  The state instead depended on implicit or explicit security 
guarantees from external actors.  Thus, Kyrgyzstan was one of the earliest Central Asian 
states to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program (O’malley and McDermott 
2003, 85), doing so in 1994. The program aims to improve military to military relations 
between NATO and the partner states, as well as improving the military effectiveness and 
professionalism of the latter.  While the partnership does not come with a security 
guarantee, an attack against a PfP member risks souring relations with NATO, a prospect 
that is no doubt unappealing to Kyrgyzstan’s Central Asian neighbors, each of whom is 
also a member of the Partnership for Peace.   
Kyrgyzstan’s defense policy also entailed cooperation with Russian-led 
institutions, including the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Central Asian 
Union, which had the effect of blunting the potential of Uzbek aggression (Bohr 2004, 
491) without making the kind of bilateral concessions to Russia that might have provoked 
a nationalist backlash.  Membership in these organizations provided an additional 
economic benefit to Kyrgyzstan, whose economy was buttressed by economic interaction 
with the more prosperous Russia (Bremmer and Bailes 1998, 137).  The September 11 
attacks and the American need for a military transit point in Central Asia for supplying its 
troops in Afghanistan served to test that dependency-based relationship.  The result was 
an inconsistent attempt to alleviate the burdens of dependency on Russia by attempting a 
multi-vectored foreign policy that eventually fell apart and tiled strongly toward Russia.     
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Kyrgyzstan Leases Military Bases to the United States and Russia 
Shortly after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the US undertook an invasion of 
Afghanistan, whose de facto rulers, the Taliban, were accused of harboring al-Qaeda.  
Unfortunately for the US, Afghanistan is landlocked, hundreds of miles away from the 
nearest major body of water.  Furthermore, the US was using the Afghanistan-based 
Northern Alliance as the main ground force in the conflict against the Taliban, which 
ruled out possible military bases in Pakistan, Iran, and Turkmenistan.75  That left only 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.  Tajikistan offered to host a military base for the 
US, going as far as demanding its Russian occupants leave, but the US decided against 
that option, possibly because of the poor infrastructure in that country (Kucera 2013).    
The United States instead obtained military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, 
Manas and Karshi-Khanabad, respectively.  In February 2002, Kyrgyz President Akayev 
made the final decision to lease the Manas military base to the US for a period of a year, 
with the possibility of future extensions (RFE/RL 2002).  There was little if any arm-
twisting involved in the deal.  In fact, the Central Asian rulers were lining up to offer 
their services to the US government, something they had been attempting with limited 
success from the time of their independence.  The US had the potential of weakening 
their dependence on Russia and providing generous economic support.76  The latter was 
useful not only for boosting Central Asian economies, but also for consolidating elite 
support for the Central Asian rulers, Akayev included.  This was particularly important 
                                                 
 
75 .  Given the hostility between the US on the one hand and Pakistan and Iran on the other, it is unlikely 
that the latter would consent to a large-scale American troop presence regardless of the circumstances.  
Turkmenistan’s policy of neutrality would also have ruled out an overt US military presence. 
76 US aid to Kyrgyzstan doubled between 2001 and 2002 (O’malley and McDermott 2003, 89). 
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for the Kyrgyz ruler due to his domestic position being conditional on his capacity as a 
power broker between clans without a strong base of his own (Collins 2004).   
Not wishing to rupture relations with Russia, Kyrgyzstan soon consented to a 
Russian military base within its territory.  By December 2002, the Russian Air Force was 
deployed in the Kant Airbase, 20 miles from the American base (O’malley and 
McDermott 2003, 72).  This coincided with the restructuring of Kyrgyz debt to Russia 
(O’malley and McDermott 2003, 82).  Unlike the US, which required the bases for 
military reasons, Russia used its military presence in Central Asia as a check against an 
anti-Russian foreign policy (Allison 2004, 288).  Kyrgyzstan was willing to accept these 
constraints given that Russia’s proximity to Kyrgyzstan, its high volume of trade with the 
country, and its willingness to allow Kyrgyz migrants to work in Russia visa-free fostered 
a high degree of Kyrgyz dependence on Russian goodwill. 
7.5 Kyrgyzstan between 2002 and 2009 
The Kyrgyz situation changed in some major ways but not in others by 2009.  
Kyrgyzstan was still dependent on Russian goodwill, and not in a position to challenge 
Russian authority.  The dependence on Russia had only grown between 2002 and 2009, 
due to Kyrgyzstan’s worsening economic situation and political instability.  The Russian 
and Kyrgyz regime looked more and more similar by 2009, as the rulers of both states 
slowly sidelined and/or corrupted most democratic institutions.  In light of this 
background situation, each of the three alignment theories would expect Kyrgyzstan to 
align with Russia when given the opportunity.  The opportunity took place in 2009, when 
Russia asked Kyrgyzstan to permanently close the Manas American military base on its 
soil.  After taking $2 billion in Russian loans and grants as a side-payment, the Kyrgyz 
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leader, Bakiyev, changed course and allowed the Americans to stay.  He did make some 
concessions to Russia after that decision, but it was not enough to placate Russian anger.  
This is thus the one case where all three theories got the alignment choice wrong.   
During the three years subsequent to the establishment of US and Russian military 
bases on Kyrgyz soil, Akayev vacillated between a pro-Western and a pro-Russian 
course.  His hand was forced by the successful overthrow of the Georgian and Ukrainian 
leaders by street protests in 2003 and 2004-2005, respectively.  The color revolutions, as 
they were called, spooked Akayev, who was concerned over a similar occurrence in his 
own country – rightly, as it transpired.  The pro-Western orientation of those revolts 
suggested to Akayev that Western forces, particularly the US, were funding and/or 
leading them.  As a result, Akayev adopted policies much more sympathetic to Russia 
than to the US (Blagov 2005).  Time was running out for Akayev, however, and Russian 
elites did not trust Akayev for his previous perceived duplicity (Blagov 2005).  Despite 
promising not to allow a 2005 legislative election to become another color revolution 
(Blagov 2005), Akayev ended up being overthrown by a pro-democracy movement after 
the election results were recognized as having severe shortcomings (OSCE 2005).   
After losing control over the southern half of the country and many state 
institutions, Akayev was replaced as president by Kurmanbek Bakiyev, a former prime 
minister turned opposition leader.  Bakiyev made a name for himself by opposing an 
American military presence in Kyrgyzstan, even when he was still prime minister 
(Gleason 2009).  It thus came as a surprise to no one when the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), of which Kyrgyzstan is a member and which is dominated by 
Russia and China, called for a timetable for a US withdrawal from its military bases in 
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Central Asia (Saidazimova 2005).  What was surprising was Bakiyev’s about-turn: in a 
meeting with US Defense Minister Rumsfeld three weeks after the SCO declaration, he 
conceded that the US base was in Kyrgyzstan to stay for the long term (Saidazimova 
2005).  Attempting to use the foreign policy turbulence to his advantage, Bakiyev 
demanded that the US increase its rent payments for the Manas base from $2 million a 
year to $200 million (RFE/RL 2005).  After a lengthy game of hardball in which the US 
was threatened with eviction multiple times, the US government agreed to increase rent 
to about $20 million a year, as part of a $150 million economic package (RFE/RL 2006).   
By 2009, Bakiyev abandoned most pretenses to democratic rule, returning to the 
tactics of his predecessor, Askar Akayev, who was by then in exile in Russia.  If 
Bakiyev’s legitimacy was not undermined by his increasingly autocratic rule, then it was 
by the worsening global economic climate, which hit hard the already fragile Kyrgyz 
economy.  It was in that context that Bakiyev flew to Moscow to obtain $2 billion in aid 
and loans (RFE/RL 2009).  The deal was not without strings: Bakiyev simultaneously 
announced that the Manas military base would be closed (RFE/RL 2009).  The decision 
was a popular one domestically: only the opposition Social Democratic Party did not 
support the measure (Tchoroev 2009).  The age of Kyrgyzstan’s multi-vectored foreign 
policy was said to be at an end (Gleason 2009).  Then Bakiyev reversed course. 
Kyrgyzstan Leases Military Bases to the United States and Russia Part II 
 After accepting $2 billion in Russian aid in exchange for ending the US military 
presence in Kyrgyzstan in February 2009, Bakiyev used the deal as bargaining leverage 
to increase the US rent payments for the Manas base from about $20 million a year to 
$60 million in June of the same year (Marat 2009).  The deal came in the wake of intense 
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negotiations between Bakiyev and the newly elected Obama administration.  The 
agreement followed a familiar pattern of a Kyrgyz leader being pressured to tell US 
troops to leave his country in exchange for economic benefits, the leader accepting those 
benefits, which leads to visits by high-ranking US defense officials, a reversal of the 
original decision, and outrage in Russia.   
 History repeated itself again scarcely a month after Bakiyev’s about-turn when 
the Kyrgyz president consented to a new Russian military base on Kyrgyz soil, this time 
in Osh (McDermott 2009).  Unlike the temporary agreements with the US, this one was 
set to last 49 years, with the possibility of 25 year extensions thereafter (McDermott 
2009).  The basing rights also came with full diplomatic immunity for all Russian troops, 
a condition not granted to American soldiers in the Manas base (McDermott 2009).  
What is more, this basing deal was made without any input from Uzbekistan, whose 
border is only a few miles from Osh (McDermott 2009).  By acceding to Russian 
demands on the Osh base, Bakiyev worsened relations with the US and Uzbekistan, both 
important regional players.  This was all insufficient to appease Russia, however. 
7.6 Kyrgyzstan from 2009 to 2013 
In the last case examined here, Kyrgyzstan was once again asked by Russia to force 
the closure of an American military base in Kyrgyzstan.  Between 2009 and 2013, 
Kyrgyzstan became even weaker and more dependent on Russian goodwill and 
assistance.  This was true on the economic front and the political one, considering that 
Russia played a role in a regime change that ultimately brought Atambayev to power.  
Though Kyrgyzstan is still far from a democracy, the current Kyrgyz president was 
chosen in an election that was a vast improvement over previous ones and his legitimacy 
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at least partly rests on maintaining the image of democratic rule.  This is in contrast to 
Russia, where the most recent election was widely seen as dubious in both the lead up to 
the polls and the vote-counting (OSCE 2012).  When the Russian leader, Vladimir Putin, 
once again insisted that Kyrgyzstan close the US military base on its soil, reciprocal 
alignment and balance of power theories would both expect him to consent.  According 
to the homophily explanation, Atambayev should have refused, if not because of his own 
support of democracy, then at least because of his desire to maintain the popular illusion 
of Kyrgyz democracy.  Unlike in the previous instance, Kyrgyzstan agreed to Russian 
demands and firmly told the US that its troops should soon leave.  That outcome is thus 
consistent with reciprocal alignment and balancing theories, but not homophily.   
As the economic climate in Kyrgyzstan worsened in early 2010 due to the ongoing 
global economic downturn, Moscow tolled the death knell of the Kyrgyz regime by 
sharply increasing the prices of gasoline and diesel products destined for Kyrgyzstan.  
The resulting price hikes for basic energy products in Kyrgyzstan led to large-scale 
protests against Bakiyev (Trilling and Umetov 2010), goaded on by the predominantly 
Russian-owned media in Kyrgyzstan (Marat 2010).  The Russian turn against Bakiyev 
was likely a combination of its displeasure at Bakiyev’s double-dealing and, more 
recently, his unwillingness to enter the Russian-dominated Customs Union of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Russia (CUBKR).77  After initially fleeing the protests to Osh, Bakiyev 
accepted exile in Belarus.  He was replaced on an interim basis by opposition politician 
                                                 
 
77 This Russian turn against Bakiyev makes no sense in the context of balance of power theory, but is fully 
expected by reciprocal alignment theory.  The former does not expect leaders to hold grudges, assuming 
that raison d'être would trump any sentimentality.  Reciprocal alignment theory, however, places 
reciprocation at the center of its causal mechanism.  Russian unwillingness to trust and/or support someone 
who had been an unreliable ally in the past is thus fully consistent with the reciprocal explanation.   
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Roza Otunbayeva, who made frequent mention of her pro-Russian orientation.  Within 
days of coming to power, she announced that Kyrgyzstan was once again reversing 
course and joining CUBKR (Marat 2011).   
 The overthrow of Bakiyev did not lead to an end of violence in Kyrgyzstan.  The 
southern half of the country was still in chaos, partially because it was Bakiyev’s base 
and partially because of attacks against ethnic Uzbeks, whose relative prosperity made 
them an easy target for Kyrgyz nationalists.  Otunbayeva’s response to the continued 
violence was to call Russian President Medvedev and ask him to send Russian troops to 
restore order in her state; she made the same call to Russian Prime Minister Putin a few 
days later (Socor 2010).  Russia decided not to accede to this request for a variety of 
reasons, but the damage to Kyrgyzstan’s reputation as an independent state was done. 
 The situation eventually stabilized, without Russian assistance, and Almazbek 
Atambayev, a prime minister under Bakiyev turned opposition leader, was elected as the 
new president of Kyrgyzstan in elections that were fairer than previous presidential polls, 
but involved substantial irregularities during the voter registration and vote counting 
process (OSCE 2011).  Not long after the victory, Atambayev played up the prospect of 
the US using its Kyrgyz military base to attack Iran, providing that possibility as a 
justification for wanting to close the base (RFE/RL 2011).   
Kyrgyz President Ends US Military Presence in Kyrgyzstan78 
As was often the case, the poor state of the Kyrgyz economy, including a $361 
million budget deficit in 2012, made the Kyrgyz president soften his previous position 
                                                 
 
78 Atambayev’s statements notwithstanding, it is still possible that the Kyrgyz ruler’s position will change 
before 2014.   
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(McDermott 2012).  In April 2012, Atambayev stated that he supported the continued 
American usage of the Manas base, but only in a civilian capacity (Marat 2012), 
something that he reaffirmed in January 2013 (RFE/RL 2013).  However, in a May 2012 
meeting with the NATO deputy secretary general, Atambayev made no mention of 
wanting to close down the base after NATO troops wind down their operations in 
Afghanistan in 2013 (McDermott 2012).  It is entirely conceivable that Atambayev is 
leaving his options open, much like his predecessors, in an attempt to extract greater 
assistance from the US in exchange for continued military use of Manas beyond 2014. 
Consistent with the behavior of Akayev and Bakiyev, Atambayev coupled his 
support for an American presence on his country’s territory with further concessions to 
Moscow in exchange for extra funds.  By September 2012, Atambayev agreed to 
transform all the Russian military facilities in Kyrgyzstan into one united base, making it 
harder to expel any individual component (Matveeva 2013, 8).  In exchange, Russia 
wrote off nearly half a billion dollars in Kyrgyz debt (Matveeva 2013, 8).  As of May 
2013, it is unclear what ramifications this move will have on Kyrgyzstan’s relationship 
with Russia or how it affects the likelihood of the US maintaining a military presence at 
the Manas base beyond 2014.  It does seem that Russian politicians have moved on from 
their hostile rhetoric and actions against Kyrgyzstan and are instead aiming their ire at 
Tajikistan, which has stalled on its own military base deal with Russia (Parshin 2013). 
7.7 The Case of Kyrgyzstan and Reciprocal Alignment 
 The Kyrgyz case provides a more complicated test for the theory of reciprocal 
alignment.  In contrast to the Uzbek case, there are no clear past alignments that played a 
decisive role in the present ones.  Instead, the focus will be on dyadic relations: whether 
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they created domestic constituencies for continued conflict or cooperation, and whether 
those constituencies in tandem with the country’s political leadership made their 
alignment decisions on the basis of these relations.  The entire Kyrgyz-Russian 
relationship also takes place in the context of severe Kyrgyz dependence on Russia, 
which can be expected to tilt the Kyrgyz foreign policy in Russia’s direction, though 
perhaps not decisively.  The balancing explanation will be more difficult to investigate.  
The Kyrgyz dependence on Russia made overt balancing against it impractical, a factor 
that the balance of threat – but not the balance of power – theory recognizes.  The case 
does serve as fertile grounds for testing the homophily explanation for alignment, given 
the variation in Kyrgyzstan’s political structure and several changes of regime.   
 Prior to the 2002 decision to allow American and Russian military bases on its 
territory, Kyrgyzstan was a recipient of fairly generous economic assistance from both 
states.  Moreover, it obtained military training from NATO personnel and was reliant on 
Russian-led institutions to stave off possible Uzbek aggression.  Akayev faced a serious 
quandary due to the knowledge that providing a military base to the US would entail 
aligning against Russia and refusing to do so would serve as an anti-American alignment.  
Akayev’s solution was to allow the US base, while granting a similar privilege to Russia.  
The decision did not entirely please both sides, but it did allow for continued Kyrgyz 
cooperation with both parties.  Such a nuanced approach is unlikely to have been taken if 
Akayev was not concerned with maintaining positive bilateral relations with both states. 
 In 2009, Bakiyev, the new leader of Kyrgyzstan, faced the decision of whether the 
US should be able to maintain its military presence in Kyrgyzstan.  Once again, Russia 
was pushing the Kyrgyz leader to disallow American troops, while the US was lobbying 
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for the opposite outcome.  Bakiyev managed to coax higher rent payments from the US 
several years earlier, but those were not sufficient to keep the Kyrgyz economy afloat in 
the wake of global economic turmoil.  Instead, Russia came to Kyrgyzstan’s rescue with 
an offer of $2 billion in aid and loans.  When combined with the lack of a significant pro-
American constituency and Bakiyev’s own earlier opposition to the American Manas 
base, these factors should have been sufficient to produce a pro-Russian alignment.  The 
fact that he did not do so and only tried to placate Russia by offering it a new military 
base at Osh goes against the predictions of reciprocal alignment.  It is likely that Bakiyev 
expected his maneuver to produce aid from both Russia and the US over the long term, 
but he should have been more concerned with the Kyrgyz-Russian relationship.  A lesser 
reason for the unexpected outcome has to do with the transactional nature of 
Kyrgyzstan’s ties with Russia.  The constant threats of punishment and the linkage of 
carrots to sticks diminished any goodwill that the Kyrgyz might have been expected to 
feel toward Russia.  This prevented the creation of a strong pro-Russian constituency, 
thereby allowing Bakiyev greater autonomy in dealing with Russia.   
 On a deeper level, the null finding reflects the difficulty in translating dyadic or 
systemic variables onto a domestic context.  A country’s institutions and its history set 
the boundaries for an acceptable foreign policy, as well as acting as selection mechanisms 
for the types of individuals that are able to become its leader.  Where those historical and 
institutional constraints are weak, a ruler enjoys a greater freedom of action, not needing 
to worry about key constituents opposing certain foreign policy moves.  Nevertheless, the 
choices available to such leaders are not without limits, particularly as each choice that is 
made constrains the range of options that are available in the next issue cycle.   
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 Moving forward, the US committed to withdrawing its combat troops from 
Afghanistan in 2014.79  This served as a green light for Russia to demand that Kyrgyzstan 
require all American troops to leave Kyrgyz territory in 2014.  Similar to the situation in 
2009, the Kyrgyz economy was in poor shape.  As before, Russia stepped in, this time by 
forgiving nearly half a billion in Kyrgyz government debt.  Distinct from the 2009 
circumstances was the Kyrgyz president’s relations with Moscow.  Russia played a key 
role in the events that led to the overthrow of Bakiyev, who by that point was not viewed 
favorably in his country.  By helping Atambayev’s ally, Otunbayeva, gain power at 
Bakiyev’s expense, paving the way toward Atambayev’s own election as president, 
Russia helped generate public and elite support for its policies.  Based on the recent 
dyadic relations of the Russian and Kyrgyz governments, the reciprocal alignment theory 
would expect the Kyrgyz government to give in to Russian demands.  That is indeed what 
occurred.  The US was told that it would not be able to use Manas for military operations 
after 2014, and Russia’s military presence in Kyrgyzstan was further consolidated.   
 The Kyrgyz case does not lend itself well to testing the balance of power 
explanation for alignment.  Kyrgyzstan is substantially weaker than Russia, borders the 
state, and is highly dependent on it economically.  A policy of balancing would likely 
have disastrous consequences for Kyrgyzstan, all while imposing minimal costs on 
Russia.  With that in mind, there is no evidence that Kyrgyzstan at any point wished to 
lessen Russian influence in Central Asia.  Its relationship with the United States was 
based on the prospect of economic gain, not on a desire to weaken Russia.  It is in that 
                                                 
 
79 The withdrawal does not include special operations forces (Shanker and Schmitt 2012). 
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context that Kyrgyzstan would grant Russia additional military privileges on its territory 
whenever it needed to mollify its government.  Kyrgyzstan has tried to contain 
Uzbekistan.  But just as in the Uzbek case, the containment is based on a history of 
antagonistic behavior and not due solely to Uzbekistan’s material capabilities. 
 Based on the homophily explanation of alignment, we would expect Kyrgyzstan 
to undertake a more pro-American path during the short intervals in which it had a 
somewhat democratic government.  Instead, the opposite is true.  Bakiyev called for a US 
withdrawal from Manas shortly after coming to power in the wake of the “Tulip 
Revolution” that overthrew the previous dictator.  Similarly, Otunbayeva opted for closer 
relations with Moscow, not Washington, after helping the overthrow of the now 
autocratic Bakiyev.  The Kyrgyz democratic parliamentary elections in 2010 did not lead 
to a notable shift in that country’s foreign policy.   
7.8 Conclusion  
Out of the five alignment decisions examined in this chapter, three were 
consistent with the expectations of reciprocal alignment theory, and were taken at least 
partially as a consequence of the causal mechanism presented in that theory.  Karimov’s 
withdrawal of Uzbekistan from the Collective Security Treaty in 1999, the initial Akayev 
decision to create an American and a Russian base on Kyrgyz territory, and Atambayev’s 
likely ending an American military presence in Kyrgyzstan comprise the three supportive 
alignments.  All were taken either because of prior alignments or due to the recent dyadic 
relations of the states involved.  One of the alignment decisions – Uzbekistan’s signing of 
the CST in 1992 – neither supports nor contradicts the expectations of the alignment 
theory; there was no opportunity to build up a history of alignment or bilateral relations 
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in the few months between independence and the signing of this treaty.  Only one of the 
five alignments investigated in this chapter contradicts the reciprocal alignment theory.  
In that case, Kyrgyz President Bakiyev opted to extend the US lease on Manas despite 
getting substantially more support from Russia than from the US and despite there being 
very little domestic opposition to ending the American military presence in Kyrgyzstan. 
The two alternative explanations examined here – balance of power and 
homophily – fared worse.  Even in the instances where the alignment decisions were 
consistent with the theoretical expectations, the actual motivations of the relevant actors 
had little to do with the proposed causal mechanisms.  Uzbekistan did not align against 
Russia because the latter was powerful; it aligned against Russia because Yeltsin refused 
to remove Russian troops from Tajikistan.  Every Kyrgyz leader did not waver in closing 
the Manas base because they needed American support to contain Russia; they wavered 
because they wanted to extract additional resources from the US to keep the Kyrgyz 
economy functioning and to solidify their own grasp on power.  Furthermore, balance of 
power theory cannot explain the variation in the alignment behavior of the two Central 
Asian states in light of stable relative power differences between them and Russia. 
Table 7.2.  Percentage of Correct Predictions for Theories of Alignment 
Theory Correct Uzbek 
Decisions 
Correct Kyrgyz 
Decisions 
Percentage Correct 
Reciprocal Alignment 1/1 (100%) 2/3 (67%) 3/4 (75%) 
Balance of Power 1/2 (50%) 2/3 (67%) 3/5 (60%) 
Homophily 1/2 (50%) 1/3 (33%) 2/5 (40%) 
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The causal mechanisms of the homophily explanation for alignment were 
similarly not present in any of the alignment decisions.  Uzbek and Kyrgyz leaders did 
not at any point base their alignment decisions on the regime types of the United States 
and Russia.  Kyrgyz President Akayev played up his tenuous democratic credentials to 
get economic aid from the United States, but certainly did not support the opening of 
Manas because of supposed regime similarities.  When Karimov, the president of 
Uzbekistan, was supporting Russian policy, it was because he needed Russia for security 
reasons.  When Karimov decided to change sides in 1999, he made no mention of 
Russia’s regime type.  Even homophily in terms of similar ethnicity failed to inform 
many foreign policy decisions.  Excluding some empty posturing, Uzbekistan did little to 
help ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, including when they were getting killed by the 
hundreds during the most recent wave of violence there in 2010.  A Turkic identity 
likewise failed to provide a basis for Central Asian foreign policy. 
Overall, the two case studies examined here provide some evidence in support of 
reciprocal alignment theory.  More importantly, they demonstrate that the proposed 
casual mechanism operates in a manner predicted by that theory.  Whether the results can 
be generalized onto a broader population of cases is an open question.  Central Asia is 
unique in its lack of history of independence, which is what made it an attractive case 
study.  It is possible that rulers of more established states operate on a different basis than 
the Central Asian leaders.  Nevertheless, if these results are taken in tandem with 
quantitative ones that reach a similar conclusion, then we should have more confidence in 
the explanatory power of the theory they are intended to test.  This does not preclude the 
utility of using different case studies to determine the general applicability of the theory.  
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion 
 This dissertation began by asking two questions: whether each form of alignment 
has its own causes and what convinces rulers to join other countries’ disputes.  The 
previous chapters provide theoretical and empirical explanations for both general 
questions.  I will review the theory and the empirical findings, and illustrate both with the 
Iraq and Iran alignments mentioned in the first chapter.  
8.1 Why Align? 
 The primary reason for aligning with other states is the desire to obtain similar 
alignment in the future.  Leaders have a finite amount of resources at their disposal to 
deal with a variety of problems.  Frequently, there is a mismatch between the type of 
resources in a ruler’s possession and the kind of resources needed to obtain the best result 
on a highly salient issue.  The Saudi royal family has money flowing out of the ground, 
but is unable to use that money to create a first-class military.  North Korea has one of the 
largest militaries in the world, but faces constant shortages of food. 
 Two conditions need to be present for leaders to take part in interstate alignment: 
they must have the ability to make a difference to the resolution of the stake and they 
must be able to obtain domestic support for this action.  The latter requires the 
intervening state to have some connection to one or more of the disputants.  Albania was 
not in a position to aid its Chinese ally in the latter’s war against India for the simple 
reason that Albania was too far away and had no ability to project power.  Rhetoric aside, 
Brazilian leaders are not going to invest political or economic capital in helping resolve 
the Palestinian conflict, because they will not be able to justify the expense to the public.    
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 The decision to align with a specific country is largely dependent on the dyadic 
relations and past alignments between the intervener and the disputants.  Positive and 
negative dyadic relations both create domestic constituencies that seek to maintain the 
current state of affairs, curtailing the ability of a ruler to pursue an opposing policy.  
Reciprocating past alignments has a more international focus: it demonstrates reliability 
to the state whose past support is being reciprocated and other states that might seek 
assistance from the current intervener.  Additionally, the perceived reliability of a state is 
affected by its institutional characteristics.  States that are unstable or ruled by 
unrepresentative regimes are at risk of being forced to radically alter their foreign policy, 
lessening their potential value as alignment partners. 
8.2 Summary of Findings 
 The broad question of political alignment has not been previously approached in a 
quantitative manner.  Neither has a state’s position on a concrete stake been used as the 
unit of analysis.  These shortcomings have more to do with the theoretical priorities and 
empirical knowledge of the time period in which alignment studies were popular than 
with the importance of the concept of alignment.  Consequently, many of the findings, 
particularly those relating to the first stage of alignment and findings related to the 
alignment measure are entirely novel.  
1. In order for leaders to take part in alignment, they must have a connection to the 
disputants and have the ability to make a difference.  The importance of these factors is 
conditional on the cost of the alignment: they matter less when that cost is low.  The 
connection factor is operationalized in terms of having alliance ties with the disputants or 
having a recent MID with those states.  The relevance factor is operationalized as the 
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potential intervener’s proximity to the disputants and that intervener’s military and 
economic capabilities.   
When war joining is the dependent variable, each of the above variables 
significantly increases the likelihood of states joining the dispute.  Substantively, 
potential interveners with a high or maximum value for these variables have a 0.909 
probability of joining an existing war.  When the opposite is true, the probability falls to a 
paltry 0.030.  The connection and relevance factors are thus each close to being a 
necessary condition for war alignment; combined, they are almost sufficient to produce 
that costly form of alignment.   
The results are somewhat complicated for the variables denoting an ability to 
make a difference as the cost of alignment decreases.  In the dangerous MID model, 
proximity ceases to have a positive effect on alignment formation.  In the non-dangerous 
MID model, the same is true for military capabilities.  With the exception of these 
anomalies, the hypotheses derived from the reciprocal alignment theory fare well.  
Having alliances or MIDs with the disputants increases the likelihood of involvement, 
suggesting that leaders have to justify alignments to their constituents.  Economic 
capabilities are shown to make one more willing to take part in a sanction regime, while 
military capabilities do the same in most militarized conflict models.  The implication is 
that only resources that could be used in a dispute affect a potential intervener’s calculus.   
2. History of interaction plays a dominant role in the second stage of alignment, 
where leaders choose sides in a dispute.  This serves as the most important and consistent 
finding throughout this dissertation.  The sanctions model is the only one where any 
variable used to represent history – past alignments, recent dyadic conflict, and ongoing 
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alliances – does not have the hypothesized effect.  That discrepancy can possibly be 
explained by the use of conflict variables being used to explain alignment on a vastly 
different type of issue.  This sanction model apart, history variables were able to explain 
alignment in every possible context.   
Past dyadic conflicts and alignments, as well as ongoing alliances, were all strong 
predictors of war alignment.  Rulers refuse to intervene on behalf of states that they have 
feuded with in the recent past or with states that have aligned against them in the past.  
They take the opposite approach for states with whom they have a history of bilateral or 
multilateral cooperation.  The substantive effects of these variables is considerable.  
When the dyadic conflict variable is at its 95th percentile, meaning that the intervener had 
a far more hostile relationship with state A than with state B, state A obtains positive 
alignment only a fifth of the time.  When the history variables are set at their alignment-
inducing 95th percentile or their maximum, together with the reliability variables, positive 
alignment takes place with a probability of 1.000.  More realistically, setting the conflict 
and past alignment variables alone to their 95th percentile – which occurs 68 times in the 
war data – shows a probability of positive alignment of 0.89 
The effect of the history variables is robust to numerous model specifications.  
These results do not appreciably change whether or not the first-stage variables are 
included in a two-stage model.  They do not change when world wars, which make up a 
high portion of war alignment observations, are removed from the population of cases.  
The variables sustain their effect in the pre-1945 and the post-1945 sample.  They also do 
not change whether the dependent variable is intervention into a war, a dangerous MID, a 
non-dangerous MID.  History not only matters, but it is the primary driver of alignment. 
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The former Soviet Union case study in Chapter 7 demonstrated that the causal 
mechanism from the reciprocal alignment theory is applicable to at least some alignment 
cases.  The Uzbek part of the case study showed that past alignments do affect decisions 
about present alignments; Russia’s negative alignment against Uzbekistan on the Tajik 
troops issue played a major role in Uzbekistan’s own negative alignment against Russia 
in 1999.  Dyadic history played the main role in the Kyrgyz alignments, where successive 
Kyrgyz leaders faced no serious domestic opposition at granting military privileges to 
Russia because of the latter’s previous acts of cooperation. 
3. Rulers align with other states because they are either repaying them for past 
support or because they want assistance in the future.  They align against states because 
such a move gives them domestic support and shows everyone that their interests cannot 
be ignored without a cost.  The latter two factors underline the importance of a state’s 
perceived reliability for reciprocating alignments good and bad. 
State reliability is assumed to include institutional and behavioral indicators.  For 
the former, the stability and public control over executive recruitment are used.  Whether 
states respect their alliance commitments against any state in the system is used as the 
behavioral marker.  The effect of the institutional variables is more straightforward, but 
all three variables affect alignment decisions in most of the statistical models.  
Representative and stable states are shown to obtain positive alignment more frequently 
than their unrepresentative and unstable counterparts when the outcome variable is war 
joining.  The behavioral variable has the hypothesized effect in a probit model, but not in 
a Heckman model.  In the probit model, the substantive effects for the variables are 
considerable.  Given a choice between a state with a representative regime and an 
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unrepresentative one, an intervener sides with the former 71 percent of the time.  
Similarly, an intervener opts to support the more stable disputant – a state that has not 
only recently obtained independence and one that is not experiencing a civil war – with a 
probability of 0.859.  When using the alliance reliability measure, based on honoring past 
alliances, interveners support the more reliable state 0.597 of the time.     
The importance of reliability does not weaken when examining meaningful sub-
samples of the population.  All three variables affect the choice of sides in war 
alignments when world wars are excluded.  The behavioral variable does fail to have a 
significant effect in the post-1945 period, and the stability one has the same problem in 
the pre-1945 era.  However, the former can be explained by the waning role of formal 
alliances since the creation of the United Nations, and the latter is a function of the low 
variability in stability levels before 1945, when civil wars were rare and regimes changes 
even rarer.  The results vary little if the dependent variable is changed.  The two 
institutional measures of instability affect a ruler’s choice of alignment partners whether 
they are joining wars, dangerous MIDs, non-dangerous MIDs, or sanction regimes.  The 
behavioral variable does not have the hypothesized effect in the non-dangerous MID 
model, but does in the other three.  Overall, we can see that leaders think twice before 
using scarce resources to help states that might not do the same in the future. 
The effect of reliability works in both directions: states that are not in a position to 
reciprocate negative alignments are likely to obtain these alignments.  Operationalized as 
the number of rivals external to the conflict triad – reverse unreliability increases the 
likelihood of negative alignment in every alignment model.  This holds for all sub-
samples mentioned above and for all forms of alignment.  The moral of this story is that 
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stretching yourself thin serves as an invitation to all potential enemies to join the fray.  
This was the case for Iran after its revolution in 1979, when its hostility to the Western 
world helped provoke an Iraqi invasion.  It is a factor that lowered the cost of invading 
Israel for various Arab states because they knew Israel faced a multi-front war. 
4. The unreliability part of alignment theory was premised on the assumption that 
states undergoing institutional changes will be less loyal to their former alignment 
partners.  A series of cross-tabs showed that to generally be the case.  Democratizing 
states – operationalized as states whose executive recruitment became more free in the 
previous five years – were at least twice as likely to turn on their alignment partners as 
were states that were not undergoing this process.  From the subset of observations 
involving multiple alignments within a short period time, the largest difference was for 
non-dangerous MIDs.  Whereas over half of the democratizing states turned on their 
alignment partners, the same was true for only a sixth of non-democratizing states. 
5. One of the key elements of this dissertation was the introduction of an alignment 
measure, which uses cost and discernibility as its two axes.  Some of the previous 
findings already incorporated the cost dimension, showing that the role of history is not 
limited to high-cost alignments and that states need fewer resources to participate in low-
cost alignments.  This was the case in the first stage of alignment models, which showed 
that both military and economic resources were necessary for war alignments, but only 
one of the two was required for less costly forms of the same phenomenon.  The 
discernibility dimension, which indicates the clarity with which a state was aligning with 
a specific state or against a specific state, offers a more mixed set of results.  Fourteen out 
of sixteen correlations were supportive of the hypothesis that states that provided 
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indiscernible alignment will in turn receive indiscernible alignment.  The ambiguous 
results came from testing the determinants of discernible alignment.   
Part of the problem with these tests is the lack of good proxies for the potential 
usefulness of an alignment partner and the potential damage that could be inflicted by the 
same partner.  The first is operationalized in terms of alliance ties and the second in terms 
of relative military capabilities and the existence of a civil war.  The variables have the 
expected effect in most, but far from all models.  Encouragingly, they are statistically 
significant in the war models.  This means that an intervener that needs another state’s 
future assistance will be quick to join that state in the latter’s wars, with the discernibility 
being denoted as the order of a state’s intervention into a dispute.  Interveners who feel 
compelled to align in a war against a state that they have good reason to fear will make 
their alignment as indiscernible as possible, hoping to avoid retaliation.   
The discernibility findings start becoming inconsistent when the cost of alignment 
falls.  The presence of a military alliance does not lead to more discernible alignments in 
the dangerous MID and sanctions models.  Likewise, military capabilities that favor the 
other side do not lead a less discernible negative alignment in the two MID models, at 
least if standard levels of significance are used for hypothesis testing.  These mixed 
results are not entirely surprising: the concept of discernibility is a new one.  What the 
concept means and what it entails for interstate behavior will have to be refined.   
6. The reciprocal alignment theory proposed here is not the only one that attempts to 
explain alignment decisions.  Two of the dominant competing explanations are the 
capability and homophily research programs.  From the capability program, I test two 
hypotheses whose expectations are diametrically opposed to those obtained from the 
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reciprocal alignment theory: that states, at least those of the major power variety, align 
with the weaker state in a dispute and that states change their alignment partners when it 
is in their immediate interest to do so.  The balancing hypothesis is premised on the belief 
that the foreign policies of powerful states are geared at preventing one of their own from 
becoming a hegemon, thereby dominating the entire international system.   
Model 9 in Chapter 5 provided a test for the balancing hypothesis.  In that model, 
the dependent variable was war joining, and the population of cases was restricted to 
those where neither disputant was more than three times stronger than the other and 
where the intervener was a major power.  If balancing does not work in this context, it 
likely does not work in any context.  The results were mixed for balancing and supportive 
of the reciprocation rationale.  The balancing and past alignment variables were both 
statistically significant, but the substantive effect of the former paled in comparison to the 
latter.  The weaker disputant obtained alignment roughly three-fifths of the time, which is 
far from the realist claims that balancing is a law of politics.  On the other hand, the state 
on the favorable side of the 95th percentile of the past alignment variable received 
positive alignment nearly nine times out of ten.   
Removing the lack of power preponderance and major power intervener criteria 
or using a less costly form of alignment as the dependent variable produced even more 
lopsided results.   In the war model without this criteria, states were more likely to 
support the stronger state, though that effect was not statistically significant.  When the 
dependent variable was joining either type of MID, the balancing variable once again did 
not have the effect predicted by the balancing hypothesis.  The no permanent friends 
hypothesis did not fare any better.  When given the chance to change their alignment 
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partner in successive disputes, rulers took that opportunity less than 10 percent of the 
time; it did not matter whether the alignment was for a war, a dangerous MID, or a non-
dangerous MID.   That outcome is not consistent with the expectations of realist theory. 
7. The other explanation tested against reciprocal alignment came from the 
homophily research program.  Democratic peace theory, which is part of that program, 
argues that democracies should be much less likely to face off against other democracies 
in military disputes than are autocracies.  It is unclear whether autocracies should favor 
other autocracies or be indifferent over regime type.  A critical test between this 
hypothesis and one derived from alignment theory is whether or not autocracies prefer 
aligning with democracies or other autocracies.  Reciprocal alignment theory argues that 
democracies, operationalized as regimes where the executive is elected, are inherently 
more reliable alignment partners and are thus more likely to obtain positive alignments 
from all states.  Democratic peace theory expects a negative or no relationship. 
The results overwhelmingly support reciprocal alignment theory.  When the 
dependent variable is alignment into a war, autocracies are significantly more likely to 
support democracies than they are to support fellow autocracies.  The result holds 
whether autocracy is defined in terms of executive recruitment or the overall Polity score.  
In Chapter 6, I find that autocracies are more likely to support democracies than they are 
to support autocracies whether they are intervening in a war, a dangerous MID, or a non-
dangerous MID.  Alignment results are thus consistent with the democratic peace 
explanation only when the intervener is itself a democracy.   
Even when alignment outcomes match those expected by the democratic peace 
theory, it is not at all certain if the latter is responsible for the former.  In the Chapter 7 
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case study of the former Soviet Union, the autocratic Uzbek regime aligned against the 
semi-democratic Russian regime on one notable occasion, and various autocratic Kyrgyz 
regimes have been unwilling to align against autocratic Russia.  A closer examination of 
the alignments, however, showed that regime similarities at no point played a role in 
alignment decisions.  The case study results suggest that balancing was also not the main 
reason for alignment decisions, even when balancing predicted the correct response. 
8.3 Iraq and Iran Alignments 
Reciprocal alignment theory provides several insights as to the workings of the 
alignments in the Iraqi and Iranian cases mentioned in the first chapter.  First, the states 
providing the most troops to help the US during the Iraq War – the only US supporters to 
meet the Correlates of War 1,000 soldier cut-off for being war participants – were the 
United Kingdom and Australia.  The UK was no friend of Iraq’s political leadership, and 
probably would have supported anyone who invaded the country.  Nevertheless, the scale 
of Britain’s contribution would likely be far smaller if it was not aligning with a country 
that had helped it numerous times since the Suez debacle.  Australia, unlike Britain, was 
more concerned with the future than the past.  A settler colony in Asia, Australia has 
always worried about a military confrontation with a major Asian land power.  As a 
consequence, Australia has sent troops to faraway corners of the earth to aid Britain and 
later the US, hoping that they will ultimately return the favor. 
Second, leaders must believe their states are capable of playing a substantive role in 
a stake’s resolution and believe that they will have sufficient domestic support to engage 
in such actions.  Looking at the Iranian sanctions, it is clear that both conditions are met 
for the countries involved.  Nearly all of the European states supporting the sanctions are 
207 
 
part of NATO, providing their leaders cover for taking part in the dispute.  The states on 
the other side of the stake, including China, India, Russia, and Turkey, either have strong 
cooperative ties with Iran or have found themselves on the opposite side from the US on 
too many issues.  States in Africa and South America, most of whom do not have deep 
positive or negative ties with either disputant, have opted to stay out of the fray. 
  Proximity and power projection played no less of a role in the Iraq and Iran 
alignments.  The UK and Australia have some of the best power projection capabilities in 
the world, which is why they were able to send thousands of troops to Iraq.  Japan took 
part in the anti-Iranian sanctions because of Japan’s large economy and considerable 
reliance on imported oil.  States more proximate to Iran are generally major oil producers, 
and thus not in a position to influence Iran by refusing to buy its oil.  Some militarily 
weak countries did join the US in the war against Iraq, but their contributions were 
symbolic or intended to lend the US extra legitimacy, not extra manpower. 
 Third, the choice of alignment partners is predicated on the dyadic history of the 
intervener and each of the disputants.  Saddam Hussein’s Iraq did not make many friends 
after its invasion of Iran, occupation of Kuwait, constant threats against Saudi Arabia, use 
of chemical weapons against the Kurds, pursuit of a clandestine nuclear program, refusal 
to allow UN inspectors to do their job, refusal to accept the UN-mandated no-fly zone, 
and support for Palestinian terrorism.  Being on the wrong side of some of the most 
salient Middle Eastern issues was extremely damaging for Iraq’s ability to obtain positive 
alignment.  Even states that were not friendly with the US had sufficiently poor relations 
with Iraq to implicitly or explicitly support the US invasion of the country.   
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 The reliability of Iran and Iraq as alignment partners were in considerable doubt.  
Both states gave overwhelming power to their leaders: Hussein in Iraq and Khamenei in 
Iran.  Along with the power of these countries’ rulers came a lack of institutional 
structure for foreign policy continuity.  Moreover, Iran faced a significant protest 
movement in 2009 and Iraq’s Hussein did not control Iraq’s Kurdish territories and ruled 
the rest of his country through fear.  In each case, a change in leadership had a high 
probability of leading to a change in foreign policy. Anyone sacrificing their resources on 
behalf of either regime thereby risked obtaining nothing in return.  In that light, the 
overwhelming support for the US is understandable, even from regimes that might 
oppose potential US hegemony or be sympathetic to authoritarian rule. 
8.4 Policy Implications 
Additional studies would need to be carried before definitive policy 
recommendations could be made on the basis of reciprocal alignment theory.  
Nevertheless, certain tentative recommendations could be made on the basis of the 
current findings.  One recommendation is relevant for US-NATO relations.  On the basis 
of the first stage of alignment theory, the US is fully justified in pressuring European 
states to increase their military effectiveness.  The rationale is two-fold.  First, increasing 
the number of countries with larger militaries that will never align against the US military 
is obviously in America’s interest.  That is probably why the US undertakes this policy.  
There is a second reason for this policy, however.  As the military capabilities of 
America’s allies dwindle, not only will their military contributions to NATO efforts 
decrease, but they will refuse to take part in military alignments at all.  This would, in 
turn, force the US to act unilaterally, undermining the legitimacy of its actions.  
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Another policy implication has to do with Sino-American relations.  It has 
recently become popular to talk about an impending military conflict between the US and 
China.  The rhetoric is only slightly amended from the previous version, which talked of 
conflict between the US and Japan.  The China argument has greater merit.  Japan 
cooperated with the US on numerous economic and military issues prior to Japan’s rapid 
economic growth.  Though there was some domestic support for reducing military 
cooperation with the US, Japanese leaders would find virtually no support for a costly 
alignment against the US.  In contrast, US-Chinese relations have been mixed.   High 
trade volumes have been coupled with arguments about Chinese dumping of goods on the 
American market and Chinese currency manipulation.  The Korean issue has seen 
agreements and disagreements between the two states, depending on the specific stake. 
The question is how the US should react to China’s increasingly aggressive policy 
toward its territorial disputes with its neighbors if the United States does not want to end 
up on the negative side of Chinese alignments for the foreseeable future.  There are a few 
options, some more viable than others.  One response is to listen to Chinese officials and 
stay out of these disputes or at least make the intervention indiscernible.  In this manner, 
a difference in preferences will not generate anti-American hostility within China and 
would not pressure China into retaliating in order to save face internationally.  Another 
solution would be for the US to attempt to decrease the salience of these territorial issues 
in favor of economic issues or those relating to North Korea.  If China gains new foreign 
policy priorities, it will be less concerned with being opposed on less salient issues.   
The clearest policy recommendations are based on the reliability findings.  A state 
like Russia should strongly reconsider its support for the unstable and unrepresentative 
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Syrian regime.  Not only does Russia risk being punished by Syria for its current policies 
if the latter ever gets a regime change, but it might end up with the same consequences 
even if Assad remains the power.  The reason is that a foreign policy change would be 
one of the few foreign policy concessions that Assad would be willing to make to the 
Syrian rebels in exchange for an end to their rebellion.  The United States face an 
opposite set of incentives.  Its relations with the current Syrian leadership are based on 
such intense hostility that there is little prospect of those relations ever being mended.  
On the other hand, a new Syrian regime, whether it owes its creation to the US or not, 
will be one that starts with a relatively blank slate in its foreign relations.  That would 
provide an opportunity for the US to develop cooperative relations with the new Syria.   
8.5 Future Research 
This dissertation points to several paths for future research.  One direction would 
be to reduce the distance between the theoretical claims and how they are tested.   Using 
leader-related variables instead of just state-related ones would be one step in that 
direction.  This could be coupled with domestic-level variables that gauge the level of 
constraints faced by that leader in making foreign policy.  The obstacle would be to 
match the specific timing of a leader’s tenure with disputes that took place during their 
tenure.  There is a large potential for error for disputes whose start date is not clear and 
for countries where the leadership situation is uncertain.  The resulting data might be 
systematically biased due to the accuracy of Western data compared to non-Western data. 
Furthermore, some of the variables used in this dissertation are indirect indicators 
of the concepts they are meant to measure.  Some concepts, like issue salience, could not 
be operationalized at all.  There is a great potential for improving confidence in the 
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empirical results by resolving these problems.  Based on the issue paradigm, there is 
every reason to think that the effect of the main variables is conditional on the issue 
salience of the particular stake.  A failure to find an adequate proxy for this variable 
likely created artificial noise and made the findings weaker than they otherwise would be. 
Another productive path for future research would be to create theoretical and 
empirical extensions for the reciprocal alignment theory.  There are many implications of 
the theory that could not be tested here due to space constraints.  For instance, if the 
perception of reliability affects the ability of leaders to obtain alignment, are rulers who 
know they will need future assistance willing to implement significant political reforms?  
Could leaders cheat the system by forming cooperative ties with states shortly before they 
get embroiled in a dispute or is a lengthy period of cooperation necessary before the 
rulers of other states can justify joining someone else’s conflicts?  Does the willingness 
of a ruler to reciprocate past alignments decrease if his expected tenure in office is brief? 
There is room for improving the alignment measure.  It might be possible to create 
a continuous measure for both the cost and discernibility dimensions of that measure by 
creating theoretically justified and replicable criteria.  That would allow one to test the 
alignment hypotheses in one composite dataset.  The discernibility dimension has a great 
deal of potential.  We know that Israel sabotages Iranian nuclear reactors, China allows 
hackers to attack American military contractors and businesses, and Russia provides all 
kinds of military equipment to the Syrian regime.  Yet by not verifying that they are 
responsible, the states are able to leverage the plausible deniability into avoiding severe 
retaliation.  The causal mechanism for this phenomenon needs to be better examined.    
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Lastly, alignment is defined in terms of cooperation and conflict.  This dissertation 
emphasized the conflict dimension, but the cooperation one is no less important.  An 
important task would be to systematically examine cooperative acts of alignment.  For 
reciprocal alignment theory to hold, the factors that make positive alignment more likely 
must be similar to the ones that make negative alignment less likely.  The difficulty is 
establishing what the alternatives to specific acts of cooperation were given that 
alignment requires a dispute over how a stake should be resolved.  It is not clear what that 
dispute is when two countries sign a trade agreement.  A theoretically and empirically 
convincing answer to this question would improve confidence in alignment theory. 
* * * 
 Theory about the correlates of alignment has fallen out of favor along with the 
realist framework that first gave rise to it.  Much of the research that deals with alignment 
does so in a fragmented manner, addressing one form of alignment in isolation from other 
pertinent research.  This dissertation is intended to demonstrate the utility of shifting in 
the opposite direction, seeking to combine the many insights from the existing literature 
into a coherent, empirically-supported story.  That story starts with the importance of 
reciprocation in international affairs, highlighting the frequent dependence rulers face on 
their foreign counterparts in obtaining important objectives.  It then moves on to the 
consequences of perceived unreliability of potential alignment partners, based as much on 
the actions of those countries’ leaders as on the institutional characteristics of their states.  
It concludes by pointing out what is similar among all alignments, while simultaneously 
using an alignment measure to underline areas where they differ.  Yet, it is only the first 
part of the story, and much more is yet to be written on the determinants of alignment.  
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Appendix A – No Permanent Friends 
 Below is a list of major powers that took part in a multi-party war on the same 
side as at least one other country.  The note part of the table mentions whether that major 
power ended up turning on that other country in another war within a 20-year period.  
The purpose of this table is to show that no major power fought on the side of one 
country in one war, and against that country in a future war while siding with a former 
enemy.  The table provides evidence against the realist contention that states have no 
qualms with betraying their allies or backing their former enemies if it is in their interest. 
Table A.1.  List of Major Powers with Opportunity to Change Sides in Proximate Wars  
Major Power War 
Year 
Alignment Partners Note 
Austria 1848 Sardinia, Tuscany, Modena Aligned against Sardinia in 
1859, but not on side of former 
enemy 
France 1849 Austria, Two Sicilies Aligned against Austria in 1859, 
but not on side of former enemy 
Austria 1849 France, Two Sicilies  
France 1854 United Kingdom  
United Kingdom 1854 France, Two Sicilies  
France 1859 Sardinia  
Germany 1864 Austria Aligned against Austria in 1866, 
but not on side of former enemy 
Austria 1864 Germany Aligned against Germany in 
1866, but not on side of former 
enemy 
Germany 1866 Italy, Mecklenburg  
Italy 1866 Germany, Mecklenburg  
Austria 1866 Most German minors  
Germany 1870 Baden, Bavaria, Wurttemberg  
Russia 1900 Japan, US, UK, France All fought on same side in WWI 
Japan 1900 Russia, US, UK, France All fought on same side in WWI 
United States 1900 Russia, Japan, UK, France All fought on same side in WWI 
United Kingdom 1900 Russia, Japan, US, France All fought on same side in WWI 
France 1900 Japan, US, UK, France All fought on same side in WWI 
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Russia 1914 Yugoslavia, UK, Japan, Portugal, 
Belgium, Greece, Romania, 
France, Italy, US 
No major power wars for more 
than 20 years after World War I 
United Kingdom 1914 Yugoslavia, Russia, Japan, 
Portugal, Belgium, Greece, 
Romania, France, Italy, US 
 
Japan 1914 Yugoslavia, UK, Russia, Portugal, 
Belgium, Greece, Romania, 
France, Italy, US 
 
Germany 1914 Austria, Turkey, Bulgaria  
Austria 1914 Germany, Turkey, Bulgaria  
France 1914 Yugoslavia, UK, Japan, Portugal, 
Belgium, Greece, Romania, Russia, 
Italy, US 
 
Italy 1915 Yugoslavia, UK, Japan, Portugal, 
Belgium, Greece, Romania, 
France, Russia, US 
 
United States 1917 Yugoslavia, UK, Japan, Portugal, 
Belgium, Greece, Romania, 
France, Italy, Russia 
 
Russia 1918 Germany  
USSR 1939 Mongolia  
Italy 1939 Germany, Japan, Hungary, Finland, 
Romania, Bulgaria 
 
Germany 1939 Italy, Japan, Hungary, Finland, 
Romania, Bulgaria 
 
Japan 1941 Germany, Italy, Hungary, Finland, 
Romania, Bulgaria 
 
United Kingdom 1939 France, USSR, US, Belgium, 
Yugoslavia, Norway, Canada, 
Netherlands, Greece, Brazil, 
Australia, New Zealand, Poland, 
Mongolia, China, South Africa, 
Ethiopia 
Party to the Korean War before 
Chinese intervention 
France 1939 UK, USSR, US, Belgium, 
Yugoslavia, Norway, Canada, 
Netherlands, Greece, Brazil, 
Australia, New Zealand, Poland, 
Mongolia, China, South Africa, 
Ethiopia 
Aligned against China in 1951, 
but not on side of former enemy.  
China is also not a major power 
in World War II 
USSR 1941 France, UK, US, Yugoslavia, 
Canada, Brazil, Australia, New 
Zealand, Mongolia, China, South 
Africa 
 
United States 1941 France, UK, USSR, Yugoslavia, 
Canada, Brazil, Australia, New 
Zealand, Mongolia, China, South 
Africa 
Party to the Korean War before 
Chinese intervention 
China 1950 North Korea  
231 
 
United States 1950 UK, France, Belgium, Canada, 
Colombia, Netherlands, Greece, 
Turkey, Philippines, Thailand, 
Ethiopia, Australia, South Korea 
 
Unite Kingdom 1950 US, France, Belgium, Canada, 
Colombia, Netherlands, Greece, 
Turkey, Philippines, Thailand, 
Ethiopia, Australia, South Korea 
 
France 1951 UK, US, Belgium, Canada, 
Colombia, Netherlands, Greece, 
Turkey, Philippines, Thailand, 
Ethiopia, Australia, South Korea 
 
United Kingdom 1956 France, Israel  
France 1956 UK, Israel  
France 1958 Spain  
United States 1965 Cambodia, South Korea, 
Philippines, South Vietnam, 
Thailand, Australia, Laos 
 
United States 1991 UK, France, Kuwait, Canada, Italy, 
Morocco, Egypt, Oman, UAE, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria 
 
United Kingdom 1991 US, France, Kuwait, Canada, Italy, 
Morocco, Egypt, Oman, UAE, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria 
 
France 1991 UK, US, Kuwait, Canada, Italy, 
Morocco, Egypt, Oman, UAE, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria 
 
United States 1999 UK, France, Germany, Turkey, 
Italy, Netherlands 
 
United Kingdom 1999 US, France, Germany, Turkey, 
Italy, Netherlands 
 
France 1999 UK, US, Germany, Turkey, Italy, 
Netherlands 
 
Germany 1999 UK, France, US, Turkey, Italy, 
Netherlands 
 
United States 2001 UK, France, Canada, Australia  
United Kingdom 2001 US, France, Canada, Australia  
France 2001 US, UK, Canada, Australia  
United States 2003 UK, Australia  
United Kingdom 2003 US, Australia  
 
